

# FOREIGN POLICY: ENGLAND AND THE EASTERN QUESTION.

BY THE

RIGHT HON. LORD ROBERT MONTAGU, M.P.  
~~and~~

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"The policy of Europe, since the Treaty of Utrecht, has been nothing but rival aims at Universal Monarchy."—CARDINAL ALBERONI.

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# FOREIGN POLICY:

## ENGLAND AND THE EASTERN QUESTION.

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### PRELIMINARY CHAPTER.

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EUROPEAN STATES may be regarded as so many great landowners, whose mental characters are severally those peculiar to the nations of Europe, and who acknowledge no superior to restrain their caprices, nor any tribunal to judge their crimes. They have, indeed, customs ; but they do not consider themselves under external laws. They make rules for their guidance ; but whenever they deem it expedient, they elude those rules and customs by dexterity, or violate them by force.

Yet nations have the same duties as the men of which nations are composed. The same moral law,—call it Natural law, or Divine law, but unchangeable, eternal,—is over nations as well as men, declaring their rights and forbidding wrong.

All bodies politic may be regarded as individual men ; and, as men are, so are they more often led by passion than guided by reason. From axioms true and maxims wise, they sometimes draw conclusions which are wild, and even grotesque. More often they wilfully invent, or carelessly accept principles which are false, in order to defend acts which are evil. As a great landowner, each state may be considered ; and he who can mentally

invest himself with the character, and put himself in the place of any State, may with safety predict its movements, and understand its aims. This maxim was a household word of foreign policy to the late Czar. In 1853, for example, he said to Sir Hamilton Seymour : "Tenez ; nous avons sur le bras un homme malade ; ce sera, je vous le dis franchement, un grand malheur si, un de ces jours, il devait nous échapper."

Changes in the circumstances of each nation (as also of every man) ever and anon occur during its life. Yet the social forces of each nation remain, for generations, the same ; and its character is for centuries unchanged, and may safely be studied in history. The antecedents of nations have to be learned, just as the antecedents of men must be studied, in order that we may arrive at a true knowledge of their characters.

Nations are as men. They are "moral persons." This truth seems obvious, and even trite, when we remember that each nation is a unity, whose elements are men ; and that the affairs of each nation are conducted by men ;—or, let us say that each nation is led, not by a cabinet or selected few, but by the one man who, by his adroit management of men, has risen to the top, and sways the Cabinet that supports him, and the Sovereign whom he should serve. The physical forces of men may be combined. Their intellectual faculties cannot be combined. The mental power of a number of minds is not equal to the sum of all their powers. It is not more than the power of the strongest mind amongst them. In physical and in administrative operations,—in the work of clerks and of carpenters, three times three make nine. In an intellectual operation there can be no multiplication. International games of chess have been played, between committees

in the two capitals. Every one knew that Germany would beat England, because Löwenstein was acknowledged as superior to Staunton. All men foretold that, when Ireland should play France, Macdonald, of Belfast, would win the score against La Bourdonnais. That is, every one knew that there was a player in one committee who could foretell more moves of the adversary, than any one of the adverse committee could predict of his moves.

So it is with States. A dozen men sit round a green baize table in each metropolis, and fondly imagine that they rule their nation's destinies. Yet it is the most knowing and most astute in each cabinet who contrives the schemes, and guides all the intrigues, and shapes the nation's acts. The rest of the Cabinet are his tools. Even in those countries where there is a "Government," and an "Opposition,"—that is, where the Government is a constitutional monarchy, and not an absolute despotism,—even there, one man rules the Government, while another of the same kidney guides the ex-cabinet, and the Parliament is led captive between them, while the head of the Government points out the direction. So it is that the nation is as one man. Further than this we may often go, and say that the astutest statesman in Europe,—that is, the man in all Europe who can predict the greatest number of moves, and best handle the passions of men,—can and does shape the actions of all the States of which Europe is composed.

Let us, however, at present confine our attention to a single state. It is obvious that the policy of a country is stable and unchanging as to its main principles,—which are the great and abiding interests of the nation,—while it varies in complexion and detail, according to the character of the man who leads the nation. More-

over, the true interests of the nation dictate the fixed policy to the Ruler; while the changing passions and enduring antipathies of the people are obstacles which hinder that policy from being steadily carried out. The passion roars loud, like the storm; while interest blows steadily and softly, like a summer wind. The ship of state has her course marked out on a great circle; but fierce gales arise and drive her from that course, and adverse winds compel her to tack and laveer to windward. The integrity and independence of Turkey has been the great circle for this country. The "atrocious agitation" made Lord Derby write that the universal feeling of indignation thus aroused "made it practically impossible to interfere in the defence of the Ottoman Empire," which would be "in direct opposition to the Treaty engagements" of the country, and a "most humiliating position" for her to be in.\* The antipathies between Turks and Russians; between Prussians and Austrians; between Magyars and Slavs; between Danes and Swedes, are trade winds which blow steadily against the ship's appointed course. Indignation at successful wrong-doing, wounded vanity or offended pride, retching greed, and, above all, fear, are passions which often arise to thwart the statesman's calculations, and the best interests of nations.

While fear in the hearts of the people can affect the policy of the Prime Minister; so the Minister's prevision of the future disposition of the people, and his fear as to its effects, may suffice to thwart the aims of his calmer moments and cause him to swerve beforehand from his appointed course. In some cases (as in the one above cited) the change of policy by the Minister occurs after the outburst of passion on the part of the people. Such

\* Vol. i. of 1877. No. 159.

cases, however, are rare. They do not occur without the knowledge, or prescience, or complicity of an ex-Premier. For, as long as negotiations are secret, the Ministry cannot be directly affected by public opinion. Moreover, the statesman who rises to the command of Parliament and confidence of his Sovereign, is always one who knows how to address men's passions and to use them for his ends. Such a one has a fearful power, which he is never slow to use. He possesses a talisman to shield him from fear of the mob. Whenever he cannot make a confusion, and then lead the people's ignorance to his own end ; at least he can light a prairie fire, in his last extremity, and escape amid the smoke and glare.

## FOREIGN POLICY:

### CHAPTER II

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IT was Count Sécur's axiom, that the two aims of every state must be security and consideration or general credit.

(1.) The security of a great state depends upon its internal administration. Its internal tranquillity and stability consist in the maintenance of justice between the citizens, of authority in the Government (that is, respect in the governed); and of Public Economy and private thrift. A free and contented people, *per se*, is both firm and secure.

(2.) The consideration or credit in which a state is held by other powers—the general opinion concerning it, or, in other words, its influence, rank, or “rate,”—can have but one of two bases: either the fearless and inflexible justice of its foreign policy; or else the fear which, from various causes, it constantly inspires. By the latter basis, I mean the dexterity of the intrigues which it has carried on; the continued success of its frauds and deceptions; the advantages it has reaped from the divisions it has engendered; the number and influence of the allies upon which it can surely count; the glory of its arms, and the succession of brilliant conquests it has achieved;—these constitute the basis of policy which looks to fear to promote its ends. This is the policy of rulers who put their trust in force, and not in justice; and who place their fortunes in the hands of chance or craft, and not in those of Providence; who engrave treaties with the point of

economy in its administration, and discipline in all its services,—such a state becomes the support of the feeble, the defender of the oppressed, a check on the ambitious and grasping, the judge and arbiter of the world.

For every weak state, the maintenance of peace is essential to life. Weak states fear every storm, and tremble at every gust of agitation. Their lives consist of feverish efforts for the preservation of a fragile existence. As soon, therefore, as a great nation has established a character for justice, weaker states will appeal to it against any state which intrigues in their affairs, or dominates over them. They yield willingly, to a just people, an influence in their councils, and a control over their acts, in return for alliance and protection. They soon become united with such a great state—if not in name, at least in a real federation. Without any geographical changes of frontiers, a true Empire is thus lastingly formed. For all Empire depends on men's minds, and not on the accidents of matter. It is the character for justice which secures the sympathies of the weak; while rapacity and harshness alienate even the populations in your midst.

Colonial policy is foreign policy. In colonial policy the same rule is true. If your Colonies find that their connection with you is a gain to them and an improvement in their condition, their strong desire to abide in union with you will add to your strength. But if you sweep away their time-honoured institutions, and offend their prejudices, they will long to separate from you, and ally themselves with some power who is more just. Justice is *the strength of states.*

This was the wise policy which made the Roman Empire, as it also formed the Assyrian Empire and the Greek. When the Romans conquered a country, they did not treat it as a vanquished enemy; but extended

## ENGLAND AND THE EASTERN QUESTION.

to it their protection, as to a friendly equal or an ally Rome was careful not to interfere with local management and ancient liberties. The conquered people were not made to pass under a yoke, and were contented, because they experienced no interference in their own concerns. The Roman Empire was strong while it was a federation “Ainsi Rome n’était pas proprement une monarchie ou une république, mais la tête du corps formé par tous les peuples du monde. Si les Espagnols, après la conquête du Mexique, et du Pérou, avaient suivi ce plan, il n’auraient pas été obligés de tout détruire pour tout conserver. C’est la folie des conquérants de vouloir donner à tous les peuples leurs lois et leurs coutumes. Cela n’est bon à rien ; car dans toute sorte de gouvernement on est capable d’obéir.”\* The true policy of greatness is justice, which never interferes with ancient liberties and local institutions.

So also, per contra, the best way to convulse, is to “unite.” One race or religion preponderates here, and another there. They each have their own constitutions, customs, and rites ; their own prejudices ; their own jealousies and antipathies. Harmoniously may all live under one sceptre, while these differences are accepted and respected. Bring about a “union,” by force or by fraud, and instantly the various parts collide, and clash and jar. Your union results in discontent and loss of power ; and then in civil war and dismemberment. In Switzerland a strong love of liberty has induced the people of each Canton to govern themselves, and to resist every attempt to persuade them to allow their affairs to be managed for them. Switzerland for many generations has been a Federation of independent States. The unity of self-governing states was the only unity that

\* Montesquieu, “Grandeur et Décadence des Romains,” p. 51.

was possible in Switzerland. A national unity is impossible ; for Switzerland is German, French, and Italian. Nay, it is quadripartite ; for the German consists of two parts, Austrian or Tyrolese, and North German. An attempt was lately made to "unite" Switzerland, by taking from the Cantons their *equal* voices in federal affairs, and giving to each Canton a number of votes in proportion to its population. The real aim was that the German Protestant, or Prussian Cantons should be able to outvote and control the others. In 1866 this new-fangled Constitution was negatived. The Swiss still understood and loved their liberty. They knew that it was a plan most sure to break up Switzerland into three or four parts. Switzerland valued her Liberty and her Federation, wherein lay her strength. Every man understood, and so devoted himself to the affairs of his locality. But this local strength and central weakness, this love of liberty stood in the way of the political intrigues of neighbouring states. The flame of a contradictory feeling had to be lit. A desire to oppress had to be engendered. The love of religious persecution, the desire to make every one as ourselves, had to be kindled. So the Catholic Cantons, tired of resistance to an overbearing majority, and weakened by the persecution they suffered, at last gave way. By agitation, carefully sown, in favour of religious persecution, the scheme which had failed in 1866, has now succeeded, and the liberty of Switzerland has fled. Bishop Mermillod was fighting the battle of Europe ; and Europe allowed him to fail. The gates of the great natural fortress will soon be in the hands of the enemy. The German Cantons are ready to fall under the arms of Prussia.

Justice is the strength of states, and the guardian of their liberties. Homage to this truth is ever being

rendered by Russia. "Hypocrisy is the homage which vice renders to virtue." While Russia plots, and perpetrates injustice, she pretends to be acting on the basis of justice, in order to draw the small states she deceives, towards her as their protector; she confuses rulers by proclaiming herself as "the great conservative power," even while she is secretly exciting revolutions in their territories.

Every great Power, which is at once just and fearless,—good and ready for war,—is a real protector and safe refuge for every little Power. That great Power is then rewarded by an increase of greatness, consisting in the support and affection of its numerous allies. But wherever a great Power is timid, indolent, selfishly isolated, it alienates all weaker states, and lessens its own federative power, at the very time that the grasping injustice of any other great Power inspires a fear on all sides, which adds to its own general consideration or rank. That was the *rôle* of Pitt. At the commencement of his glorious era we acted the part of the good Samaritan, and helped the weaker states, who had fallen among thieves. Passion soon—a hatred of the names of Napoleon and of France—blinded us, and made us, in 1812, desert the grand *rôle* with which we commenced to stem the tide of the Revolution. Talleyrand tried to shew us the folly of the rivalry, and the paramount necessity of combining to curb Russia. We fought against Napoleon, instead of aiding him in his attempt to reconstitute poor plundered and bleeding Poland, to drive Russia back from the Black Sea, and almost to make her an Asiatic power.

Examples in modern history, of states taking their stand upon the basis of justice, are, to our shame be it said, most deplorably scarce; while numerous are the

examples of states who built up a general opinion in their favour, on the basis of fear. I will mention one, because of its similarity to the scenes which are being enacted before our eyes. The Czars of Russia had already substituted themselves for the Patriarchs of the Eastern schism. They were the absolute, if not infallible heads of the Russo-Greek Church ; and required (as shown by the Catechism) an adoration which is due to God alone. There is then no wonder that the Czar should be the natural enemy of the Pope ; and, as Poland was a Slav and Catholic nation, which also shut out Russia from contact with the states of Europe, it became an object of Russia's fear and hatred. At the close of the seven years' war,\* the other great powers of Europe were worn out by war. The Poles and Turks were close allies, being bound together by the same fears and the same interests. The Czarina managed that a suggestion should be whispered to the Porte, that a "roi Piast" ought to be elected to sit on the Polish throne. The Turks regarded such a suggestion as an eminently Polish idea, and one that would contribute to the liberty of Poland. They knew not that it came from the Czarina, and that she was plotting against the liberties of Poland, by getting her paramour placed upon the throne. Too late, they discovered their mistake, and declared against Stanislaus ; for he was at once elected at the points of Russian bayonets. Then all the measures, which had been already established for the amelioration of the Polish State, were swept away under the various pretexts, fallacious and false ; and the Republic of Poland was plunged into chaos, anarchy, and "confusion worse confounded." That was Russia's first step, during which her cloven foot was not seen. Then stepping into the

\* A.D. 1763, when Augustus III., King of Poland, died.

dirt, she lifts her skirt, and lo ! a glimpse of her cloven foot is seen. She occupied Poland, "in the cause of order," and "for the rectification of frontiers." A few members of the Greek Church, who were called "dissidents" from the catholic faith of Poland, were induced to raise an outcry about some imaginary rights. The sanctimonious, or sham religious zeal of Russia was at once kindled. The Czarina posed as their "protector," promising redress of all their grievances, and uniting in a Confederation, centered in Lithuania, all who professed the Greek religion. A Protestant Confederation, under the lead of Prussia, was formed at Thorn ; and then the Catholics united themselves in the famous Confederation of Barr. Thus there was a pro-Russian party, and a German party made in Poland. In 1767 the Turks demanded a withdrawal of the Russian troops from the Polish soil (not, as now, a "demobilisation" on Russian soil). This was promised by Russia with alacrity. But Russia never for a moment contemplated a fulfilment of her promise ; and the Russian successes in fraud gave her such consideration that the Turks feared to enforce a fulfilment of the promise. In 1771 all was ready. The Czarina, through the Prussian Prince Henri, proposed to Frederick a partition of Poland. Prussia was as anxious for Pomerania, as Russia was for her share ; and they both worked together to achieve the robbery. Kaunitz, on the part of the young Emperor of Austria,—himself an admirer of his brother sovereign Frederick, whom he had fought and learned to fear,—made counter-proposals, and did all he could to save the Polish State. Austria wished France to join her in opposing the scheme ; but Louis XV. cared for his pleasures. Yet it was clearly the interest of both to maintain both Poland and Turkey, as a rampart to keep Russia from supporting

Prussia. France refused. This was a blunder; for she was henceforth regarded, not as the supporter of justice and the refuge of the weak; but as an instrument of Russia and Prussia; and every instrument counts for nothing, except in the hands of him who uses it. The weak states then ranged themselves under the banner of Russia, or under that of Prussia.

Frederick the Great, and Catharine, at once put their troops in motion, as the best answer they could give to Austria. Austria feared to carry on a war alone against Russia and Prussia, and consented to take the shilling. If Austria, instead of haggling in St. Petersburg and Berlin, had offered her mediation, and armed to give weight to her offer and to support her award, she would have been sustained by Turkey and the Polish forces,—perhaps even by France,—and could have kept in check Russia and Prussia, who were in this position: by Poland, a hostile country, they were divided from each other. But the two Emperors and the King (like the three Emperors now), met and devised a perfidious robbery and outrage.

De Broglie, in his Memoir of 1775, wrote: “The fruits of this annexation will be that Russia will obtain the whole commerce of the Black Sea; also the Crimea, Wallachia, and Moldavia. The leaven of rebellion will also be spread among the Greek populations of Austria and Turkey. Moreover, Russia will acquire all the Cossack tribes for her cavalry; and so she will menace Turkey, Austria, and even Prussia. Of course, Russia will soon possess herself of Prussian Poland, the mouths of the Vistula, and the commerce of Poland.”

Austria has since discovered her error. Austrian policy has constantly been in favour of a reconstitution of Poland, even at the Congress of Vienna, when

Russia was her ally. During the Polish insurrection in 1863, she and France and England were about to compel Russia to carry out the engagements made at the Congress of Vienna, and recognize the autonomy of Poland. Prussia at once stepped forward, and thwarted their efforts :—fear, again, being the basis of their policy.

To return to 1771. Frederick received a tract (of 9,645 square miles) which was vital to the very existence and union of Prussia. Russia took 87,500 square miles ; while to Austria were chucked 62,500 square miles, which the Empress mother, Maria Theresa, refused to accept, until she found herself compelled to do so. She then wrote a solemn Protest (Feb., 1772) : “What an example we are giving to the world. . . . We throw our honour and reputation to the winds ! I see well that I am alone, and no more in vigour ; therefore, I *must*, though to my great sorrow, let things take their course. . . . Placet, since so many great and learned men will have it so ; but long after I am dead, it will be known what this violation of all that was hitherto held sacred and just will give rise to.”

Russia’s success was due to the general opinion of Europe in her favour, which was built on fear. Next came the assertion of a general proposition, which every one feared to controvert. The Czar, Nicholas, said to the Poles at Warsaw—“I have prohibited your sons, as those of the Russians, from studying at German Universities, and even from travelling abroad, that they may not be affected by foreign principles. Ye are Poles no longer, but Slavonians, fellow-brethren of the Russians. This I speak to you as Emperor of all the Russias, and I shall soon speak to you, and to the rest of your Slavonian brethren, as Sovereign of the whole of Slavonia. Know the ambition of Russia, which

is also mine! *She bears in herself the germ of her greatness.* From the Duchy of Muscovy she became a Czardom—she conquered the adjacent free towns and dukedoms; her Czars have *re-incorporated* all the Russias, and have assumed the name of Emperor of all the Russias, a title corresponding with the extent of their dominions, and that of Autocrat corresponding with the nature of their unlimited power. My brother has *reconquered* Poland, and it is an inheritance of the great family, of which I am the head, not to lose it, not to lose an inch of what had once belonged to Russia. Believe me, it is a real happiness to belong to Russia and to enjoy its protection.” Side by side with the Warsaw address, let us put the Moscow speech of the Czar Alexander.\* The Russian policy is the same. “I thank you for the sentiments you have been good enough to express towards me in reference to the present political state of affairs, which has now become more clearly defined than before. I am pleased and ready to receive your address. It is already known to you that Turkey has yielded to my demands for the immediate conclusion of an armistice in order to put an end to useless slaughter in Servia and Montenegro. In this unequal struggle, the Montenegrins have, as on all previous occasions, shown themselves to be real heroes. Unfortunately, the same cannot be said of the Servians, notwithstanding the presence of our volunteers in the Servian ranks, many of whom *have shed their blood for the Slavonian cause.* I know that all Russia most warmly sympathizes with me in *the sufferings of our brethren and co-religionists.* The true interests of Russia, however, are dearer to me than all, and I should wish to the uttermost to spare Russian

\* November 11, 1876.

blood from being shed. This is the reason why I have striven, and shall still strive, to obtain a real improvement of the position of the Christians in the East by peaceful means. In a few days negotiations will commence in Constantinople between the representatives of the Great Powers to settle the conditions of peace. My most ardent wish is that we may arrive at a general agreement. Should this, however, not be achieved, and should I see that we cannot obtain such guarantees as are necessary for carrying out what we have a right to demand of the Porte, I am firmly determined to act independently, and I am convinced that in this case the whole of Russia will respond to my summons, should I consider it necessary and should the honour of Russia require it. I am also convinced that Moscow, as heretofore, will lead the van by its example. May God help us to carry out our sacred mission!" Yes; Russia, who committed the enormous crime of murdering Poland, now puts herself forward (indeed, she has always done so), as the earnest sympathizer with the Christians, as the friend of order, and as the enemy of the Revolution. A compound she is of the astutest hypocrisy and the most barbarous ferocity. Pope Gregory XVI. characterized Russian diplomacy as "Avita Fraus," or hereditary duplicity.

Let us first consider her Christian sympathy, and then look at her Slavonic idea. The first treaty of Partition of Poland\* contained an article, assuring to the Poles complete civil and religious liberty, and the free exercise of their religious worship and discipline. As soon as it had been signed, a horde of Cossacks was launched against "the enemies of our (Russo-Greek) religion," and, according even to Russian accounts, 50,000 Poles

\* September 18, 1773.

were slaughtered. Twenty years elapsed, and the Treaty of Grodno stipulated for the Catholics of both rites (Latin, and United-Greek) a full and free exercise of their religion, and perfect toleration. The Czarina Catherine, moreover, promised to maintain them in undisturbed possession of their prerogatives, and to abstain for ever from doing the least thing prejudicial to their religion. Yet she was, at this very time, taking secret counsel as to how she might put an end altogether to the United-Greek Church. In 1831, out of 300 convents in Poland, 202 were destroyed; while numbers of Churches were seized and handed over to the Russo-Greek schism. On April 10, 1832, a Rescript was issued, ordering all Catholic children to be snatched from their mothers, and sent away to be brought up in the Russian Church. In 1839, the Czar Nicholas gave 33,000 roubles to the Protestant Governor of Witepsk, as a reward for having perverted 33,000 Catholics. The Czar, at the same time, wrote to the Pope the fullest assurances that he (the Czar) would never cease to protect his Catholic subjects, and respect their religious convictions, and secure their perfect tranquillity. This was the Avita Fraus. In 1845, the Czar Nicholas, with his own hands, gave Gregory XVI. a note, in which he had written that "no one was more anxious than he to maintain, in a worthy manner, the Catholic Church in Poland," and that he "vowed to God that, without distinction as to religion, he would watch over the spiritual interests of all his subjects." By the Penal Code, which came into operation on the 1st of May, 1846, it is enacted that "whosoever shall turn away any one from the Orthodox confession to another Christian confession shall be condemned to the loss of all rights and privileges to him belonging, and to exile in the

government of Tobolsk, or of Tomsk (Siberia). If he is not exempt by law from liability to corporal punishment, he will receive from fifty to sixty lashes before being sent into penal servitude for one or two years" (Art. 195). By Article 196 it is provided that "whosoever shall abandon the Orthodox confession for another Christian confession is handed over to the ecclesiastical authority to be exhorted and enlightened, and that he may be dealt with *after the rules of the Church.*"

Alexander II. forbade his ambassador, Count Orloff, to permit any mention to be made at the Congress of Paris concerning the sorrows of the Poles. Count Orloff, however, promised, in the name of "his august master," that the Czar would go far beyond the desires of Europe, in according to the Poles (1) a general amnesty; (2) full liberty of conscience; (3 and 4) re-establishment of the Polish language in the Administration and in the schools; and (5) restoration of the Polish Universities. That was in 1856. In 1862, Russian agents were sent, in disguise, to stir the Poles up to rebellion, in order to furnish a pretext for further barbarities. Those barbarities were described in the journals of the day. Here is one from a journal always most favourable to Russia:—"They put unarmed men, women, and children (of the Poles) to the sword. . . . They put the peaceful inhabitants of the town to the sword, after they had routed the 'insurgents.' . . . The Russians do not allow the Poles to bury their slain, as the Grand Duke Constantine has declared that they shall be food for ravens." \*

On April 23rd there were accounts of the slaughter of entire unoffending families. With regard to the men, the *Times* says:—"The above were first castrated, and then twice stabbed with bayonets." In January, 1874,

\* *Times*, Feb. 21, 1863 (quoted by Baron de Worms).

troops were sent into all the villages of the diocese of Chelm, and the inhabitants were assembled and bidden to abjure their religion. Those that refused—men, women, and children,—were first beaten, and then shot.

Thus we see what is a government which is based, not on justice, but on fear. Thus we see how the Russians can promise and pledge the royal word, and not fulfil. We see, also, how not one of those governments who now propose to enforce fulfilment of Turkish promises, ever even whispered such a desire to the Russians. We see, too, what faith must be put in Russian pretences of sympathy with Christians, and regard for humanity. Before the Annexation, there were 12,000,000 Catholics in Poland, now there are 3,140,000 ; while the United-Greeks have been well-nigh extirpated. This day there has been issued, “by command,” a correspondence carried on between 1871 and 1875, concerning the treatment of the members of the United-Greek Church in Russia. The United-Greek Church consists of Catholics who adhere to the Greek rite, but who own the supreme jurisdiction of the Pope, and the doctrines of the Catholic Church.

The United-Greeks separated from the Greek schism, and were *united* with Rome at the end of the 16th century.\* In 1812, vast numbers of them were exiled, and others were sent to the Khersonese. Since 1833, the Russian Government has employed violence and persecution in order to compel the Uniats to enter the Russo-Greek Church. Many fell away ; but some thousands remained steadfast, and have been persecuted up to the present time. From a despatch of Nov. 23, 1872,† we learn

\* Bull *Magnus Dominus* of Clement VIII., Jan. 10, 1595.

† No. 2.

that “a Committee of Inquisition has been installed . . . before which the United-Greek clergy are summoned from time to time, and interrogated respecting their opinions.” If the Commissioners do not approve of their answers, or suspect their opinions, the clergy are suspended, and sometimes exiled. The above measures,” it continues, “are having a somewhat disastrous effect; in cases of suspension the parishes are left indefinitely without religious services, sacraments, and pastoral supervision; while if United-Greeks frequent the Catholic churches, punishments and fines are the consequence.”

As the Pope, by Bull, confirmed to the priests of this Church their ancient practice of being married, “the distress and suffering is far from inconsiderable.” In a further despatch \* we read :—“In the district of Minciéwicz the peasants surrounded the church, and defied the military to introduce the Russo-Greek priest. The peasants, with their wives and children, were finally mastered and surrounded, and were given the option of signing a declaration accepting the priest; on their refusal, fifty blows with the ‘nagaika’ (Cossack whip) were given to every adult man, twenty-five to every woman, and ten to every child, irrespective of age or sex; one woman, who was more vehement than the rest, receiving as much as one hundred.”

Again, March 7, 1874, “Any show of resistance on the part of the peasants is now met by a comparatively overwhelming body of military, the recalcitrant peasants are imprisoned, and fined sums of from ten to fifteen roubles; while in the villages, where the culprits cannot be got hold of, the whole community is fined from 200 to 400 roubles.”

\* No. 3 of Jan. 29, 1874.

On June 12, the despatch from Warsaw is in the following terms:—

“The general features of the condition of the United-Greeks have undergone little alteration; the governmental priests are now fairly installed, with the result of a total abstention on the part of the population from all relations with the clergy and participation in the services in the churches.

“The peasants bury their dead in the churchyards without funeral services, and by night, and assert that they have ceased to baptize or marry; but I am informed that they get the assistance, in secret, of the Catholic clergy in the latter cases, often going immense distances, such as sixty and seventy miles, to avoid detection, either for themselves or for the priests who assist them in their difficulty.

“Since 1839, when the United-Greeks in Lithuania were finally drafted into Russian orthodoxy, very considerable districts in that province have followed a similar system, and I need hardly point out to your lordship the evil consequences of a whole peasant population being deprived of spiritual supervision, and that generations should grow up to whom meeting for public worship is but a tradition.”

Again, on New Year's Day, 1875, another despatch is sent from Lord A. Loftus to the Earl of Derby:—

“Since I last had the honour to address your lordship on the subject, the details of the antagonism between the authorities and the peasants have been most harrowing.

“In one village a peasant suffocated himself and family with charcoal rather than have his child baptized by the governmental parish pope.

“The mortality among the peasants bivouacking in the forests in this severe weather has been frightful.

"Orders have been lately given to the Cossacks to hunt them down back to villages, so that the peasants bivouacking have been constantly on the move, retaliating by hanging the Cossacks here and there, when in isolated parties.

"Finding their crops and stores are ravaged by the Cossacks, the peasants, in many instances, have determined to leave their fields uncultivated."

On January 27, Lord A. Loftus speaks of "the conflict (with the Russian troops) which has desolated so many hearths in the districts of Chelm and Siedlce." In forty-nine parishes a population of 50,000 inhabitants abjured their faith, and were imitated by twenty-six priests, who were constrained by the stress of Russian ferocity to enter the State or "Orthodox" Church. The following despatch of January 29 to Lord Derby explains the circumstance:—

"The passing over of these 50,000 United-Greeks has been effected by various means, in which physical maltreatment has formed a not inconsiderable element.

"In some parishes the most obstinate having been sent to the interior of the Empire or Siberia, the remainder finding their substance eaten up by the Cossacks, gave in to the pressure of the subordinate officials, and signed the petitions desiring to be received into the Russian Church.

"In other districts money has been distributed, when it was seen that the resistance was less obdurate.

"In others, corporal maltreatment was resorted to until the peasants gave in, but stating as they did so that they yielded only on compulsion. . . .

"The peasants were assembled and beaten by the Cossacks until the military surgeon stated that more would endanger life; they were then driven, through a

half-frozen river up to their waists, into the parish church through files of soldiers, where their names were entered in the petitions as above, and passed out at an opposite door, the peasants all the time crying out, ‘You may call us Orthodox, but we remain in the faith of our fathers.’ . . . .

“ It is now officially stated that, among the remainder of the United-Greeks in the Government of Lublin, numbering something over 300,000, a like movement is to be expected, which probably means that measures are being taken to secure a similar result.

“ Looking on the whole in a broad point of view, the measure is very similar to what took place in Lithuania between 1835 and 1838, when upwards of 1,000,000 United-Greeks, by fair means and foul, were passed over to Russian orthodoxy. . . . .

“ Roman Catholic priests in this country are under so much surveillance, and know so well that a whisper may send them to Siberia for life, that it is unlikely that they have put forward any pressure, and indeed the obstinate fanaticism of the peasants did not require an additional stimulus.”

Lord A. Loftus adds, in a despatch to the Earl of Derby on Feb. 16 :—

“ Circumstances under which cruelties of the most revolting nature were committed by the military authorities—cruelties which can only be compared with those resorted to in the darkest ages of the Inquisition.”

Another despatch to Lord Derby of April 24, 1875, contains the following :—

“ The United-Greek conversions to Russian orthodoxy have made considerable progress since I last had the honour to address your Lordship on the subject, and in the Government of Lublin nearly the whole of the

United-Greeks, numbering something over 250,000, have passed over to the National Church. . . . I regret to have to report that the system of barbarity and oppression is still in requisition to compel the peasants to frequent the churches, and avail themselves of the services of the Russian popes as regards baptisms, marriages, and burials, while terrorism on one side, and reprisal on the other, has by no means abated. . . .

“The Catholic priests of these latter have in various instances, been exiled to Russia on the charge of abetting the recalcitrants, such as having admitted them to the confessional, and various other matters of a religious character.”

On New Year’s Day of 1876, the following is sent to the Earl of Derby :—

“The United-Greek converts of last year are far from acquiescing in their conversion ; *they frequent neither churches nor sacraments, do not have their children baptised or their dead buried by the Russian popes, and contract no marriages.*”

Lastly, on June 29 :—

“There now remain about 60,000 Uniats, all of them small landowners ; and, as they will not change their religion, the Government persecutes them by putting them in prison, by flogging them and by billeting Cossack troops, who commit every license, in their villages.

“Numbers of them were confined in fortresses, and last winter, 300 of the most earnest, who had previously been in prison, were exiled to the Government of Kherson and 300 to the Government of Ekaterinoslav.

“All these 600 possessed small parcels of land, which they were forced to abandon. They were torn ruthlessly from their wives and children, who remained behind to

share their houses with the Cossacks who were quartered upon them. . . .

"What afflicts them the most is the conviction that now they are away, their wives and children, who are being persecuted by the priests and ruined by the soldiery, will no doubt be driven into becoming members of the Russian Greek Church."

Who gains the members which the Catholic Church loses ? The Russo-Greek Church ? No, the Revolution, —the band of atheists. Russia, in murdering Poland with protracted tortures, and in extirpating the Catholic religion of both rites, is preparing her own death at the hand of the Secret Societies or the Revolution. Russia will die like Antiochus, who was inwardly gnawed by the rottenness and ulcerations which his wickedness had engendered.

Now let us turn to the Slav idea in the Partition of Poland. As Prussia and Austria had received part of that Slav population, the Czars, who constituted themselves as the champions of the Panslavic idea, had fixed their fish-hook in the jaws of their two neighbouring Leviathans. Moreover East and West Prussia, containing Königsberg and Dantzig, are surrounded on two sides by Russia, and on one side by the sea ; while the mouth of the Vistula, which bears the grain of Polish Russia and the trade of Warsaw, to the sea, is in the hands of Prussia. That mouth is guarded by Dantzig, which Russia has more than once planned to seize. Panslavism will break up Germany and Austria ; and Panslavism is Russia. A Panslavonian Empire cannot be formed without taking from Germany (Prussia) those provinces of hers which once belonged to the kingdom of Poland, and which comprise one-third of Germany's seaboard ; while Austria would lose Bohemia and Moravia,

(which are half German and half Slav), and Hungary, (of which the nobles are Magyar, and the people are Slav). The mouths of the Danube,—that is the control of South German commerce, would also be in the hands of that Panslavonian Empire. This is the wraith which hangs over the heads of the two thieves, or rather accomplices; while that which hangs over the head of the instigator of the plot will be seen further on. There is a Russian proverb, “Woe to Europe when the Czar shall wear a beard;” that is; when the Czar shall put himself heart and soul at the head of the Panslavonian movement. There is a maxim far older and of far greater authority: “What seest thou? A seething pot, and the face thereof is toward the North. Then the Lord said unto me: Out of the North an evil shall break forth upon all the inhabitants of the land.”\*

\* Jer. i. 13, 14.

### CHAPTER III.

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I HAVE said that the aim of every state is twofold : security, and general consideration ; and that the general consideration in which a state is held—that is, its influence, rank, or rate—depends either on its acknowledged justice, which is respected ; or else on its force, which is feared. We will now confine ourselves to the latter basis —the reign of force by fear.

The power of every state is relative. A state is relatively stronger, as the power of other states is wasted, or, at least, discredited. All things remaining the same, a state is stronger if it is generally believed to be stronger. For it can play a great rôle when other states fear to meddle. To believe any state to be more powerful, is to yield to it the pre-eminence ; and every state which accepts such a belief—every state which fears—must play a subordinate part. Only that state which is believed to be strong can, indeed, be said to play any part at all. For the other states are made subservient to its ends. They must dig pits for their neighbours, or be swallowed up themselves. They must ever consent to the actions of their master, or be crushed themselves. In either case that master is still further aggrandized ; and all that every other state can hope is that, like Ulysses, it may be eaten up the last. Dependence is inferiority ; and independence means either an acknowledged pre-eminence, or else a *noli-me-tangere* isolation.

Force, or the power which is feared, is of four kinds—  
(1.) *Military and Naval power*; or the ability to destroy men and property.

(2.) *Social power*; or the number, the character (moral, intellectual, and physical), and the disposition or passing feeling, of the population.

(3.) *Financial power*; or the amount of productions, and profits in trade, beyond the amount of unproductive expenditure.

(4.) *Federative power*; or the number and character of its allies. (It must be noted that another species of Federative power is that which is based on a character for justice.)

Power being of four distinct kinds, it follows that the sum of power of any state is a matter of difficult calculation. Per contra; war is a difficult calculation for a statesman; for war consists in the destruction of one or more kinds of power in the hands of the enemy, without thereby losing a greater balance of power oneself. This destruction of power may be effected with or without the help of gunpowder; that is, a power of the enemy may be decreased or destroyed, by means of any one of the powers which a state possesses. I will give some examples.

A state, with a view to vanquish an enemy, may enter into a number of offensive and defensive alliances, which will hereafter entail continual and harassing wars. The desired victory over one enemy, will thus result in its own lasting destruction, by the loss of Financial and Social powers.

A state with vast military resources, may proudly and ambitiously dash into an unjust war, and thereby permanently alienate all other nations. The balance of Federative power will then be thrown into the enemy's scale.

An unjust war, or a shameful peace, may be so un-

popular with the nation, that the Government becomes weak and insecure. This is a loss of Social power.

A war may result in loss of trade, and financial depression, without a balance of augmentation in any of the other kinds of power. An example of this was the Federal war in the United States in 1862. The Government was short-sighted in its desire for a stricter unity. The self-government claimed by the Southern States would have resulted in a greater strength of the Republic.

The refusal of one state to assist another state in war, may prevent an alliance which would add more to the sum of its powers, than would be lost in Financial and Social powers, by many campaigns. If we had stood by Denmark in 1864, by Austria in 1866, and by France in 1870, we should have gained in Federative power. If France had helped Austria in 1866, she would have gained the Rhine provinces, and the catastrophe of 1871 would not have occurred.

A state may be cajoled into declaring itself for one combatant, when she should remain neutral, and become the arbiter of their differences. For this is an increase of Federative power. A little more than forty years ago, we declared in favour of the Sikhs and against the Affghans, and so threw the Affghans into the arms of Persia and Russia, and lost immensely in Federative power. When England rebelled against her Sovereign, James II., Ireland remaining loyal and faithful, Louis XIV. might have aggrandized himself by supporting King James and Ireland, against William the old enemy of France. Whenever an enemy's country is divided into two camps, and you can support the weaker, you destroy your enemy's Social and Financial and Military powers ; while you gain Federative power for yourself. If you

support the stronger, the weaker will be dispirited, and your enemy will become united. You would thus be giving an increase of Social power to your enemy.

A state may have its hands full, in a quarrel with an enemy, which a third state has stirred up. That third state will then be unmolested in some process of aggrandizement which it may have in view. So Russia, having seen us plunged into a war with Persia, seized Persia's north frontier—Mazanderan ; and we actually took off our hats and bowed and thanked Russia for aggrandizing herself at our expense, and threatening our possessions of India. •

Or the state which would be likely to interfere with that aggrandizement, may have its Social power destroyed by civil disturbances, or even agitations, which that third state, by its secret agents, has fomented. So Germany may, any day, be paralyzed by a Slav agitation (*i.e.*, by an irruption of Russian Poles) ; or by exciting the rage of the disinherited German Princes (now called "Particularism"—*i.e.*, particular states, as against a German Empire), and the jealousy of other Sovereigns, and the resentment of Catholic populations.

Or that third state may threaten war against the first state, if it should prepare an interference to prevent two other states from weakening themselves in war. Thus Russia threatened us with war in 1870, if we should dare to "come between the points of two fell insensate opposites," Prussia and France. Russia then, seeing our fear, and consequently their own great consideration, declared herself free from the Treaty of 1856. In the same way Russia led us into the "Opium War," and at once took the Amoor from China. After our war was over, Russia had to give back to China all her booty, except the Russian settlements at the mouth of the Amoor ; and

the Chinese were about to drive them from these also, when we bombarded Canton and saved Russia.

A state may lose Social power by an immoral or atheistical propaganda. It loses Financial power by luxury and selfish expenditure. Thus Russia has always promoted luxury at Constantinople, and a waste of resources in building palaces for the Sultan; while she has also abetted mal-administration in the Turkish Government, and discontent in the people; and has sown, by means of secret societies, books and pamphlets of a socialistic and revolutionary tendency. She has always, moreover, driven from power any minister who has tried to stop this course of vice and folly. Examples of this we shall see hereafter.

A state may be induced to conclude a secret treaty with another state, which treaty involves detriment to an ancient ally. Then, at the proper time, that other state discloses the Treaty to the ancient ally. Thus Russia cajoled us into a secret treaty against Turkey, which she then showed to the Porte. Another example was given in the *Times* of March 24, 1877. "The second thing which happened at Berlin was this:—Scarcely had General Ignatief communicated his first instructions and the draught Protocol proposed by Russia to Prince Bismarck than the latter forwarded them by telegraph to London, where they were placed under the eyes of Lord Derby. Thus, while Count Schouvaloff and General Ignatief were discussing between themselves and with others the terms of the Protocol, and what it was proper to retain or expunge, the English Cabinet had in its hands the original text, which indicated to it the extreme starting-point of the Russian proposals—a thing which put one party on their guard and betrayed the exigencies of the other."

So also Benedetti, Napoleon's envoy, was persuaded to act as scribe, while Bismark dictated the heads of a Treaty between France and Prussia, giving Belgium to France and Holland to Prussia. As it was in Benedetti's handwriting, Bismark showed it to our Government as a French scheme, which the Prussians had scouted. Thus England was deterred from helping France in 1870, and France lost an amount of Federative power which would have turned the scale in her favour.

A state may be induced to refuse the payment of interest on its debts. Thus did Turkey, at General Ignatiew's suggestion, and very nearly lost the general consideration in her favour, and an immense amount of Federative power. It was Mahmoud Pasha, the Grand Vizier, Russia's tool, who, at Ignatiew's suggestion, and with the aid of some Greek bankers, prepared the Firman of October, 1875, which amounted to a declaration of either bankruptcy or dishonesty. The following words occur in a pamphlet of great authority and power,—a pamphlet which reveals some Cabinet secrets, and in which are found an apology for Lord Beaconsfield, and complaints of his too timorous colleagues. The apology was easy to write, as Lord Beaconsfield is the only one of the Cabinet who has shown knowledge, courage, or consistency:—

"We know that Mahmoud Pasha was the tool of General Ignatiew; our knowledge of him erases the word 'simpleton,' and writes the word 'traitor.' Through him and the gang of parasites, and worse, who thronged his doorstep, the Russian ambassador ruled Turkey."\*

A state, by proclaiming its cordial alliance with an enemy of other nations, may alienate those nations, and

\* T "The Northern Question," p. 29. King & Co. 1876.

so lose Federative power. Thus the repeated assertions of various members of the present Government, that the most cordial ties exist between us and Russia, have alienated the Turks from us, and must also alienate the Persians and Affghans, and all who look for protection against Russian aggressions. Those few ministerial phrases have taken from us an immense amount of Federative power.

A Government may alienate an important ally, by resisting some measure of defence which it desires. Austria would not join with us in the Crimean war, unless we would consent to join with her and Prussia in proclaiming the re-constitution of Poland, as a barrier between them and Russia. We thus lost both Federative and Military power.

Federative power may be gained by taking up the absurd theories which nations run after. Thus the Porte, in announcing the Constitution, said it was in adherence to the theories of Liberty, Equality, and Fraternity of France. So likewise Cavour wrote to Admiral Persano :\* "Il problema che abiamo da sciogliere, è questo : aiutare la Rivoluzione ; ma operare in guisa che apparisca agli occhj dell' Europa come un moto spontaneo. Se questo avviene, la Francia e l'Inghilterra sono con noi."

If a state assails the basis of Justice, by doing a mean and shameful act, it loses Social, and even Federative power, as well as General Consideration on the basis of Justice. Thus France weakened herself in the war of 1859, and was stopped at the Adige by a threat from Prussia. Still more did she weaken herself in 1860. So also the Governments of United Italy and United Germany, having allied themselves with the

\* August 9, 1860.

Freemasons, were forced to declare a spiritual war on the Church. The effect has been an enormous loss of Social Power. First: the Revolutionary party (Socialists and Communists) has increased greatly, and aims at the establishment of a Universal Republic (Associazione Repubblicana Universale); Secondly: the Catholic subjects have been alienated from their rulers; and Thirdly: the Catholics of the whole world are enemies of those two states. This is, for them, a loss of Federative power.

To seize the fruits of unjust conquest is a loss of Federative power. Germany, by taking Alsace and Lorraine, has permanently alienated the French; by her Austrian conquests, she has made an enemy of Austria; by seizing Holstein and part of Schleswig, she has established resentment in the breast of Denmark; and by her burglary and falschoods in the matter of Hanover, she has engendered a bitterness against her in England. Italy, by receiving Lombardy from Napoleon's hands, has made an enemy of Austria. In each of the cases I have mentioned, the ceded territory is full of unwilling subjects of the Conqueror; so that there has been a loss of Social power as well as a diminution of Federative power.

We must now pass in review each of the four kinds of power.

(I.) *Military Power* all men understand. An army is a fighting machine. The discipline and *esprit de corps* render it a unity. The physique and exercise of the men give it rapidity of motion, so that it may, with quickness and precision, assemble and strike at some unexpected point, before its adversary can bring together his troops and make the proper dispositions for a defence; and "more battles are won by legs than

by arms." The discretion of its Generals, and their knowledge of the country and of the enemy's position, show them where the attack should be concentrated, and where feints or diversions should be made. The detailed acquaintance of the officers with the character of the ground, enables them to seize natural advantages in carrying out their orders.

*Naval power* does not consist in Ironclads. For ironclads are ever being built of thicker and thicker ironsides, so that they may not be pierced. The enemy's ironclads are then as invulnerable as your own, and may steam into your harbours (if invulnerable), destroy the shipping, and steam out again. To prevent this, Whitehead torpedoes have been invented; and Whitehead-torpedo-ships. These have lessened the value of ironclads. Moreover, ironclads cannot sail; they steam slowly and laboriously; and they cannot keep the sea for a long time without coaling; and our coaling-stations abroad are always liable to be taken or burned. Or the ships which carry the coals to those stations, may be destroyed. What swift frigates can do to destroy the Financial power of the enemy, was shown by the achievements of the Alabama. She burned 10,000,000*l.* worth of her enemy's goods on the sea; she caused damage (by loss of trade, rising of freights, &c.) to the amount of 200,000,000*l.*; and last of all she drove away the American trade, and to this day it has not come back.

Great also is the effect of the maxim, "Free ships make free goods," in destroying the Financial power of a maritime enemy. For it means that an enemy's exports may be taken only out of his own ships, but not from under a neutral flag. It was proved before a Committee of the House of Commons, that, at the

mere rumour of war in 1859, American ships of the second class commanded a freight fifty per cent. higher than our first class ships could obtain. This was because our merchants would not send their goods in English ships, lest England should be involved in war, while America remained neutral. Thus our trade was greatly injured, and only came back to us during the Federal war of the United States. Then the Americans lost their trade; their ships passed into our hands, and their sailors were discharged and became articled to English ships. Countries are, however, variously affected in this respect, in proportion to their exports by sea in their own ships. The per-cent-age of maritime exports, in respect of the total exports (*viz.* by sea, and over the land frontier), is as follows:—

Austria . . . . .	15·9
Holland . . . . .	24·4
Belgium . . . . .	35·3
Italy . . . . .	47·8
France . . . . .	66·0*
Spain . . . . .	90·6†
United States . . . . .	99·3
Russia . . . . .	67·5

Spain and the United States still hold to the maxim that enemy's goods may lawfully be captured wherever found, and under whatever flag. France would not be benefitted by the maxim "Free ships, free goods," if she were at war with us, and the United States do not acknowledge that maxim. Russia is the power who would be most injured by the ancient maxim, and who, therefore, benefits by the new maxim of "Free ships, free goods." Moreover, the exports of Russia

\* Half of which is to Great Britain.

† Two-thirds of which is to Great Britain.

cannot well be taken by land, as they are bulky raw produce, *viz.* :—

Corn . . . . .	45 per cent.
Flax . . . . .	11 "
Wood . . . . .	9 "
Linseed . . . . .	7 "
Living animals . . . . .	3 "
Hemp . . . . .	3 "

Besides wool, tallow, and leather.

The per-cent-age of exports in national ships to the total exports by sea, is as follows :—

Belgium . . . . .	9·0
Russia . . . . .	11·9*
Holland . . . . .	26·0
France . . . . .	33·0
United States . . . . .	34·0
Italy . . . . .	37·0
Spain . . . . .	39·0
Denmark . . . . .	41·0
Germany . . . . .	51·0
Great Britain . . . . .	66·0
Norway and Sweden . . . . .	80·0
Austria . . . . .	85·0

Belgium and Russia are, therefore, in this respect, also, the most interested in asserting the maxim “Free ships, free goods,” or “Neutral flag covers the goods.” These remarks, suffice to show the true source of “maritime Power.”

(II.) *Social Power* consists in the numerical quantity, the health, the stamina, the strength, the intelligence, the character, the content, and the passing disposition of the population. If the people are healthy and contented, for example, they love their country, and are eager to support the policy of their rulers. During the Franco-Prussian War it was frequently said that the overwhelming superiority of the Germans, even when

\* This is a per-cent-age rapidly diminishing.

opposed to greater numbers, arose from the greater strength and higher intelligence of their soldiers. Towards the close of the war, France learned to rue the prevalence of those secret crimes which had, through the lapse of many years, contracted families to only one or two children, and so reduced the numbers of the French people. The French, at the last, were in absolute want of men. The close of the same war serves also as an example of the importance of good character and content. The Emperor was informed, while at Sedan, of a discontent so widespread, that only a brilliant victory could save his throne. That is the reason why he fought the battle, when all military critics said that he should have retired on Paris. His soldiers went to battle singing the Marseillaise, and other revolutionary songs; and soon, not caring to spill their blood for an Emperor, they ran away in thousands.

I will give another example. On Sept. 11, 1857, the King of Prussia assembled at Berlin, an "Evangelical Alliance," with the intention of making himself the Head or Calif of a union of all the "Reformed" Churches in Europe,—the Anglican, Scandinavian, Lutheran, Calvinist, *et hoc genus omne*. This plan was not original. It was the plan of Frederick the Great, exactly a century before. What were the effects of this assemblage called "The Evangelical Alliance"? The Polish and the Rhenish provinces of Prussia were thereby alienated, and began to look to the Emperor of Austria as their natural Head. This was a great loss of Social power. Next month the King of Prussia was declared mad, and the present Emperor, who was and is the Head of the Freemasons, was made Regent. Nevertheless, he had at once to remove, as far as possible, the effects of the Evangelical Alliance, and regain some of

the lost Social power, by issuing a Royal Proclamation in favour of liberty of worship and freedom of teaching in "confessional" (*i.e.* denominational) schools for the poor.

The Prussian statesmen were henceforth more alive to the necessity of preserving Social power. Prussia, in order to unite all Germany, saw that it was necessary both to excite the passions of Germany and of France; and also to make it appear that the war was forced on Germany, against her will, by a declaration of war on the part of France. Prussia having already seized the Federal fortresses of Raastadt and Mayence, contrary to the express words of the Treaty, Bismark heaped continued insults on Napoleon, which he took care to publish in all the newspapers. Napoleon became uneasy; for he felt that he was losing Consideration and Federative power as well as Social power. That game was at its height in 1867. When the propitious moment arrived, Bismark,—having ascertained that the candidature of a Hohenzollern, to the throne of Spain, would be unacceptable to France; and having committed the French Government to an assertion that they would use every means in their power to resist it,—at once advanced this candidature in a manner which was sure to provoke opposition. Benedetti had interviews with the King of Prussia. At the last of these interviews, at Ems, he appeared to have settled matters amicably; whereupon he took cordial leave of the King. That instant it was telegraphed, throughout Germany, that Benedetti had insulted Germany, in the person of the Prussian King; whilst it was telegraphed, throughout France, that the Prussian King had wantonly insulted France, in the person of her Ambassador. The popular passions in both countries were aroused to a pitch of fury; and

Napoleon had either to declare war, or see all Social power slip away from him. The Germans, having been aroused to a common fury by a supposed wrong to their race, combined to seek revenge. Hence the Union of Germany.

Another element which forced Napoleon to this course, so fatal to his dynasty, was that the French Socialists were looking for an accession of strength to their cause (which any paroxysm of weakness in the French Government would be), in order to break forth in a long prepared Communist Revolution. The loss of Social power, which would have been occasioned if Napoleon had brooked the insult, would have at once furnished them with the desired opportunity. Napoleon had the choice of either vacating the throne, or risking all in war, in order to retrieve his Social power. Russia, desiring the prostration of France, as she had before desired the prostration of Austria (in order that her own powers might be relatively greater), had announced that any interference, by other states, in the quarrel of Prussia and France, would cause her to support Prussia by arms. Austria had agreed to brave the uttered menaces of Russia, and aid France, by causing a diversion. This she was to do on the first success of the French arms, as Austria was not sufficiently prepared to declare war at once. The defeats of France, however, followed each other in such quick succession, raising so much the Teutonic enthusiasm of Austria's German provinces, that Austria would have lost Social power by declaring herself in favour of France. Moreover the Hungarian conspirators, who were in possession of the Transleithian Government, tied Austria's hands and prevented her from giving aid to France. The English people had been turned against France by Bismarck's opportune

publication of the draft secret Treaty (which was in Benedetti's hand-writing), whereby France proposed to seize Belgium. Italy had promised to send an army of 100,000 men to the Rhone, in return for Napoleon's promise to evacuate Rome and Civita Vecchia. But the agents of Bismark, and the Carbonari, at the orders of Mazzini and Garibaldi, threatened to overturn the Piedmontese dynasty. This had been negotiated by Usedom (who had, in 1866, arranged the filibustering expedition of Garibaldi to Dalmatia, in order to raise the Slavs and Hungarians).\* Moreover, Bismark offered, as a bribe, the throne of Spain to Amadeo, the son of the King of Italy. The King of Italy then promised not to send the 100,000; although he procured the evacuation of Rome and Civita Vecchia by his promise to send them. Put not any trust in Princes !

Before quitting the subject of Social power, it is well to remark how acutely the present Government felt the danger of losing Social power, through the "atrocious agitation." Lord Derby's despatch † will be afterwards considered. The Chancellor of the Exchequer on Sept. 17, at Edinburgh, was inclined to kick against fate. He complained bitterly of the members of Corporations making speeches on Foreign politics, which, he said, they did not understand. While Lord Derby said he was anxious to receive directions from the people, whom he called his employers and masters, and only complained that he generally received those directions too late, and after he had been compelled to act. In that spirit he wrote the despatch No. 159, in August. In regard to Sir Stafford Northcote's manly avowal, it may indeed be

\* See, in the posthumous works of Mazzini, the letter from Usedom's wife, in 1870.

† No. 159. I. of 1877.

said that if no one is to utter that which he does not know to be true, nor discuss that which he does not understand, England will become a land of silence, like the place of shadows across the Styx. He evidently holds that even the English people consists of deceivers and deceived :—the majority going about ever ready to swallow anything that “designing politicians tell them, and to do what those persons, for their own ends may bid them.” In short, he maintains that they “drink in errors like water.”

(III.) *Financial, or Monetary Power* comes from the resources of soil and climate ; the productions of manufactures ; and the profits of trade. These may be relatively and fictitiously increased in value, by acting on other countries, and interfering with their resources, productions, or trade. An export duty, and still more a prohibition, placed by the Government, on the export of an article, will increase the value of the like product in other countries. There is a rivalry in production. If Russia produces corn, tallow, hemp, hides, she must desire, with a view to increasing her wealth, that the corn and oil of Turkey, the palm oil of Africa, the corn of the Danubian principalities and of North America, and the hides and tallow of South America, may meet with hindrances against exportation. The Vistula was the means of egress of Polish corn. The Vistula was seized, and that trade strangled, and Poland weakened, before she was divided. The mouths of the Danube are allowed to silt up, so that the corn, which should be borne on that great river to the sea, may be deterred.

The struggle to decrease the Financial power of other nations—the wars of commerce, are carried on, from year to year, under the guise of peace and friendship. Whenever a war of commerce reaches the crisis of open

battle, it is always more fierce than a religious war, because money is more esteemed than religion, and Financial power is more sought after than righteousness and justice. Internal discords may be fomented in countries which are our rivals in some produce, so as to interfere with their agriculture, factories, or mercantile marine. The Republics of South America are always in a state of revolution, or else in external war. Influence has, before now, been obtained on Railway and Canal Company's Boards, and the rates of corn freights have been raised. The corn of the Western States of North America, is not allowed to come by the lakes to the St. Lawrence, for exportation. Its compulsory destination is New York ; and so the freightage is greatly increased, and the corn is rendered dearer. This is an advantage for the corn-producing countries. In the Federal war, the Southern States looked forward to a split between the Northern and Western States on this very point, and calculated that the trade down the Mississippi would be increased.

The debts of countries (*e.g.*, those of Turkey) have, by external pressure and cajolery, been first initiated, and then increased, so that the internal burdens of taxation may press down the production and trade of the country, and that the cost of production may be increased, and the profits on exports may be diminished or destroyed. This is the same as a relative increase of Financial power in other countries.

The carrying trade of a country may be filched away ; or it may be harassed by mercantile marine laws "in the interest of humanity ;" and then its freights will gradually disappear. Russia places restrictions on our commerce with her vast empire. We therefore export to her less than we import from her, the balance being

paid in gold. Her aim is, doubtless, to increase her capital, and fictitiously to nurse her industries. Turkey, on the other hand, encourages trade with foreign nations. It is, therefore, a financial injury when Russia annexes a Turkish country; for Russia at once restricts the foreign trade, and especially excludes British trade. In 1874,\* the

Imports from Russia were . . .	£20,800,000
Exports to , , . . .	£11,800,000
Exports to Turkey . . .	£16,900,000
Imports from , , . . .	£12,500,000

We may say, then, that for every 20s. which Russia receives from us, she takes 10s. of it in goods and 10s. in cash, while Turkey takes more, in goods, from us than we get from her. If we were to buy the oil of Turkey (which is now hampered by a heavy duty of 1s. per quintal,†) instead of the tallow of Russia, then Turkey would demand still more goods in exchange, and our exports and carrying trade would be greatly increased. This would be an increase of our Financial power.

It is as well to note that the source of revenue which pays for war, is the export trade. Adam Smith says:‡ “Fleets and armies are maintained, not with gold and silver, but with consumable goods.” He then enumerates three means by which a nation may support war: “by sending abroad (1) some part of its accumulated gold and silver; (2) some part of the annual produce of its manufactures; (3) some part of its annual raw produce. . . . It can seldom happen that much can be spared from the circulating money of the country; because in that there can seldom be much redundancy.”

\* Abstract Tables of Trade and Navigation.

† Hubner’s “Customs Tariff.” Murray, 1855.

‡ “Wealth of Nations,” book iv. chap. i.

War must, therefore, be supported by the export of manufactures, or by the export of raw produce.

(IV.) *Federative Power* (not that Federative power whose foundation lies in a character for just dealing, but that which is based on force),—Federative power rests upon reciprocal wants. Portugal, for example, being shut in between its rival and the sea, must cling, for the sake of its maritime trade, to some great naval power; while we, on the other hand, receive, by a close alliance with Portugal, an influence over the affairs of Spain. This advantage was patent during the Peninsular War.

In every alliance (based on the lower ground of which I am speaking) there must be a common ground of interest. The objects or aims of the allies may be distinct, but not separate; they may be subalternate but not repugnant. Friendship, or alliance, is “*idem velle et idem nolle de rebus publicis.*” The old empire of Germany was a federation of free and sovereign kingdoms, yielding to all of them the maximum of Federative power. The modern German Empire could not be made a true alliance or federation; for many of the German kingdoms are Catholic; and Protestant Germany would not hear of their freedom or sovereignty. Hence the “Union” of Germany was brought about by feigned insults and the blind passions of war. The “Union” of Italy, also, was engendered by force and fraud. In neither case was there any increase of Federative power, while there has been a loss of Social power, seeing that all the people are not at one, and content with the Government.

The defeat of Jena appeared to be the extinction of the Prussian kingdom and nation. Stein and Hardenberg, however, rebuilt Prussia by means of the same policy

which Burke advocated for England : *viz.*, opposition to those abstract and “ philosophic ” doctrines of the Revolution, which only tended to the subversion of local customs and national traditions; to the equality which is repugnant to liberty ; to the democratic Cæsarism which effaces the individual ; to the disregard of rights, and the worship of force ; to the extinction of provincial autonomy and local life. The policy which built up Prussia, in the day of her disaster, and which Burke recommended for England in the days of her blindness, was the policy which the Christian Church laboured to establish in a Europe just ruined by the fall of the Roman Empire and the sway of barbarians. Stein made Prussia strong, not by a revolutionary sameness and centralization, but by a federal unity,—Christian, historical, traditional, and free. Without diminishing her independence, he united Prussia in closer bonds, and thus increased her Social power. Bismark, on the other hand, has made an onslaught on local independence, without even creating a unity of feeling,—nay, even while alienating the Southern States, and Saxony, and the Rhine Provinces, Bavaria, Westphalia, Wirtemburg, Poland, Alsace, and Lorraine. Let Austria pursue a wise and conciliating policy, shunning concentration, respecting local liberties and ancient rights, and she will reap the fruits of Prussia’s ploughing and sowing. In the Home policy of Austria is to be found the revenge for Sadowa. To Prussian unitarianism, Austria must oppose the provincial and historical varieties of a conciliating federalism. Bismark should have endeavoured to consolidate the German Empire on German sympathies and feelings—an Empire based on the cordial assent of all, for this is Social power ; or if the component states are sovereign, then it is the maximum of Federative power. It is now

a Protestant state, with millions of Germans in hostility to it,—a Protestant state, with a Protestantism which is the subject of numberless and incurable divisions and varieties, and with the absorbed states crying out for “particularism” or disunion. By attacking the Church, by his alliance with Italy, Bismark has lost the Social power of a single state, and the Federative power of allied states,—virtually dividing Germany into hostile atoms, and causing the particular states to sigh for autonomy, while the Socialistic Revolution seeks to annihilate the Empire and erect a Republic on its ashes. He has lost political unity in a butterfly chase after an impossible religious unity. He has destroyed an Empire in snatching at the phantom of a national Church, which the antichristian party will never allow either Germany or Italy to frame.

Yet a false and unreal federation, having gone thus far on a wrong road, seeks now to go still further. Not Germany, but a Panteutonic Empire ; not Russia, but a Panslavonic Empire ; and a Pan-Italian kingdom, with the Trentina, Corsica, and Malta. These would indeed be great seething masses ; they would be sandhills of atoms, without Federative power.

No alliance can in reality exist, nor is it of any use that an alliance should exist in name, where a common ground of mutual wants and reciprocal assistance has either not been found, or has once been found and passed away. Not sheepskin parchment, writing ink, and appeals to the sacred name of the “most holy, one, and undivided Trinity,” can make that essential character which is called friendship or alliance. Where there is no common interest, no reciprocal service, it is no more than an empty name, impotent to move an army, unable even to awake an echo. It is worse than that : a nominal

alliance, where the aims of the allies are separate, is insidious, fraudulent, and misleading. It causes you to "trust in Egypt" when "Egypt is but a broken reed, which will pierce your hand;" it causes you to trust in Russia, when she is but "a wall against which, if a man lean, a serpent comes out and bites him." All the advantages are on the side of the more cunning ally; while the expenses and danger will be borne by the other. The more astute will dominate; the more stupid ally will be his Caliban to hew wood and draw water for him.

As all power is relative, so Federative power must be relative. For more than a century, it has been the diplomacy of Russia, relatively to increase her own Federative power, by setting one state against another in Europe and Asia. Now Prussia and Austria have a difficulty. Now the French colonels threaten England. Now there is a Danish "question;" then Germany attacks France. Now the relations between the United States of America and England are "strained." Russia, the world's great diplomatist, remains quiet, and then poses as arbiter in the dispute, as mediator in the quarrel, as conciliator in the differences which she has been busy, on both sides, in stirring up.

Just so is a state relatively strengthened in Social power, and is sought as a home of residence, on the ground of "security in life and property,"--whenever other states are socially weakened, by setting the people against their rulers, through Fenian, Chartist, or Communist theories; or by inducing the rulers to oppress the people, so that they may be goaded into rebellion; or by disseminating irreligious and immoral doctrines, such as those which flood the east of Germany; or by confusing men's minds through moving the landmarks of ancient principles.

Unless by a stupid Government, treaties are entered into solely from clear motives of self-interest. Hatred, resentment, admiration, and other passions, should never affect the policy of cabinets:—no, not even Royal connections. Passion only blinds the cabinet, and prevents them from seeing the real interests of the nation; while sentiment is no proper motive for a ruler, who has to look to the good of the nation alone. The aim of every treaty must, therefore, be the increase of the four kinds of power. The clause in the Treaty of March 1856, for the neutralization of the Black Sea, was a relative increase of the naval powers of France and England. The Treaty with the United States, concerning the Alabama damages, caused a slight increase of Financial power to the United States, and a great augmentation of Consideration and the character for justice in our favour; while the ravages of the Alabama, by transferring the carrying trade of the United States to England, was an immense loss of Financial power to the United States. Russia had, at that time, just increased her Financial power and her Federative powers by the sale and cession of Alaska to the United States; and the naval power of America against us in any war would have been troublesome. The Treaty and award removed every ground of quarrel, and by increasing our alliance with America, was a relative loss of Federative power for Russia. The Protocol of London of 1871, was a great loss of Consideration for Russia, as it declared that she had been guilty of gross injustice and a breach of international law; and so her Federative power was lessened at the very time that she was preparing to spring upon Turkey.

Any treaty which is very unpopular with the nation, is a loss of Social power; for it shakes the bond which should bind the people to their rulers. At this moment

Russia is in such a position that she must sustain a serious loss of Social power if she withdraws her armies, or if she fights and is beaten ; while she must lose in Federative power if she does not withdraw her armies and fights.

As the material power of a nation is the resultant of these four kinds of power, in its own hands and in its allies, on the one side ; as against the adverse powers of inimical nations, on the other side ; so the Federative power of a nation is the resultant of those interests which are common to it, and to other nations. Let us take an example. Our own interest in the preservation of Turkey is patent. France and Austria have the same interest. Yet, on the other hand, a war with Russia would be a greater detriment to France and to Austria, than to us ; for they have not yet recovered from their recent prostrations, by which Germany was so enormously aggrandized. They may, therefore, be tempted to stand by and see Turkey dismembered. Germany, knowing this, may wish to see England and Russia with their hands full, in order that she may unhindered seize Holland and the Schelde, and so increase her naval and commercial (Financial) powers, by obtaining a naval station outside the narrow Sound. This, however, would be against the interests of France, England, and Denmark ; while the possession of the mouths of the Danube by Russia would be such an injury to Austria, that she would have a common interest with us in preventing the advance of Russia.

## CHAPTER IV.

## INTERNATIONAL LAW, AND TREATIES.

LET US now pass to the Eastern Question. A few chapters must first be devoted to a study of the *elements* of this question. The principles above advanced shall then be applied to the proceedings of this country in regard to the Eastern Question.

The foremost place must be occupied by international law. In the consideration of a policy, or course of conduct, the first question which should be asked is this: Is it right? Is it lawful? A policy is a method, or way of arriving at a definite end. Not only must the end be right, but the means also must be lawful.

The conduct of individuals is always modelled and shaped after the acts of its Government. For that which the Government does, in the name of the nation, the nation itself commits; and if a nation commits a crime, it will at once seek for some maxim, or frame some general principle, by which to defend its sin. In this *ex post facto* labour the Government and the party-press are foremost to assist. Those maxims and principles, having been invented for the sake of defence or excuse, and accepted by the people,—either through carelessness and indolence, or else to save their vanity,—will then at once be applied to their private lives. For every one is conscious in himself that there cannot be two moralities, one for the individual man, and the other for an aggregate of men,—a nation or moral person. Everyone

knows that there is one moral law which is eternal and universal. The Law of Nature was established by God at the Creation, and promulgated again, amid the thunders of Mount Sinai. It governs all men; and no other law was ever proclaimed to rule the conduct of nations. If the leaders or rulers of a state regard these moral principles as effete, and throw them aside whenever expedient, then every man, in his private dealings, will also consider them as effete and dead; and the moral law will cease to be regarded as a law, in that authority is no longer attributed to it. The fishermen of the sea of Azov have a true saying: "It is always at the head that the fish begins to stink." Private demoralisation always follows political turpitude.

Before deciding to interfere in the internal affairs of Turkey, or of any state, the Government and nation have to ask themselves what right they have to interfere. What *general* right is there under the natural law? or, what right has been *especially* conceded by Treaty?

First: what general right is determined by the law of nature (which is the law of nations).

Vattel \* says that: Every nation is mistress of her actions, so long as those acts do not affect the rights of others. Even if a nation is badly governed, yet other states are bound to acquiesce, since they have no right to dictate any course of conduct. He further adds these words: † "It is an evident consequence of the liberty and independence of nations, that all have a right to be governed as they think proper, and that no state has the smallest right to interfere in the government of another. Of all the rights that can belong to a nation, sovereignty is, doubtless, the most precious, and that which other

\* Prolim., p. lxiii. § 10.

† Bk. II. ch. iv. § 51.

nations ought the most scrupulously to respect, if they would not do her an injury." Again,\* he says that no Sovereign may judge the conduct of another, nor oblige him to alter it. "If he loads his subjects with taxes, and if he treats them with severity, the nation alone is concerned in the business ; and no other Sovereign is called upon to compel him to amend his conduct and follow more wise and equitable maxims."

The Sultan, then, is, according to the Law of Nations, an independent or Sovereign Ruler. We have under the law of nations, no more right to intervene in Turkish affairs (that is, to violate his independence or sovereignty), (except at the call of Justice), than a man has a right to enter his neighbour's house, and dispose of his goods according to his own pleasure. It will be perceived that I have made an exception or limitation to the duty of non-intervention. The Syllabus condemned the principle: "Proclamandum est et observandum principium quod vocant *de non-interventu*." The contradictory of that principle is true ; that is : Sometimes it is right to intervene. When ? At the call of Justice. If the Sultan, by oppressing his subjects and invading their rights, causes them to rise in insurrection, we may then intervene to defend the right ; but no more.

This is the answer to an objection which may be urged, viz. : "Then every Government may do just what it likes ?" Certainly not.

(1.) If the Government is limited by a Constitution and persistently violates the fundamental laws, then it ceases to be a legal Government.

(2.) If the Government is absolute in form, and breaks the natural law, by persisting in injustice, then it ceases to be a legal Government.

\* § 55.

In both cases the subjects may revolt against the illegality and injustice, and defend their rights ; and other nations may help the insurgents to regain their rights (but no more than their rights), and may declare war on any state which helps the illegal Government to maintain its oppression. For a Government that does not fulfil the *raison d'être* of every Government, is no Government. *Cessante ratione, cessat lex. Cessante fine, cessant media.* That this statement is correct, is proved by Vattel.\*

“ Some celebrated writers maintain that if the prince is invested with the supreme command in a full and absolute manner, nobody has a right to resist him, much less to curb him ; and that nought remains for the nation, but to suffer and obey with patience.”

Against such an inhuman dictum, Vattel argues, and then adds : “ If the prince becomes the scourge of the state, he degrades himself ; he is no better than a public enemy, against whom the nation may and ought to defend itself. . . . If he be absolute, when his government, without being carried to extreme violence, manifestly tends to the ruin of the nation, it may resist him, pass sentence on him, and withdraw from his obedience.” Again :† With regard to other states : “ If the Prince, by violating the fundamental laws, gives his subjects a legal right to resist him,—if tyranny, becoming insupportable, obliges the nation to rise in their own defence,—every foreign Power has a right to succour the oppressed people who implore their assistance. . . . Whenever, therefore, matters are carried so far as to produce a civil war, foreign Powers may assist *that party which appears to them to have justice on its side.*”

\* “Vattel,” Bk. I. ch. iv. § 51.

† Bk. II. ch. iv. § 56.

Vattel also lays down the principle which should guide all states in the case of religious disturbances : " When a religion is persecuted," he says that a foreign nation of that religion may not do more than " intercede for their brethren." \*

If that is the law for each nation separately, it is the law for all in concert ; for half a dozen nations together have no more right of interference than each of them singly. The result is that, except in support of undoubted Justice, no nation may coerce another, except it has received or is menaced with an injury from that other nation. †

It may be objected that Turkey, not being a Christain nation, is outside the comity of nations or European concert, and that the natural law may and does bind Christian nations in their mutual dealings, but does not restrain their action towards unchristian nations. To this it is enough to reply that the natural law is universal and eternal. It extends over the whole world, and is not subject to change. If there is any difference between Christian nations and others, in regard to the law, it is that Christian nations are those who are more rigid in observing the Divine law, or law of nature.

Isodorus says : ‡ " *Jus naturale est commune omni nationi.*" And St. Thomas of Aquin § : " *Dicendum est quod lex naturæ, quantum ad prima principia communia, est eadem apud omnes;*" and " *Lex naturalis dirigit hominem secundum quædam præcepta communia, in quibus convenient tam perfecti quam imperfecti;* et ideo est una omnium." ||

By the natural law, then, there is no right of interference unless it can be shown either that some Treaty

\* Sect. 61.    † See Vattel, III. cap. iv. § 51.    ‡ V. Etymol. cap. 4.

§ Sum. Th. 1a, 2æ, Q. 91, § 4.    || Ibid. Q. 91, Sect. 5, ad. 3.

has been made with the Porte, by which a right of interference has been conceded ; or that persistent injustice and oppression on the part of the Porte, has been the cause of the present troubles. These two exceptions shall presently come under our attention.

It is proper, here, to advert to the liberal doctrine of "absolute non-intervention ;" that is, the assertion that there can be no occasion on which it is right to interfere in the affairs of another nation. *Dolus latet in generalibus.* This is one of those general propositions which Burke used to call "great swaggering majors." So far from this being true, it is right, on the contrary, to do all that is possible in order to prevent justice from succumbing to force. Half a century ago a man was stopped by two highwaymen not far from Portsmouth. He fought for his life, and nearly succeeded in overcoming the highwaymen. A sailor boasted that he had seen the struggle from behind a bush, where he had hid himself. That sailor was hung on the ground that his intervention would have been enough to prevent the murder. *Mandavit unicuique de proximo suo :* Every one is bound to come to the aid of his neighbour. So, then, intervention in the cause of justice is right ; intervention where no right is threatened, is always wrong.

This major premiss—"The domination by men of one religion over those of another is an injustice"—would go further than most men would desire. It would bind us to take Poland from Russia ; Alsace, Lorraine, and the Rhine provinces from Prussia ; and Ireland from England. It would compel us to assert that all legislation and administration must be strictly founded on the Gospel of Christ as the people of each locality expound it. Such a notion is at the opposite pole to the liberal principle that the State, and indeed every civil administration,

has nothing to do with religion, and must regard all religions with indifference.

Secondly : we have to see whether there is any right of interference by Treaty. It must be borne in mind that it would not be sufficient to show that the Treaties with the Porte do not debar us from interference. For even if they do not debar us, yet interference is forbidden by the natural law. The question before us is : Whether a right of interference has been expressly conceded by an existing Treaty ?

So far from this, it is a fact that the existing Treaties, also, debar us from interference in the internal affairs of Turkey. On this point I may be allowed to quote a portion of my speech in the debate of February 16, 1877 :—

"The right honourable member for Greenwich (Mr. Gladstone) said that 'it is necessary in the first place to consider what the Treaties are.' He was right. But in considering them he led up to an erroneous conclusion, namely : 'The Treaties, even if binding, would not debar any one of the signatory powers from interfering between the Sultan and his subjects.' I affirm, on the contrary, that they do debar each of the powers from interference ; and further, that they were framed and intended directly against the interference of Russia. The House will doubtless remember the 'proposals' which were made by Count Nesselrode, before the Crimean war, on June 24, 1854. The third proposal was, 'the consolidation of the rights of the Christian subjects of the Porte.' That was identical in scope and aim with the phrase which has since been invented, and is now in vogue : 'Guarantees for the good government of the Christian subjects of the Sultan.' At the eighth sitting of the Conference of Vienna, although the order

of the day was the ‘neutralization of the Black Sea,’ the Russian Plenipotentiaries (knowing that the other was the vital point, without which all would be worthless to them, as they would, without it, no longer be able to interfere in the internal affairs of Turkey)—the Russian Plenipotentiaries knowing this, pressed Prince Nesselrode’s third proposal on the attention of the Conference. Lord John Russell, our Plenipotentiary, however, met it with a decided negative, on the ground that it ‘nearly affected the rights of the sovereignty of the Sultan.’ On this point, as the most vital of all, the Conference broke up. The allies preferred war to the plea for increased interference which such a proposal would give to Russia ; and the Russians risked a war against four European powers for the sake of it. Russia was beaten ; and the Congress of Paris met in February, 1856. At the second sitting, on the 28th of February, the Russian Plenipotentiary, Count Orloff, along with Baron Hübner, endeavoured to insert in the Treaty a recital of the measures already decreed or promised by the Sultan in favour of his Christian subjects, making the execution of those measures ‘an obligation on the co-signatory powers,’ with the addition of a sop or blind, in the words : ‘without touching the independence of the Porte.’ Austria, France, England, Sardinia, and Turkey objected, and the proposal was negatived. On the 25th of March, during the fourteenth sitting of the Congress, the proposal was insidiously renewed by Baron Brunnow, in a long speech, and again, with the crafty suggestion of this stipulation : that ‘it should not give to any power the right of interference.’ Again this was opposed by Lord Clarendon ; and at length the French compromise—that of Count Walewski—was accepted. This compromise was formally based on the proposition that ‘Russia had

no greater interest in the condition of the Christians in Turkey than any other power of Europe ;' and it became Article IX. of the treaty. That Article recited that the Sultan had issued a 'Firman emanating spontaneously from his sovereign will,' and added that such a communication 'it is clearly understood cannot, in any case, give to the said powers the right to interfere, either collectively or separately, in the relation of His Majesty the Sultan with his subjects, nor in the internal administration of his empire.' That is to say, although the gracious act or promise of the Sultan is mentioned in the deed, yet it is carefully excluded from the contract which then was made. Now I ask any lawyer in this House whether a verbal promise made before the time of signing a deed, but excluded from the contract by a proviso in the deed, can in any way affect the contract itself ? I believe that the contract would be equally binding whether the promise were fulfilled or not. What, then, was that contract which still remains ? The only part to which I shall allude is contained in the 7th Article : 'Their Majesties engage, each on his part, to respect the independence and territorial integrity of the Ottoman Empire ; guarantee in common the strict observance of that engagement ; and will, in consequence, consider any act tending to its violation as a question of general interest.' That contract was rendered still more stringent by the Tripartite Treaty between England, France, and Austria, on the 15th of April : 'The high contracting parties guarantee, jointly and severally, the independence and the integrity of the Ottoman Empire, recorded in the Treaty concluded at Paris on the 30th of March, 1856 ; any infraction of the stipulations of the said Treaty will be considered by the powers signing the present treaty as *casus belli*.' That is to say, those three

powers bound themselves to make war upon Russia if she should violate the independence or the integrity of the Ottoman Empire; and the refusal of any one of those powers to fulfil its obligations was not to act as a release to the others. This Treaty was not signed by Turkey, and cannot be affected by the acts of the Porte. It was made in the interest of Austria, France, and England.

"The proposition which the right hon. member for Greenwich has just affirmed was that 'the Treaties do not debar any power from interfering between the Sultan and his subjects.' Yet this very proposition was answered by the right hon. gentleman himself, in his speeches at Frome and at Taunton. Speaking, at the latter place, of the Treaty of March 30th, 1856, and of 'the second Treaty, more stringent still, passed a few months after the Treaty of Paris, between Austria, France, and England,' he continued in these words:—

"' If these Treaties are in force, then we are bound towards Turkey, not only to the general recognition of its general independence and integrity, but likewise to that which is much more important, viz., to a several as well as a joint guarantee. In truth, it is impossible for national engagements to be stronger. . . . If the Treaties are in force, you are bound hand and foot by them. . . . This is, to a great extent, the hinge of the whole subject.'

"The Secretary at War certainly asserted just now that those Treaties 'do not bind us to go to war.' But what did a superior authority affirm? On the 14th of July, Lord Derby said, in reply to two deputations:—

"' We undertook, undoubtedly, twenty years ago (1856) to guarantee the sick man (Turkey) against murder, but we never undertook to guarantee him

against suicide, or sudden death. Now that, gentlemen, is, in a few words, our policy as regards this war now going on. We shall not intervene; we shall do our utmost, if necessary, to discourage others from intervening; but I don't believe that, under present circumstances, it will be necessary.'

"Now, first, the 'discouragement against intervening,' which was not then 'necessary,' could not refer to diplomatic action, which was then going on briskly. It must have meant a threat of war, at the least. Secondly, according to Lord Derby, those Treaties bind us to defend the Porte from murder, but not from suicide. Suicide is death by one's own act; murder is death by the hand of another. By that 'other,' he certainly meant Russia; so we are bound to defend Turkey against Russia. Let us see what another authority says of the character of those Treaties. Prince Gortchakow himself, the Russian Chancellor, wrote, in despatch No. 1,053 (Nov. 7, 1876), after stating that the aim of Russia is the same as the end of England, but that they differ as to the means:

"The London Cabinet would reconcile it, with the letter of stipulations concluded in former times (1856), . . . without taking into account the twenty years which have elapsed, and the painful experience they have brought. This experience has shown on the clearest evidence that European action in Turkey has been reduced to impotency by the stipulations of 1856. . . . The independence and integrity of Turkey must be subordinated to the guarantees demanded by humanity. . . . It is the right and duty of Europe to dictate to Turkey the conditions on which alone it can on its part consent to the maintenance of the political *status quo* created by that Treaty."

"It appears, therefore, that even in the eyes of Russia, the Treaties of 1856 have a binding effect, to reduce to impotency all efforts to interfere with the independence and integrity of Turkey.

"The Russian Government, then, hold that, up to the end of 1876, those Treaties were in vigour and force, and therefore desire that the independence of Turkey should be subordinated to a vague chimera of the brain, called 'the interests of humanity.' I think this is sufficient to disprove the proposition of the right hon. member for Greenwich, that 'the Treaties do not debar any power from interfering between the Sultan and his subjects.'

The 7th Article of the first Treaty of 1856, then, guarantees the independence and integrity of the Ottoman Empire. Can it be construed as no more than a permission to defend that independence and integrity? No; without any treaty, every state has a right to defend the independence and integrity of any other state which is unjustly attacked. There is no need of a solemn Treaty to give such a right. Such a Treaty would be a superfluous affirmation of a right which already exists under the natural law. It would, as has been well said,\* be impossible to get nearer to "the depths of diplomatic vacuity." But if the 7th Article affirms more than a right, it must bind by a duty. It is the duty of the signatories to defend the independence and integrity of the Ottoman Empire. If this be the scope of the Treaty of March, how much more can it be said of the Tripartite Treaty of April? This binds the three nations severally and in common, to take part in such a war of defence.

That this was the intention at the time, that this

\* *Times*, March 8, 1877.

was the duty to which the European states bound themselves, is proved by the words of Lord Palmerston, in giving his reasons for the Crimean war.\* "The five great Powers have, in a formal document, recorded their opinion that it is for the general interest of Europe that the integrity and independence of the Ottoman Empire should be maintained; and it would be easy to show that strong reasons, political and commercial, make it especially the interest of England that this integrity and independence should be maintained. . . We support Turkey for our own sake and for our own interests."

In 1875, this was the policy of England. On July 31, Mr. Disraeli said:† "But why was England in a state of isolation? She was isolated because she determined in favour of the principle of non-interference." He then asserted that the other Powers had come round to that principle; and he affirmed, moreover, that the *status quo* and integrity of the Turkish Empire should be maintained; and that the territorial integrity could not be preserved, except upon the principle of the *status quo*.

Immediately on the first sign of the rising in Herzegovina, Russia,—in order to get in the thin edge of the wedge of diplomatic intervention, and in order to give an air of importance to the rebellion, and to raise it into a European question, and to get the maxim of the necessity of interference accepted,—proposed that the Consuls of all the powers should be convened to deliberate on the affairs of Turkey. On what ground did Lord Derby first object, and then, with great reluctance, and, only at the direct request of the Porte, assent

\* Life by the Hon. E. Ashley, M.P.

† Hansard, cxxxii. p. 207.

to the mission of the Consuls? Because such a mission was "scarcely compatible with the independent authority of the Porte over its own territory. . . . and may not improbably open the way to further diplomatic interference in the internal affairs of the Empire."\* This was repeated, in nearly the same words, in Lord Derby's despatch of Jan. 25, 1876, when, also at the direct request of the Porte, he accepted the Andrassy Note,† or gave, rather, only "a general support to it . . . without pledging Her Majesty's Government to the details." The Porte left it entirely to the British Government, before the Porte had even seen the Andrassy Note, to decide whether the Andrassy Note was "altogether objectionable,"‡ and "strongly" requested Lord Derby to agree to it if not "altogether objectionable." Yet, for twelve days after this request, and for a month after the presentation of the note, Lord Derby hesitated to give the note a "general support." He hesitated, although he stated that it merely proposed those reforms which had already been promulgated by the Sultan. So far, then, the Government adhered to the principle of integrity and independence.

The Andrassy Note had "reference to the whole Empire," and proposed (1) religious liberty, which, Lord Derby said, § had already "been acknowledged to the fullest extent," by the Porte; (2) the abolition of tax farming; (3) the application of the revenues, derived from direct taxation, to the interests of the Provinces in which they were raised; (4) a mixed commission to superintend reforms or an Extra-national Government of those Provinces; (5) improvement in the state of the

\* II. of 1876. Despatch of Aug. 24, 1875. † II. of 1876. No. 73.

‡ II. of 1876. No. 60. Sir H. Elliot. Jan. 13, 1876.

§ II. of 1876. No. 72.

rural population.\* On January 22nd, 1876, Count Beust, the Austrian Ambassador, informed Lord Derby that this note "was not regarded by the Austrian Government in the light of mere good advice"; to which Lord Derby replied that the British Government would not "do more than offer friendly advice." He still respected the independent Sovereignty of the Porte, and feared the menace against the integrity of Ottoman territory, of which menace Count Beust had been made the medium of communication.

The history of this note was as follows: Austria, having (as we shall see in a subsequent chapter) at the first aided in the intrigues for stirring up the rebellion, was now afraid lest the sedition should extend to the Slav populations in her own territory. Russia feared that Austria was veering round against her, and therefore cunningly persuaded Count Andrassy to draw up a note which should be more favourable to Turkey, than were the demands of the insurgents. Russia, it appears, then said that she could not propose the measures contained in the note, as she was too deeply interested; and that Prussia could not do so, as she was too little interested; and that it would be convenient for Austria to do so, in accordance with the maxim: *in medio tutissimus ibis*. This was the *mise-en-scène* of the Eastern melodrama: Russia whose persecutions of Poland had lasted for a century; and Prussia with her Falk laws; and Austria who had repudiated the Concordat, agreed to put on masks and suitable attire and act the part of Protectors of the Christians. Austria indites and presents the note. Turkey promises to carry out the note before she sees the note; and then Russia persuades the insurgents to reject it absolutely, and swear that they will never

\* II. of 1876. No. 55. Dec. 30, 1875.

lay down their arms. The result of this machination was that Austria was made unpopular with her own Slav populations, and thus suffered a considerable loss of Social power; and she offended the Slav populations in Turkey and Russia, and lost Federative power.

Wisselitzki,—a Russian, domiciled at Cetigne, who was one of the Russian agents in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and engaged in stirring up the revolt,—was the bearer, to St. Petersburg, of this refusal by the insurgents, and of the demands of the insurgents. Russia then put herself forward as the friend of the Slavs, by embodying those demands, word for word, in the Berlin Memorandum (of which anon). This was an increase of Federative power for Russia, while it weakened the Social power of Austria, Prussia, and the Porte, whose Slav populations naturally turned to Russia.

Lord Derby, having been so informed by Count Beust, wrote a despatch on Jan. 18, 1876,\* saying: “that if the Porte accepted the Andrassy Note, it would be advantageous to the Porte, *as the Powers engaged themselves* (1) *not to make fresh demands, and* (2) *to give support to the Turkish Government*, in the event of its acceptance.” A promise, that the Powers would “restrain Montenegro,” was also conveyed. These promises were speedily broken. The Berlin Memorandum was one of the violations of it. Yet no one learns by experience. Exactly the same thing occurred a year after. For in the index of Vol. I. of 1877, we find a reference to a despatch of Lord Derby’s, which runs thus: “No. 63, p. 56. Her Majesty’s Government do not contemplate probability of Powers urging Porte to make fresh concessions to Prince Milan (of Servia).” The despatch itself has been cut out of the Blue-book;

\* II. of 1876. No. 63.

doubtless because the promise was violated directly afterwards. The clerk forgot to remove the reference from the index.

The mission of the Fleet to Besika Bay—the most powerful fleet that ever divided the blue waves of the Mediterranean—is the next incident, indicating the policy of the Government, which we have to contemplate. The Blue-book\* contains four telegrams of the 10th of May. Sir H. Elliot informs Lord Derby that he has telegraphed for the fleet to protect the Christians against the Turks.† A second telegram of the same day‡ says that this move is to “give confidence to the Christians.” On the same day Lord Derby telegraphs§ to Sir H. Elliot : “to explain more fully his reasons.” On the same day || Sir Henry Elliot replies merely : “that the presence of the squadron at Besika Bay would greatly conduce to the security of the Christians.” That, surely, is not “explaining more fully his reasons” ! On the same day ¶, doubtless after the four former telegrams had gone back and forwards, and the more full explanation to show the necessity had been given, the permanent Secretary at the Foreign Office writes a despatch to the Secretary of the Admiralty,—by far the longest communication of the five, saying that “there are grounds for apprehending *serious occurrences* at Constantinople, and that great uneasiness prevails there *among all classes*.” The reader may think that the telegraphic operations were extraordinarily rapid; or he may have his suspicions aroused, and may recall to mind how that, in the House of Lords, and also on various platforms, Lord Derby was congratulated, by his Conservative supporters, on his “spirited foreign policy,” in sending the Fleet to Besika Bay to

\* Vol. III. of 1876.

† No. 224.

‡ No. 271.

§ No. 228.

|| No. 229.

¶ No. 230.

*support the Turks*; and that Lord Derby owned the soft impeachment. There was commercial disturbance, there was financial uncertainty, there were war risks on insurance,—until the Deputations interviewed Lord Derby on July 14, and were told that the Fleet was to *menace* the Turks, who had dethroned a Sultan and murdered a Consul; and to prevent a massacre of Christians, that is, to repress the Turks and aid those insurgents whom the Turks were twice bidden by Lord Derby to put down with vigour. Could it be so? Was the principle of integrity and independence already forgotten? At the end of the conference\* we seem to learn a different story. Lord Salisbury presented the twice diminished undiminishable ultimatum, and demanded, in peremptory terms, the Sultan's instant adherence. The Sultan said it would be as much as his crown was worth. Lord Salisbury said he should no longer have the countenance and support of England, and that the Fleet should therefore be recalled from Besika Bay. If it was recalled in order to take away support from the Turks, it was there in order to give support to the Turks. If this be true, it is another example of the policy of maintaining the integrity and independence of the Porte.

I have learned from a source of undoubted knowledge,—but the name I may not reveal;—I have learned in a manner which has produced certainty in my mind,—but to that mode I may not allude,—the true history of the whole matter. I prefer to give the story in the words of another authority, of very great weight and knowledge.† “The nation is demented. Some months ago the Russian Cabinet planned the immediate surprise of Constantinople. *Lord Beaconsfield* foiled the attempt, and the English

\* Telegram of December 27.

† “The Northern Question,” pp. 10 and 34.

people, misled by a parcel of dishonest agitators and frenzied enthusiasts, rewarded him with abuse. . . . By sending the fleet to Besika Bay, Russia received a severe check, and was about to resume her former quiet course of action, when the 'Daily News' started on its unpatriotic crusade ; and England, carried away for a moment by a mistaken sympathy, caught up the popular outcry and preached a religious war, whilst Russia, misled by the apparent discord between the opinion of the Government and that of the nation, resumed the offensive. . . . To the end Russia strove against fate. With her ambassador at his elbow, the unhappy monarch (the Sultan) planned the occupation of his capital by 60,000 Russian troops. The Russians were ready, and waited only the signal to sweep down on the Bosphorus. That signal was never given. The English fleet dropped anchor in Besika Bay, and in a single night the sword of Othman was wrenched from the hand of Abdul Aziz. . . . The popular party, headed by Hussein Avni, Mithad and Namyk Pashas, rose in their might and swept away at one stroke, treason and its prompter. Mahmoud fell, and with him the power and influence of General Ignatiew."

This fact was probably alluded to by Lord Derby in a despatch of October 30.\* He is relating the past transactions to Lord A. Loftus : "I thought it right to warn his Excellency (Schouvaloff) that, however strong might be the feeling of national indignation against Turkish cruelties, it would be superseded by a very different sentiment if it were once believed by the English nation that Constantinople were threatened." The Government, then, still continued to adhere to their policy of non-

\* I. of 1877, p. 560.

intervention, of maintaining the independence and integrity of Turkey.

The Berlin memorandum was an attempt, on the part of the three Emperors, to govern Turkey without the co-operation of the Porte, or even the cognizance of the other powers of Europe. Russia, Germany, and Austria settled the terms between them, and despatched the note on May 13, 1876, to England, France, and Italy.\* It proposed (1) an International Commission to supervise the necessary reforms in Turkey. This was a blow at the sovereignty or independence of the Porte ; and was a proposal for an extra-national government of the Ottoman Empire,—the germ of an extra-national government of Europe by a committee of foreigners. It proposed (2) the interning of Turkish soldiers within certain fortresses,—which was in fact taking the command of the Turkish army from the Sultan, and, by denuding the country of all armed force, would have certainly led to conflicts (between the armed Mussulmans and the refugees who returned with arms in their hands), to further seditions, and to intervention by the other Powers. It proposed (3) what were called by the vague term “guarantees ;” by which was evidently meant either war or annexation, or at least an occupation, for an indefinite time, by foreign troops. This was a blow at the integrity of the Ottoman Empire. The Memorandum concluded in these words :—

“If, with the friendly and cordial support of the great powers, and by the help of an armistice, an arrangement could be concluded on these bases, and be set in train immediately by the return of the refugees and the election of the Mixed Commission, a considerable step would be made towards pacification. If, however, the armistice

\* III. of 1876. No. 248.

were to expire without the efforts of the Powers being successful in attaining the end they have in view, the three Imperial Courts are of opinion that it would become necessary *to supplement their diplomatic action* by the sanction of an agreement with a view to *such efficacious measures* as might be demanded in the interest of general peace, to check the evil and prevent its development."

On the 15th of May, Lord Odo Russell telegraphed from Berlin that the Italian and French Governments had agreed to support the Berlin Memorandum.\* There were now five great powers on the one side, and England alone was standing out. On that day Lord Derby wrote a despatch containing an account of the conversation with the German Ambassador.† It contains the following passage :—

*"With regard to the 3rd Article, I said that I did not see how peace was to be preserved between the Christian and Mahometan populations if the Turkish troops were to be concentrated as proposed, or how the Turkish Government could be held responsible for the maintenance of order, if the only disciplined force in the country were thus withdrawn. The 4th Article showed this conclusively, since if the insurgents were to return armed to meet the Mussulmans, also retaining their arms, a collision would be inevitable.*

*"I did not lay any stress on the 5th Article, as it might mean much or little, according to the interpretation which might be given to the duties of surveillance by the Consuls or Delegates entrusted with them. (In short, it opened a door to any amount of interference.)*

*"I could not, however, but remark that the intimation*

\* III. of 1876. No. 261.

† III. of 1876. No. 259. May 15.

contained in *the last paragraph of the Memorandum seemed to leave the disposal of events wholly with the insurgents. It almost amounted to an invitation to them to refuse to entertain any terms that were likely or possible to be offered, since it gave them to understand that by continuing the insurrection they would secure further intervention on their behalf.*"

Yet the Berlin Memorandum was officially termed "A Memorandum for the Pacification of the Provinces of Turkey." After four days of consideration Lord Derby explained to Sir Henry Elliot his ground of refusing to accede to the Berlin Memorandum. It was : that ever since the commencement of the troubles the British Government had deprecated any intervention in the affairs of Turkey, and that they would not consent to a policy which struck at the integrity and independence of the empire. The words are :—

"Her Majesty's Government have, since the outbreak of the insurrection in Bosnia and Herzegovina, *deprecated the diplomatic intervention of other Powers* in the affairs of the Ottoman Empire.

"They agreed, at the instance of the Porte, to take part in the Consular Commission established in August last, although they felt little confidence in any good results arising from it. They also, at the request of the Porte, took part in the concert of the Powers in regard to Count Andrassy's Note, although with certain reservations. They scarcely suppose that the Porte will again appeal to them to join the other Powers on the present occasion ; and, even if the Porte were to do so, they would not be able to comply, since they feel that they cannot conscientiously advise the Porte to accept conditions which they cannot recommend as politic or feasible." \*

On the same day he wrote a despatch to our ambassador at Berlin.\* It contains the following passage :—

“ In the first place, it appears to Her Majesty’s Government that they would not be justified in insisting upon the Porte consenting to an armistice without knowing whether the military situation admitted of its being established *without prejudice to the Turkish Government*, and without rendering necessary the exercise of greater efforts on the renewal of the campaign, and a consequent prolongation of the struggle. Moreover, the faithful observance of the armistice by both sides would have to be secured, since the Porte could not well be called upon to suspend operations against the insurgents while the insurrection was receiving support from Servia and Montenegro, and the insurgents strengthening their position, and recruiting their forces and obtaining arms and supplies. . . . Her Majesty’s Government do not feel justified in recommending it to the Porte, still less in insisting upon its acceptance. . . . ”

“ The concentration of the Turkish troops in certain places would be delivering up the whole country to anarchy, particularly when the insurgents are to retain their arms.

“ The ‘Consular supervision’ would reduce the authority of the Sultan to nullity; and, without force to support it, supervision would be impossible.

“ Even if there were any prospect of the Porte being willing and able to come to an arrangement with the insurgents on the basis proposed, which Her Majesty’s Government scarcely believe possible, the intimation with which the Memorandum closes would render any such negotiation almost certainly abortive, for *it could not be supposed that the insurgents would accept any terms*

\* III. of 1876. No. 275. To Lord O. Russell. May 19.

*of pacification* from the Porte in face of the declaration that if the insurrection continued after the armistice the Powers would intervene further."

It was not until the 29th of May that Lord Derby, as we find from a despatch of that date, discovered that the proposals of "the chiefs of the insurgents," with which "M. Wissclitzki" was entrusted, "closely resembled those which the three Powers adopted at the Berlin Conference." \*

So far, then, it is evident that the policy of Her Majesty's Government was to prevent interference in the internal affairs of the Ottoman Empire, or (in other words) to maintain the independence and integrity of Turkey.

The next assertion of this policy, by the British Government, reveals to us, however, a deplorable infirmity of purpose. The occasion arose on an endeavour, first to terrify, and then to cajole the Porte into accepting the "mediation" of the six Powers. The mediation meant, of course, that the six Powers should constitute themselves into an Arcopagus, or rather a cabinet or committee to manage the affairs of Turkey:—another attempt to establish extra-national government. Into such a fatal course the six Powers endeavoured first to terrify, and then to cajole the Porte. The *argumentum in terrorem* consisted in a threat that we would disregard all Treaties and not defend the Porte, should Russia make an attempt to murder her, unless the Porte would consent to the extra-national government. The *argumentum in spem* was a promise that if Turkey would accept the proposed extra-national government (which would put an end to the independence of the Porte), the Treaties (which guaranteed the independence of the Porte) should not be disregarded, and the integrity (termed the "interests")

\* III. of 1876. No. 313.

and the independence (called the "dignity") of the empire should be maintained. In short, the promise was that if 'the Porte would relinquish its integrity and independence it should not relinquish them. This is found in a despatch from Sir H. Elliot to the Earl of Derby, dated Sep. 10, 1876.\* The words are these :—

"The Porte was again, on this occasion, distinctly given to understand that if it rejects the offered mediation, and an attack on the part of any power were to ensue, *no support from Her Majesty's Government is to be expected by it.*

"It was informed that if, on the contrary; the mediation is accepted, the Sultan's Government may be assured that no efforts will be wanting on the part of that of Her Majesty to procure the conclusion of a peace by which the empire should *not suffer either in its interests or its dignity.*"

This vacillation was accentuated by Lord Derby, on the 20th of April, 1877, in the House of Lords. He is reported to have said: "I stated as long ago as May last, when negotiations in connexion with the Berlin Memorandum were pending, that the Porte must not count upon receiving material support from England. I have repeated that warning on several occasions, particularly at the time of the Conference, and if I have not uttered it again within the last few days, it is because a repetition of it would be superfluous, and would only weaken the effect of the previous warnings we have given."

Another occasion speedily arose for enforcing the policy of non-interference. On September 26, Count Schouvaloff, the Russian Ambassador, communicated proposals to Lord Derby, that "in the event of peace

\* I. of 1877. No. 332.

being refused by the Porte, Bosnia should be occupied by an Austrian, and Bulgaria by a Russian force," while the combined fleets should force the passage of the Dardanelles. This is the account which Lord Derby gave of the proposal in his summary despatch of October 30.\*

"I had no difficulty in submitting this proposal to my colleagues, and informed Count Schouvaloff that Her Majesty's Government had . . . been *unable to concur in the measures of occupation and the entry of the united fleets into the Bosphorus* which had been previously suggested by Prince Gortchakow.

"Sir Henry Elliot was accordingly instructed, on the 5th of October, *in the event of the terms of peace which had been proposed by the Powers being refused*, to press upon the Porte as an alternative to grant an armistice of not less than a month, and to state that, on the conclusion of an armistice, it was proposed that a Conference should immediately follow. He was further to intimate that, *in case of the refusal of an armistice, he was instructed to leave Constantinople, as it would then be evident that all further exertions on the part of Her Majesty's Government to save the Porte from ruin would have become useless.*"

The following is the account of the transaction, which is given by the renowned author of "The Northern Question":—

"Witness the Sumorakoff mission. Austria was on the very point of falling, from sheer fright of Russia, into the gaping trap, when our Government's counsel saved her, and if *Lord Beaconsfield again become independent of hostile Radicals and too cautious colleagues, will save England also.*"†

\* I. of 1877. No. 800. Earl of Derby. Oct. 30.

† "The Northern Question," p. 10.

This, then, was a pre-eminent example of the determination, on the part of Her Majesty's Government, to defend the independence and integrity of the Ottoman Empire.

Lastly: even Lord Salisbury, at the beginning of this year, had to confess that none of the Powers have any right to interfere between the Sultan and his subjects. Lord Salisbury spoke these words at the Conference :\* “In 1856 the arrangements entered into at a previous date were abolished in order to declare that henceforth the Ottoman Empire would be admitted into the concert of the European Powers and *placed under the guarantee of the Six Powers*; all of which has been done without reservation. The wise intentions and promises of reform made by Sultan Abdul Medjid were communicated to the Powers, and the great value of this communication has been attested by them; but in spite of the circumstances which caused the Crimean War and the discussions which preceded it, *no right of interference in the relations between His Majesty and his subjects was established by Article IX. of the Treaty of 1856*. Yet the engagements of this Treaty were not and cannot be unilateral. *No right of interference in internal administration was to be deduced from the Treaty*. It was confidently believed that the Sultan would always be ready to listen to the disinterested counsels of the Powers who guaranteed his Empire, and who maintained its integrity and independence by means of the well-known sacrifices that some of them made.” This was said by Lord Salisbury, after the furious agitation which had been carried on, in England, against the Turks, and the Treaties of 1856,—an agitation which, like the

\* Eighth Protocol of the Conference. Jan. 3, 1877.—II. of 1877, p. 361.

"widely-wasting breath" of a Simoom, succeeded, to some extent, in blasting the policy of Her Majesty's Government; or say, rather, which inspired terror in some of the more timid of her Majesty's advisers. During that agitation, some persons proclaimed the hideous doctrine, that National sentimentalism is superior to written pacts; and that a Treaty is worthless whenever "the National Will" should cease to support it. Even Lord Derby\* held,—doubtless in a wavering moment as a "timid colleague,"—that the policy of the Government is not to be determined by Right and Justice, not by Law and Treaties, but by expediency and the evil suggestions of self-interest. He avowed that the meaning of the words in a Treaty, how plain soever that meaning may be, is to depend on circumstances of time and place, and the whim of an ignorant and excited multitude. How different from his former clear enunciations of that one policy of non-interference! Perhaps he wavered chameleon-like, changing colour and purpose, with the colour of his environment. It was the time of the holidays. The Foreign Secretary was left alone, and played his plaintive ditties in the key of A flat. When the Prime Minister was at his elbow, his despatches were given in the key of D sharp major.

A little later, on Sept. 21, Lord Derby wrote a despatch† to Sir H. Elliot; and Lord Derby commanded Sir H. Elliot to "demand" an audience of the Sultan, and lay the despatch before him. A parallel, for insult and indignity, had never been sent before to any Sovereign. On a report of outrages, not sworn to in a court, and no cause of justification of them having been examined, Lord Derby decreed that "ample reparations"

\* I. of 1877. No. 159.

† I. of 1877. No. 316.

tion shall be afforded," he "denounced officials," he "called for reparation and justice," he "urged that striking examples should be made," and demanded that the "disturbed districts should at once be placed under an able and energetic Commissioner specially appointed for the purpose." This despatch showed no respect for the independence and integrity of the Ottoman Empire. It was a direct interference between the Sultan and his subjects. Doubtless it was the noisy agitation which caused Lord Derby to write both this despatch and the former one, No. 159. The "Atrocity" declamation of butchers and grocers caused him to change his policy ! Yet the policy of England was not changed in substance, although it may have suffered an alteration in name. The policy of Lord Derby, who penned the despatches, was not the policy of England, which was inspired by one man : the hands were the hands of Esau, but the voice was the voice of Israel. The policy of non-interference and of maintaining the integrity and independence of Turkey soon reappeared. Who could doubt the authorship of that strong, consistent, enlightened, enduring policy, which was veiled for a time ?—could anyone doubt the authorship, who, on Nov. 9th, in the Guildhall, heard the Shylock voice, with brazen tones, that croaked, "My bond, my bond: what says my bond ?"

Yes ; Lord Derby, on hearing the noise of multitudes, at once relinquished the ancient policy, and forgot the dearest interests of England in his anxiety to "learn his master's bidding, and fulfil the desire of his employers." Yet Sir Henry Elliot had warned him that mis-government in the Turkish provinces, could not affect our duties, nor change our Treaty obligations. Of course every one desired to remedy the mis-government in

Turkey, as much as those who said that the breach of Treaties, and the creation of autonomous provinces, are the only means of accomplishing this end. But to assert that, because there may be misrule or even anarchy now, we should drive out the Turks, and make the anarchy far worse, is as much as to say that, for the sake of peace, we will light the flames of a civil warfare, which is certain to spread into an European conflagration ; and that, for the sake of erecting a barrier against Russian ambition, we will allow Russia to make a certain acquisition of all ; and that, for the sake of religious liberty, we will bring into European Turkey the most hideous religious despotism, and most heartless persecution, which the world has ever seen. The Government were right all along in respecting the plain meaning of Treaties, and obeying the commands of international law, and refusing to interfere in Turkey, or to slight the independence and integrity of the Ottoman Empire. They regarded the true interests of the nation, and not that which a few noisy persons erroneously, and for the moment, supposed to be the good of the nation. They elected to stand or fall by the conscientious performance of their duty ; and they stood. Yet, as we shall presently see, they are not free from blame for errors of judgment. In the political, as in the social order, it is inferiority which entails dependence ; and, to preserve the independence of Turkey, our constant moral support was as necessary as her own moral improvement.

## CHAPTER V.

## DISREGARD OF TREATIES.

THE Right of convenience or expediency, has now taken the place of Public Law, and the faith of Treaties. A large state seizes on a smaller, because it is expedient ; and then, for the sake of convenience, and in order to preserve the equilibrium, another large state seizes on another tract of country ; and a third swallows up another people. Neither Law nor Treaty is allowed to stand in the way of national ambition or a ruler's avarice. The "neutralisation of the Black Sea," or limitation of the Russian naval force was secured,—secured, shall I say ?—by a clause in the Treaty of Paris of March 1856. In 1870, this was kicked to the winds, by Russia, in the most high-handed and insulting manner. Russia was condemned by the Protocol of London, and she doubtless laughed at the verdict, and jeered at the judges. This was the verdict. The treaty of March 30, 1856, had enacted, regarding the convention which determined the number of war vessels to be admitted into the Black Sea, that : "It cannot be either annulled or modified without the assent of the Powers (seven) signing the present Treaty." Yet Russia annulled it without any assent. The following Protocol was then agreed to by the seven Powers, including Russia :—

"The Plenipotentiaries of North Germany, of Austria-

Hungary, of Great Britain, of Italy, of Russia, and of Turkey, assembled to-day in Conference, recognise that it is an essential principle of the law of nations that no Power can liberate itself from the engagements of a Treaty, nor modify the stipulations thereof, unless with the consent of the Contracting Powers, by means of an amicable arrangement."\*

Why was it that we were unable to prevent this wrong from being perpetrated, or avenge it after it had been accomplished? Because we had stood aside to see Law and Treaties set at defiance in former years. France lay prostrate and crushed in 1871, because Prussia chose to disregard the Law of Nations, and went to war without just cause, and without presenting an ultimatum. In 1859 Austria was prostrated by France, who fought her without any just or sufficient ground; and we unconcernedly witnessed the wrong. In 1860, a French subject,† levied war, as a filibuster, on an ally of France, and made a "United Italy," whose origin and birth was lawlessness; and we did nothing to prevent it. In 1864, Austria and Prussia conspired against Denmark, and we stood by to see her spoiled, and to watch Treaties thrown to the winds. In 1866, Austria was dismembered and crushed by Prussia, while Hanover was swallowed up by means of falsehood, fraud and surprise. Yet Prussia had no just cause of war, and did not even make the war legally. Austria, although taken unawares, would not have been beaten, had not the "United Italy" threatened her frontiers, and drawn off troops enough to turn the balance. In any of these cases, if we had armed and offered to arbitrate, there would probably have been no war, and treaties would have been upheld, and the law

\* Protocol of London. Jan. 17, 1871.

† Garibaldi, a native of Nice.

observed. But we stood indolently and criminally aside, and looked on at the commission of crime, without even a protest against the wrong. Prince Gortchakow now sneers, and throws in our teeth, our former disregard of treaties.

"ST. PETERSBURG, NOVEMBER 15, 1876.

"MY LORD,—On visiting Prince Gortchakow this morning, at Czarskoe, I found his Highness rather disturbed in mind by the speech of the Earl of Beaconsfield at the Lord Mayor's banquet, which his Highness feared would have a bad effect at Constantinople, and would encourage the Porte in a Policy of resistance to the counsels of Europe.

"I observed to his Highness that the Prime Minister had in his speech especially *referred to the respect of Treaties*, and I reminded his Highness that in our conversation at Orianda, his Highness referred to the same subject, and very much in the same language, observing to me that he alone, on the occasion of the dissolution of the German Confederation, had remonstrated against the destruction of a political body created and guaranteed by an European Treaty.

"Prince Gortchakow replied that *England had raised no objection in regard to an infraction of treaties during the political changes in Italy and Germany*; on the contrary, had not only accepted, but approved them."\*

We may go further back, and still we shall find that a disregard of duties under treaties, has always been a cause of weakness. By the Treaty of Vienna in 1815, it was agreed that: (1.) The Bonaparte family should be for ever excluded from the throne of France. This con-

\* Lord A. Loftus to the Earl of Derby. II. of 1877. No. 1031. Nov. 15, 1876.

tract was broken. Napoleon III. set up the doctrine of Nationalities, and was the proximate cause of all the above mentioned wars, and then of his own ruin. (2.) Hanover was to remain for ever united to England ; yet Prussia was allowed to aggrandise herself in 1866 by seizing it treacherously without even a declaration of war. (3.) Venice and Lombardy were to be for ever part of Austria. Austria was weakened by Napoleon in 1859, and these were torn away. (4.) Holland and Belgium were to be for ever one kingdom. They were divided in 15 years ; and now Prussia has her eye upon one, and will pounce upon Antwerp and the Scheldt, that she may gain a naval seaport outside the Sound. What wonder is it (but yet no less a shame), that our public men, after such a political education, should not consider a treaty or contract as binding ? Lord Salisbury wrote to Lord Derby a despatch on January 4, 1877,\* in which he says :—

“The independence of the Ottoman Porte is a phrase which is, of course, capable of different interpretations. At the present time it must be interpreted so as to be consistent with the conjoint military and diplomatic action taken in recent years by the Powers who signed the treaty of Paris. If the Porte had been independent in the sense in which the Guaranteeing Powers are independent, it would not have stood in need of a guarantee. The military sacrifices made by the two Western Powers twenty years ago to save it from destruction, and the Conference which is now being held to avert an analogous danger, would have been an unnecessary interference if Turkey had been a power which did not depend on the protection of others for its existence.”

The first proposition, in that extraordinary argument,

\* II. of 1877.

is, that the Porte is no longer an independent State, because that some of the powers who signed the treaty of Paris (and I cannot discover which) have exercised some conjoint military and diplomatic action in Turkey in recent years; that is to say, supposing that such military and diplomatic action did take place, those criminal acts which we had bound ourselves not to commit are to be taken as the standard and rule by which we are to shape our future conduct! Just imagine a burglar defending himself in a court of justice by saying that he had a right to break into the house, because that he had broken into it before, and committed similar burglaries! Would the Judge consider that he had attained immunity by his previous crimes? Would that be considered a sufficient ground for acquittal? The second proposition is that the Porte is not an independent State, because that the five Powers had guaranteed its independence and integrity. So, then, no State whose independence and integrity have been guaranteed is an independent State, and every Power is at liberty and has a right to interfere with its internal administration, and to invade its territory. Belgium has been guaranteed. Has France a right to seize upon Belgium? Holland has been guaranteed. May Prussia seize upon the Scheldt, take possession of Antwerp, and become a standing menace to England? Greece has been guaranteed. What would the five Powers say, if Turkey were again to annex Greece? The argument is reduced to an absurdity. The third proposition is that the Western Powers made military sacrifices for the protection of the Porte's independence and integrity in the Crimean war, so that the Ottoman Empire is not a whole and independent. The results for which we fought are, therefore, to be considered as lost, by the very

fact of our having fought victoriously for them! But we made far greater sacrifices of blood and treasure, for every State of Europe, excepting France, from 1792 to 1815. If Lord Salisbury's argument is valid, it follows that the independence and integrity of no power of Europe excepting France, are now to be recognised and respected.

Lord Derby, also, advanced a fallacious argument. He said that we proffered advice which the Porte would not accept, and therefore we are free from our engagements, and the integrity and independence of the Porte are to be treated as null. Lord Derby, on Feb. 8, said :—

“ If a Power, which you are bound by Treaty to protect, declines your advice, and acts in a different sense, you cannot be pledged to support that Power for an indefinite time against the possible consequences of its own action.”

The very fact of our offering counsel and advice (instead of making demands and imperiously insisting on their acceptance, and using coercion to enforce them,) is sufficient to prove the independence of the Ottoman Power. The fact that we invited the Porte, as an equal, to take part in a Conference, is a demonstration of the independence of the Porte; and the despatches which have passed between all the powers leave no doubt about it. How can the offer of advice destroy independence? If I offer some one advice concerning the management of his house or estate, do I thus procure for myself the right to interfere, to coerce, to invade? The supposition is absurd. Such are the arguments of our Plenipotentiary and of our foreign Minister! Again :—

Lord Derby, by brooding over a particular act of error, and not liking to confess that he was wrong, has since expanded that error into a general principle, or maxim of conduct. On April 19, 1877, he said in the

House of Lords, in speaking of the Tripartite Treaty of 1856, and of Treaties in general :—

“ I am perfectly convinced that neither the French nor the Austrian Government has the slightest intention of calling upon us to fulfil what we are bound to under the Treaty of April, 1856, and consequently I have not thought it necessary to take any steps in regard to that Treaty, or to free ourselves from the obligations which it involves. . . . No Treaties can be or are intended to be eternal. They are framed with reference to existing circumstances, and though I do not say whether that is or is not the case in regard to the Treaty of 1856, yet nothing can be more probable in European diplomacy than the recognition of the fact that Treaties do by the lapse of time and the force of events become obsolete. I do not think it would be a fair or satisfactory conclusion to come to, either that you must be eternally bound by a treaty, made long ago under conditions wholly different from those now existing, or that you are to be held guilty of a breach of faith because you consider it to be no longer binding.”

Does it not seem a frightful doctrine that we are not to do our duty, not to fulfil our obligations, not to execute our contracts, unless positively called upon to do so ?

Such are public men! The peace of the world no longer rests on law,—which is the old and the only secure basis,—but on brute force, and two-hundred-ton guns. Big battalions and monster ironclads are the Providence to which all modern nations look to decide the future of the world. Hence the enormous expenditure for armies and navies, which burden the world. Every State is running a suicidal race, towards a goal of carnage and bankruptcy. The fundamental maxim of modern mor-

ality is : *La force prime le droit.* Force is put in the first place, where right used to reign; and expediency governs the conduct of states, which law alone used to sway. Europe is no longer Christian, but Pagan. On such a Pagan basis, peace cannot be secure. Not even for a few weeks, can there be an equilibrium of forces, or balance of power. Any day an unforeseen accident may kick the beam. The comity of nations, or "the European family of Christendom," is a rubble house "built upon the sand,"—a house built with "untempered mortar,"—with nothing to bind the stones together, and without stable ground whcreon to stand.

## CHAPTER VI.

THE PHYSICAL CONFIGURATION OF COUNTRIES, RACES,  
AND RELIGIONS.

— + —

“ Quicquid non possidet armis, religione tenet.”

THE only limit, to the ambition of States, seems to be the inflexible and eternal conditions of geography, which man is unable to disregard. These conditions are like the sand which has been “ set as bounds to the sea, which it cannot pass.” Thus, Switzerland, in the hands of a neutral power, is still a great neutral fortress, or keystone to the triple arch of Germany, France, and Italy. But if it came to be in the hands of any one of them, it would be a standing menace, a great arsenal, a fortified camp, stretching along the flanks of the other two. Hence Prussia’s claim to Neuchatel, once so hotly pressed, but now dormant *for a time*. Switzerland may be the arbiter of Europe.

Russia is another example. The peculiarity of Russia is its configuration. It is very large; and its rivers run north and south, not into oceans, but into gulphs with very narrow outlets ; namely, the Sound and the Bosphorus. Her trade is, therefore, at the mercy of the maritime Powers. England, on the other hand, is surrounded, by the sea, and cannot live except by trade, and cannot be a military Power, and must be a maritime Power, or perish. Now, the Commerce of Russia is in

raw produce, which, being heavy and bulky, must be carried by sea, and must pass through one of the two funnels,—the Sound or the Dardanelles,—where a few frigates can seize or destroy it. Her overland Eastern trade has been starved by the opening of the Suez Canal ; and yet, if she trades with the East, through the Suez Canal, then her produce must go through a third funnel, where a maritime State may take it.

Turkey holds a remarkable power ; and Constantinople is unique in its position. There is no wonder that Russia covets Constantinople. It is the gate of the Black Sea. As much as Malta, it threatens the Red Sea, and our present route to India. It menaces the Euphrates valley, our future road to India. It holds the outlet to South German commerce—the mouths of the Danube. It is the key to all Southern Asia, and the Persian Gulph. Russia wants Constantinople. Russia seeks to revive, in Byzantium, the universal empire of the Cæsars. Lord Derby, on Sept. 11, 1876, said to the two deputations : “The reasons which induced us to set a value on the territorial integrity of Turkey, are permanent and real. *The last word on the Eastern question is this :—Who is to have Constantinople ?*”

So valuable is Constantinople ! And, withal, Constantinople is nearly impregnable. Twenty thousand men on the European side, and thirty thousand on the Asiatic, with possession of the sea, may hold it against the world. How easy is it, then, for us to maintain our plighted word, and do as we are bound by Treaty, for saving Constantinople ! But if we shrink from this duty, what perils environ us ! If Russia gets Turkey under her influence, then Persia is at her feet. If Russia can control Persia, she equally gets Turkey. She needs to influence but one, and then the whole of Southern Asia

is hers, and an alliance with the Affghans (whom we have just been busy in offending), brings her, by Merve and Herat and Candahar, to India. This is obvious to any one who merely studies the map. These are the sources of danger which frown at us and menace us, while we tamper with the integrity of the Ottoman Empire. These are reasons for preserving the territorial *status quo*. Have we not, then, grave cause for anxiety in watching the endeavours of Russia, persistent and unremitting through so many years, to mix herself up in the affairs of Turkey ? Bearing these facts in mind, let us ponder the words of Lord Derby on September 11 :—

“ The reasons which induced us to set a value on the territorial integrity of Turkey are permanent and real, and I hold that it is sound policy now as much as it was in 1856 to adhere to that which diplomatists called the territorial *status quo*. It is possible that the language which is being used may induce foreign politicians and governments to think that England has changed her mind on that subject. If that impression is produced it will be a misfortune to us and to all the world.”

The danger is too vast, the crisis too imminent, for paltry questions and sentimental policy. Let us be up and doing, or we are for ever lost !

There is another geographical point which must not be forgotten. The Balkan range is the second and most formidable line of defence against Russia. Bulgaria is on the north side—north of the precipices. But some Bulgarians live on the southern slopes. How hard Russia has fought, first by means of the erection of a separate Bulgarian Church ; then by political intrigues ; next by causing the “ atrocities ” to be committed at Philippopolis on the southern side ; and lastly by General Ignatiew and Lord Salisbury in the Conference, in order to

get both sides of the Balkans consolidated into one autonomous state, so that she, at any time, may pass the second line of defence. Sir H. Elliot refers to this \* in a despatch to Lord Derby :—

“The province marked on the map as Bulgaria, which is the only one that can be looked upon as geographically possible to trace, is the district lying to the north of the range of the Balkans, which does not comprise the parts where the worst excesses were committed in the suppression of the late insurrection.

“South of the Balkans no natural line could be found, and the large Bulgarian populations would be left in a state of perpetual discontent at their exclusion from autonomic arrangements made in favour of their countrymen to the north of the mountains.

“The Turks will never entertain the idea of granting an independent administration to a province over which, with a view to the defence of their Danube frontier, it is essential for them to have direct control ; and if the question should unfortunately be raised by persons of influence in England, the future tranquillity of the province will be rendered more precarious than ever.”

On January 4, 1877, Lord Salisbury wrote † thus, describing the fifth guarantee which the Conference required of the Porte :—

“The proposed limitation and division of the territory known inaccurately as Bulgaria is the only other matter which requires some notice before I conclude.

“The idea of confining guarantees against maladministration to the country north of the Balkans is negatived by the fact that by far the worst excesses were committed in the sandjaks of Philippopolis and Slivno, which were

\* II. of 1877, p. 261. No. 356. Sept. 13, 1876.

† II. of 1877. No. 167.

to the south of that range. A similar reason made it necessary to include the sandjaks of Uscup, to the west, as well as some cazas from other adjoining sandjaks.

"The extent to which this was done could not be made a matter of serious controversy, as the happiness of the inhabitants would be materially advanced and the authority of the Sultan would not be injuriously diminished by the inclusion of a larger territory.

"A far more serious question arose as to the division of the territory which was to be so dealt with. It was in the first instance *proposed that one province of Bulgaria should be constituted, extending from the Danube almost to Salonica.* To this proposal there appeared to me to be insuperable objections. Under a system of self-government the province would have been *in the hands of a Slav majority; they would have held the most important strategic positions in the country,* and the extent of their population and territory, and the magnitude of their resources would have made their position in regard to the Sultan one of practical independence. I pressed, therefore, for a subdivision of the district into two, and the dividing line which I proposed was so drawn as to leave the eastern district in the hands of a non-Slav population. The Mahomedans alone would have been very powerful, and combined with the Greeks, who, in any question of political aggregation, could have been trusted to act with them, they would have commanded a clear majority. The traditional supremacy of the Mussulmans and the superior intellectual resources of the Greeks would have given to the predominance of the non-Slav population a decisive character. The Eastern Province so formed would have included the sea coast, of course, the passes of the Balkans, the approaches to Constantinople, and a large portion of the Lower

Danube, which an invader could not afford to leave in hostile hands. I therefore thought that in the interests of Turkey the arrangement was of some importance."

Lord Salisbury was in favour of granting autonomy to both sides of the Balkans, dividing this new Bulgaria in two, by a line at right angles to the Balkans, and leaving the Eastern portion, the sea coast, the passes of the Balkans, and the approaches to Constantinople, in the hands of an autonomous state ! and the only safeguard he adhered to was the flimsy one that Turks and Greeks together should outnumber the Slavs ! If the Moslem party were in a majority, what guarantees against future atrocities ? If in a minority, what safety for Constantinople ? Moreover, if the Greeks and Slavs should make common cause, the defiles would be at once in the hands of the enemy and Constantinople would be, past redemption, gone !

Russia cannot advance into Turkey without the consent of Austria. She would have to pass through the narrow territory of Moldavia (part of Roumania), with one flank exposed to Austrian troops posted on the strongholds of the Carpathian mountains, and the other flank exposed to the sea ; and regiment following regiment, and gun after gun, and tumbrils and ammunition-waggons, and provision-carts, and camp followers, on one long-drawn slowly winding line, along the same battered, and worn, and rutted high road of light alluvial soil.

The railways would be of no avail ; for Russian railways are of 5 ft. gauge, and Roumanian railways are of 4 ft. 8½ in. gauge ; so that Russian rolling-stock cannot run on Roumanian rails ; and the Roumanians have extraordinarily little rolling-stock. The poor, ploughed-up roads will be the only means for transport of troops, ammunition, and supplies. The naval force of Turkey,

in the Black Sea, will stop the transit of supplies by water. The closing of the Dardanelles will prevent the arrival of ammunition and stores from abroad. The army of Austria in Transylvania will threaten the flank of the Russian army. Turks may be landed at Varna to threaten communications. This would be fatal. Even if the Balkans were passed, then, 20,000 men being left to defend Constantinople, the remainder of the Turkish army in the valley of the Maritza would threaten the Russian communications.

The diversion which Germany could make, on the long exposed frontier of 500 miles, without natural impediments, which divides Prussia from Russia, would also be fatal to Russian aims, unless she had the co-operation of France and Austria. It was said to be now the aim of Germany to involve Russia in a war, so as to weaken a possible ally of France, and a rival for universal dominion. Hence it was that Baron Werther protested against the concessions which Russia appeared to wring from Lord Salisbury at the Conference.

Sweden is powerless to effect a diversion, or to help Turkey. Yet she has everything to fear from either a subjugation of Turkey or from a concert of Russia and Germany for the annexation, to the latter, of Denmark.

For us, the control of Russia, over either Turkey or Persia, is highly dangerous. Such a control over the one, at once puts the other at her feet, and all Asia in her power. Now the Mahomedan tribes of Affghan and Turkistan are against Russia, and in favour of their Califf—the Sultan. The Shihites of Persia do not altogether abjure him as Califf, although they are dissenters from the Sunite religion of Islam. The Persians, moreover, know that every Treaty between Persia and Russia has ended in losses to Persia. If Russia should control

Turkey, all this Mahomedan power of the Head of Islam would be thrown into the other scale.

In the same way, Austria is of the utmost value to us ; because she serves as a great check on the south of Russia, and on the south of Germany. For this reason it has been the constant aim of Russia to keep Austria and Germany at loggerheads ; just as she has always sown dissensions between France and England, so that the naval power of the one may hold at bay the naval power of the other, and that neither may molest Russia.

We speak of preserving or abandoning the independence and integrity of the Ottoman Empire, while we restrict our thoughts to the territory of the Porte. Therein lies a fallacy. The Sultan is the Caliph of the Osmanli sect,—the Head of all Islam. Far beyond the confines of the Ottoman Empire his spiritual rule extends. His religious sway is potent over the north of Africa, throughout Tartary, in Affghan, and over 40,000,000 British subjects in India. The attempt to destroy the Ottoman Empire may create a Timour or a Genghis Khan to overrun Europe with great swarms of cavalry.

We must not forget Italy. The long-drawn configuration of middle and southern Italy, renders her a certain prey to the chief naval power in the Mediterranean. As for northern Italy, its long sea-board is likewise vulnerable ; while the passes of the Alps on the north-west, which were acquired with so much care by Victor Amadeus II., and which a few men can hold against armies, were yielded by Cavour to Napoleon III., and are now in the hands of France. On the north-east, the Alps are held by Austria, whom Italy has deeply wounded. Italy has no longer that local advantage once possessed by Sardinia, which would enable Italy to hold the balance between France and Austria, and to ally herself with the

one or the other, as each might offer her the means of aggrandisement. The defence of Turin against Austria, used to be France ; her defence against France was Austria. It is no longer so. What has she instead ? Has she the support of Germany ? Her subserviency to Bismark has destroyed her centre of unity. The unity of the whole catholic world was in her hands ; and she cast it from her. She has cast from her the only feature which could render her an important Power in the world. She has let slip the great Napoleon's maxim : "Never forget to regard the Pope as equal to the master of 100,000 bayonets." Italy's policy has been, subserviency to Bismark—to Germany ; and that harsh patron has used her as his tool, as the instrument of German aggrandisement. Germany will protect Italy : (1) as an ally in the attack upon the Papacy, and (2) because of the raids on Switzerland and France, on Holland and Belgium, which Germany contemplates. Bismark reckons that, in such an event, Italy, by placing an army on her northern frontier, will call off 70,000 men from France or Austria, as she did during the Sadowa campaign.

The Eastern Question is not only a matter of geography ; it involves races and religions also. Throughout Russia, speaking generally, we find the Slav races up to the east of the Dneister, at the Black Sea. The old Polish provinces are Slav : in Germany—the provinces of Posen, East and West Prussia, and Prussian Silesia (comprising one-third of the sea-board) ; and in Austria—Galicia, Bohemia, Moravia, are Slav. Also the Austrian provinces of Carinthia, Carniola, Croatia, and Dalmatia, and the Slavonian and Slovack districts in Hungary are chiefly Slav. The population of Austro-Hungary, is 36,000,000, of which 16,000,000 are Slavs. From the Moldava, all south of the Danube and the

Saave, is chiefly Slav. Between these two Slav masses of nearly 80,000,000 on the north and east, and about 30,000,000 on the south, a wedge of different races is thrust in. In Austria proper, there are Germans ruling over some Slavs; in Hungary there is a supremacy of Magyars over a few Slavs and Germans.\* The Banat and Bukovina are Wallacks (or descendants of old Roman legions). Transylvania is chiefly Wallack, with a block of Szecklers and Germans, in that Eastern corner of the Austrian Empire, which juts out into the Wallacks of the Turkish autonomous state of Roumania (Wallachia and Moldavia). In Turkey—Bessarabia, on the west of the Dneister, is also Wallack, with a few Slavs and Germans at the southern end, near the Black Sea. The eastern part of Bulgaria is Mahomedan, mixed with Slavs and Greeks. The rest of Bulgaria, Servia, Bosnia, Croatia, Herzegovina, and Montenegro are Slav. The Albanian population is Greek and Mahomedan. The western side of Greece is of the United-Greek (Catholic) religion; while the population of the rest of Greece, and of the southern part of Roumelia, is Greek.

The three great facts to be borne in mind are :

- (1) Between the two great masses of Slavs there is a wedge of alien population, extending from Germany to the Black Sea at the mouths of the Danube.
- (2) The Greek population extends from Greece to the Black Sea, along the whole southern part of European Turkey.
- (3) The Greeks (not Russo-Greeks, but Greek race) are no friends of the Slavs nor of the Turks. The Greeks think themselves to be the natural heirs of the Byzantine

\* It must be remembered, however, that the Austrian Slavs, the Czecks, are Catholic; while the Turkish and Russian Slavs are of the Russo-Greek Church, and the Poles are Catholic (either Latin or United-Greek).

Empire, whose capital should be, as it used to be, Constantinople.

The Ottomans\* (all Mussulman),—originally of Scythian and Tartar races,—amount to 2,100,000 in Europe, and 10,700,000 in Asia. There are, in the Turkish Empire about 1,000,000 Greeks in Europe, and the same in Asia. There are 400,000 Armenians in Europe, and 2,500,000 in Asia. There are 5,123,000 Roumans (descended from the Dacian Legions). The Slavs (comprising about 2,000,000 Bosniacs, who are Mussulman) number 6,200,000. Bosnia contains 246,000 Turks, 350,000 Bosniacs (all Mussulman), 120,000 (Russo-Greek) Servians, and 40,000 Croats (Catholics). Servia is nearly all Slav (1,098,281), and of the Russo-Greek church. Bulgaria (4,800,000) consists of Slavs, of which, 3,600,000 belong to the Bulgarian national church; 600,000 are Turks, and as many Roman Catholics. Herzegovina has a population of 300,000, of which more than 60,000 are Mahomedans of Slav race,—the descendants of renegade Christians; while 240,000 belong to the Roman Catholic and Greek Churches. There is a population of 1,600,000 in Albania, of which 800,000 are Mahomedans, 100,000 Greek, and as many Roman Catholics. In Roumania (Wallachia and Moldavia) the population belongs, nearly entirely, to the Russo-Greek Church. The Croats and Mirdites are Roman Catholics.

The religions of the Ottoman Empire, according to Baron De Worms, are :

Mahomedans . . . . .	34,573,000
Greek (? Greek, United Greek, Russo-Greek) . . . . .	9,370,068
Bulgarian Church . . . . .	4,000,000
Roman Catholic . . . . .	590,000
Armenian . . . . .	3,000,000
Other religions . . . . .	359,000

\* See Baron de Worms.

From the "Statesman's Year-Book," and other sources, it seems that :

The Roman Catholics of the Latin Rite amount to	640,000
The United-Greeks (Catholics) . . . . .	25,000
The Armenians . . . . .	75,000
The Syrians . . . . .	20,000
The Maronites . . . . .	140,000

The Russian Government, conscious that their intrigues were the cause of the Eastern difficulty, and that, in their intrigues, the Russians use their church as an *instrumentum regni*,—artifice of domination and means of political propaganda,—at once proclaimed that the struggle in the East was the preliminary skirmish of a religious war. Lord Derby thus reports, to Lord A. Loftus, the substance of a despatch from Prince Gortchakow :\*

"In the opinion of the Russian Government, a conflict, which bore the character of a struggle between Christianity and Mahommedanism, was by its nature stamped with a character of inveteracy, and assumed exceptional proportions, which appealed to the honour and conscience of the Christian Powers, and rendered it difficult to abstain completely from interference.

"For this reason the Russian Government must dissent from the opinion expressed by me that it would be useless to look for a practical solution till hostilities had resulted in some definite issue. They had always held, on the contrary, that the Powers should use their best efforts to avert a fanatical war of extermination, both on grounds of general humanity and for their own interests."

The Czar is accepted as the infallible head, and as the ultimate authority without appeal, of the whole Russian Church, or Russo-Greek Church.† Since the days when

\* No. 476. Earl of Derby to Lord A. Loftus. June 21, 1876.

† The Russian church is often, very erroneously, called the Greek church. It is Russo-Greek. The Russians call it the "Orthodox Church."

Peter the Great put himself in the place of the Greek Patriarch, and made himself the Head, the Czars have aped—nay gone far beyond, in their travestie—the Vicar of Christ, the head of the Catholic Church. The Czars are therefore, rivals to the Popes. The extent to which the Czars have gone, may be gathered from the Catechism published at Wilna, the capital of Lithuania, in 1832.

The following is an extract :

“Q. 17. What are the supernaturally revealed motives for this worship (of the Czar) ?

“A. The supernaturally revealed motives are, that the Emperor is the Vice-Regent and Minister of God, to execute the Divine Commands ; and consequently disobedience to the Emperor is identified with disobedience to God himself.”

Russia and the Secret Societies have therefore constituted themselves the one great enemy of the Holy See, and their object has been the destruction of the Papacy. Yet the Church of Russia is not a *spiritual* Body, but a department of the State, and an engine of despotic rule and political propaganda.

To understand the Russian Church, we must gain a precise idea of the end which Peter the Great had in view, when he established it. Things have the same character as their Origins. He sought to create a Cæsarism, such as that which was formulated by the Emperors of Byzantium, and imitated by most of the German Emperors,—an ecclesiastical organisation in opposition to the Catholic Church. The principle of the Russian Church and State is this : There is only one authority, one origin of power, one source of rights—the Czar. He is the Head of the Church, and the State. Now, the essential notion of Cæsarism is that the temporal power of the State (whether the State be an

absolute despot, or a popular assembly) shall not be subordinate to any power, authority, or law ; but shall absorb into itself all spiritual power, and rule without restraints, and be free from all conditions imposed upon it.

The Czar found himself at the head of a very religious, and very ignorant people. Their clergy were separated, by the Eastern schism, from the Roman Pontiff ; and they had no power to lean upon, except one of four Patriarchs—the Patriarch of Constantinople. In making a Russian Church, by separation from that Patriarch, the Czar Ivan had to his hand an instrument of Cæsarism. Peter the Great suppressed the Patriarch of Moscow, and substituted Himself. He also established a “Holy Synod” in St. Petersburg, consisting of members named by himself and removable at his pleasure. It is presided over by a military officer, who has the sole initiative of their discussions, and an absolute veto on their decisions. Moreover, every member has to swear this oath : *“Confiteor, porro, et jurejurando assevero supremum hujusce collegii judicem esse ipsum totius Russiae monarcham nostrum clementissimum ; &c.”* The Holy Synod has a supreme and unlimited authority over all the Bishops, and nothing can be done in any diocese without its sanction. The whole Russian Episcopate is, thus, the absolute slave of the Czar to accomplish his will. This is Cæsarism. It is the destruction of the liberty of man, both in the spiritual, and in the temporal orders ; for the Czar’s will is the only law, and the only rule of morality. He is the chief spiritual and temporal authority.

Poland belonged to the Greek schism ; and then became “United-Greek” or Catholic. When the Czar tried to impose his religion on Poland, he did not trouble himself about the dogmas wherein Greek and Latin Churches differ. Not one word about dogma is mentioned

in the "Instructions of Holy Synod," relative to the admission of the United-Greeks of Lithuania, into the Russo-Greek Church. Morals and dogmas, Canon-law and Liturgy, are merely accessories or accidents of Russian "orthodoxy." The Bishops are ever ready to change them at the bidding of the Czar. They have even manufactured texts, as if quoted from the Fathers, in order to attain this end. The only essential dogma of the Greko-Russian Church is the spiritual and temporal supremacy of the Czar. Hence it is that in their religious books, the Czar's name, and the name of God are written in capitals equally large.

The pith and marrow of Russian policy,—that to which all else is subordinate,—the secret of the Russian passion for absolute power, is the Cæsarian idea. For this, Russia did that which was most imprudent and least calculated to bring about the union of Poland with Russia. For this, she considered every Pole a *rebel*; because he was not spiritually subject to the authority of the Czar.

Roumania and Bulgaria, a short time ago, acknowledged the Greek Patriarch of Constantinople as their spiritual Head. Russia commenced intrigues to lead them into union with the Russian Church. She brought into discredit the Greek Patriarch, and the Greek Bishops which he sent into Roumania and Bulgaria. The Bulgarians then, in their desire to escape from the rule of the Greek bishops, desired to join the Church of Rome, and actually sent an address to the Pope. The Russian Ambassador at Constantinople pretended to sympathize with the Bulgarians in their complaints against the Patriarch; and invited the leader of the Ecclesiastical revolt, against the Patriarch and in favour of Rome,—Bishop Joseph Sholkowski,—to his house at Bayukdere. When the Bishop arrived in his boat, from

the other side, a treachery was practised : he was put ~~ab~~<sup>ab</sup> board of the steamer which was just starting for Odessa. On landing he was made prisoner and sent to Kiew. The upshot of these intrigues was that Bulgaria has a national Church, and appoints its own Patriarchs. Roumania has likewise its national Church.

In Albania, the priests receive a yearly stipend from the Czar. This is true also of the Wallachian and Slavonian clergy of Hungary and Transylvania.\* The Slavonian populations everywhere are supplied, by Russia, with religious books, containing obligato prayers for the Czar as their spiritual head.

Omitting Roumania and Bulgaria, there is, then, in the Turkish Empire, a great rival to the Head of the Russo-Greek church—a spiritual enemy of the Czar. Constantinople,—the old Byzantium,—is still the Rome of the Eastern or Greek church (not Russo-Greek). The Greek Christians of the Ottoman Empire look to the Greek Patriarch in Constantinople as their supreme Head. In proof of this I may cite a reply of the Greek Synod, to a brief of Pope Pius IX. in 1848.† “In disputed or difficult questions the three Patriarchs,—of Antioch, Alexandria, and Jerusalem,—discuss the matter with the Patriarch of Constantinople; because that City is the seat of Empire, and because he is the President of the Synod. If they cannot agree, the affair is, according to ancient precedent and usage, referred for decision to the Head of the Government (*i.e.* the Sultan).”

The Greek Christians, then, of the whole Empire look to the Patriarch of Constantinople as their Head. Some eight or ten millions of Greek Christians in Southern Russia, who are called “Starovirtzi,” or Believers in the

\* See Dr. Döllinger, “The Church and Churches,” p. 138.

† Dr. Döllinger, “The Church and Churches,” p. 126.

old Faith (*i.e.* before the schism of Peter the Great),—or “Rashkoluiks,” which means “apostates,” or “seditious faction,”—these also look upon the Patriarch of Constantinople as supreme. This sect (says Dr. Döllinger) amounts altogether to 13,000,000. They protest against the dominion of the Czar over the Russian Church,—against Cæsarism, against what we should call Erastianism. They regard the Czar as “Antichrist.”

Ségur,\* speaking of the subjection of the Russian Church to the Czar, asserts that such had always been the spirit of the Greek schism; and that, from the time of the Pagan emperors, the Russians had always regarded their princes as “the Vicars of God upon earth :” † that Vladimir, “taking his religion from Byzantium, became the Head of it, and thus to the civil and military power, added the theocratic power, one of the deepest roots of the autocracy of his descendants ;” that the result of this was, that “in Russia, obedience to the offspring of Rurik—to the princes of the blood of St. Vladimir, was a religion almost as powerful as that of Christ.” In the XVth century it was that the Greek Church was divided into four provinces : Constantinople (comprising Russia), Alexandria, Antioch, and Jerusalem. In the next century it was, that the Russian Church separated from the Patriarchate of Constantinople. In 1589 a Russian Patriarchate was erected in Moscow, by the Czar, who desired to have a National, or Russian Church ; the clergy desiring to remain in dependence on Constantinople. The Sultan, Mahmoud II., had, through the Patriarch of Constantinople and the Greek Church, to which all Russians belonged, a great spiritual influence in Russia. Ivan III. transferred the patriarchate to Moscow, in order to destroy this influence, and by degrees to acquire the

\* “Hist. of Russia.”

+ P. 187.

whole Byzantine Empire. In 1689 Peter the Great came to the throne, at the time when William III. seized his uncle's throne in England. Peter's proud spirit could not brook the spiritual influence of a priest. He determined to put an end to the division of authority between himself and the Russian Patriarch. He desired to be himself the spiritual, as he was already the temporal Head. For he said that : \* "If religious feeling should spread and increase, men will come to think more of the Chief Pastor than of the Chief Ruler." On the death of the Patriarch Adrian, Peter burst into the Conclave of Bishops,—the brusque, burly, giant barbarian,—and, striking his breast with clenched fist, making a noise like a drum, he said : "Here is your Patriarch." Some assert that he added the words : "And your God." Séjur observes : † "To Catholic eyes this would appear a surprising stroke of authority ; but it will seem less astonishing when we call to mind that the Russian Grand-Princes were the Founders, Apostles, Saints, and Martyrs of the Greek Religion in Russia ; and that, consequently, they were looked upon as the heads of a religion, founded, preserved, and sanctified by them [bless the mark!] ; and, still more than this, that, in their gross ignorance, these people, brutified as they were by all kinds of slavery, paid an almost equal veneration to God and to the Czar." Since that time the Czar's deputy or Procurator,—a dragoon officer in jack-boots and spurs, with a clanking long-sword by his side,—has presided over the Church, and has an absolute veto in the Synod, and appoints and dismisses the Ecclesiastical officers, without appeal.

Dr. Döllinger ‡ says : "The power of the Emperor, according to the Russian catechism, comes immediately

\* Séjur.

† Séjur, p. 272.

‡ "The Church and Churches," p. 134.

from God. The veneration due to him, must be expressed by the most complete submission in words, bearing, and actions ; and obedience must, in every respect, be unlimited and passive :”—*tanquam cadaver*. So also Marsden :\* “The Czar is represented in the Catechisms, taught to all the children of his Empire, as God’s Vice-Regent. Under this title he claims absolute submission ; his designs assume a sacred character ; and the subject who shall dare to thwart him, is regarded as accursed both in this world and the next.”

The Starovirtzi, or Rashkolniks, are of the original Eastern or Greek Church. They are those who never transferred their spiritual allegiance to the Czar. They speak of the Czar as “Antichrist.” They are banded together by a holy vow, and are necessarily “always in veiled rebellion” against the Czar. They dissent, in short, from that central doctrine of the Russian Church : That the Czar is the spiritual Head, and to be adored,—infallible in his doctrines, and irreformable his decrees. They dissent from this doctrine, and know well that if the Czar should seize Constantinople, he will absorb their Patriarch into himself, as Peter did the Patriarch of Moscow,—and become almost omnipotent.

This dissent is spreading. For this reason it is that Russia is compelled always to maintain a religious crusade, in order to keep her people united, by a “holy war,” which gives rise to a religious *esprit du corps*. The Cossacks are nearly all Starovirtzi. So are the gallant population of Malo-Russia. The population whence Russia’s cavalry and artillery are drawn, are opposed to Russia’s propaganda-Church, and look to the Oriental Patriarch in Constantinople as their Spiritual Head.

By the Church of Rome, the Oriental Church and

\* “Dictionary of the Christian Churches and Sects,” p. 714.

Starovirtzi are held to be schismatic. They are also regarded as schismatic by Russia. These Christians, therefore, desire no union with Russia, but seek to form a Slavic state apart. In 1842 the Czar inflicted a severe persecution on them, and swept off all their priests, in order to extinguish the sect (for they believe in the Apostolical Succession). One Bishop escaped to Vienna, and bore the sad tale to Metternich. He was permitted to consecrate 300 priests in Galicia. But Austria, stupid Austria, had not the courage to protect them. If she had done so, she would have gained great power throughout Southern Russia. The Sultan protected them; and the Starovirtzi are now furnished with priests from Constantinople.

Against them they have the Czar,—the Head of a powerful State Church; the head of Panslavism; the leader for a time of the Secret Societies; the head of the “emancipated” Serfs of Russia, who, in their fanatical ignorance, consider it a sacred duty, to liberate “Christians” from Mahomedan rule, while shedding Christian blood, like water, all around in Russia. Against the Czar there is the Sultan, who is Califf, or supreme Head of all Islam. The religion of Islam is a positive religion—a religion of dogmas accepted on authority. The system of Islam is not revolutionary, but is founded on Respect, and requires rules of “etiquette” to be fulfilled. The Czar is not the Head of such a religion. The Russo-Greek Church is not remarkable for faith. It is not, indeed, like Protestantism, a varying religion embraced by each man, as it commends itself to his understanding or imagination. It is not rationalism, but Nihilism:—it is the abjuration or negation of all beliefs, which is spreading in the Russian Church. This Nihilism is mixed with Socialism and Red Republicanism among the poor, and has undermined religion and morality among

the upper classes. Count Tolstoy's "Report" proved the alarming spread of these doctrines over the whole of Russia, with the exception of Russian Poland. The Prussian correspondent of the *Times*, on March 22, 1877, made a statement which bears upon this point:—"The Emperor is not unaware also of what is seething in the breasts of the mass of his subjects. Stories are related in Russia *à propos* of the recent Socialist trials which, even if only fictions, are calculated to inspire reflection. It is whispered that among the Socialist conspirators have been found high personages and aristocratic ladies disguised as workmen, in order to propagate subversive doctrines, especially among the young artisans destined for military service whom it was intended to make instruments of a future propaganda in the Army, hitherto untouched by such influences. What, indeed, is not said in that city, where everybody is afraid of his own shadow, and where the strangest and most audacious stories circulate? Alarming reports are related of prevarication affecting almost the highest personages; in short, the last few months have shown that peace was absolutely incumbent on an Empire so stirred to its depths. The person of the Emperor alone dominates that agitation. He is the Sovereign, and remains the tangible symbol of faith. A friend of mine asked a rich Lithuanian proprietor some time since, 'Did you ever see the Emperor?' The peasant uncovered his head. 'No, I have not seen him, but I know what he is like.' 'Indeed?' 'Yes, he is of immense size, wears a crown on his head, is all shining, and has a white beard reaching to his knees.' It was just the portrait of the Almighty such as He is represented in apocalyptic portraits. That is why, in the days when the Emperor delivered his Moscow speech, a single word sufficed to snatch

from the Panslavist Committees the direction of the masses. Hence it is that a warlike, but silent and patient enthusiasm has prevailed since then in the country ; hence it is that a proclamation of the Emperor will suffice to reduce the effervescence to its proper level ; for, despite all conspiracies, despite all underhand incitement, the Army and people will then reply, ‘The Czar has spoken,’ and that will suffice.” Against the positive, ardent faith of Islam, and religious fanaticism of Mahomedans there is pitted this Russian Nihilism, and a European scepticism, or epicurism.

Those are the factors of a question, religious as well as political, which depends not so much on a “want of reforms,” as on the odium theologicum, or rather a bare and staring antagonism of religions and races. Individual religion is the raw material of grievances, wherefrom grievance after grievance sprouts up, and grows, covered with the prickles of bickerings, and surrounded by the tangled brushwood of intrigues and diplomacy.

In illustration of this antagonism, let us read some Secret despatches on the subject.\* The following is from the Russian Ambassador at Constantinople, General Ignatiew, to the Russian Ambassador at Vienna, M. Novikow. I may state once for all, that I have investigated, and learned from two sources, of great authority, that the secret despatches, contained in this pamphlet, are authentic :—

“ PERA, CONSTANTINOPLE, MARCH 4, 1871.

“ The very interesting details which your Excellency has been good enough to forward me respecting the relations between the Prince of Montenegro and our Consul at Ragusa have given me much pleasure ; our

\* “ Russian Intrigues.” Ridgway, 1877.

friends of St. Petersburg will now be able to judge the difference between M. Sonine and M. Petrowich, and to understand how very important it must be to us to place near Prince Nicolas a civil servant—not only of capacity, but—whose agreeable manners and gentlemanly behaviour will gain us the good opinion of every one.

“The details you give me of your relations with Khalil Bey,\* and *his* intimate connection with the famous Saxon statesman† are scarcely a surprise, for I am an old acquaintance of your Turkish colleague, who at one time, before he dreamed of future grandeur, was a friend of Russia, at least as far as an Osmanli *can* be our friend. After he left St. Petersburg, and made a sort of political alliance with Moustapha Fazyl,‡ he completely abandoned his old friends, and did us the honour to cordially detest us. Understanding this, you will see that it was most natural for Khalil Bey, as soon as he came to Vienna, to become great friends with M. de Beust, as the Austrian Minister, who is the open enemy of the Slavonic idea, could not have found a better accomplice in his intrigues than Khalil Bey. Still, it is sad to see your Turkish colleague intriguing against you—he thinks that he can put off the evil day, and he will end by hurling his country into the abyss which is yawning for her.

“Thanks to the wrong-headedness of the Turks and the obstinacy of the Patriarch, *the schism between the Bulgarians and Greeks is now unavoidable*, though, to tell the truth, I thought once that some sort of reconciliation would have taken place ; but as the Patriarch would not give in, the matter got to such a pitch of mutual animosity that Aali Pasha could do nothing to reconcile

\* Now Khalil Cherif Pasha.

+ Count von Beust.

‡ The late Moustapha Fazyl Pasha, brother of the Khedive.

the parties ; so now we must work harder than we have ever yet done.

" If the Vizier accepts (as it is almost certain that he will do) the resignation of the Patriarch, the enthronement of the new Prelate ought to be inaugurated by *an address from the inhabitants of Thrace, Macedonia, Bosnia, and Herzegovina, demanding Bishops of their own nationality; thus at every nomination of a new Patriarch, we shall gain a few dioceses.* I have written to this effect to Adrianople and Monastir, and your Committee must act in the same way as regards the Herzegovina and Bosnia.

" Have you received the new strategic maps of the Western Provinces of Turkey ? Judging from the reports of our emissaries we seem to be well looked upon by the opinion of the populations, and even the Mussulmans are ready to help us in our work of emancipation. Thank God, we are getting on well ; but I shall be still more glad when I get orders to ask for my passport."

It must be remembered that the schism of the Bulgarians, from the Greek (Eastern) Church, and the erection of a National Church in Bulgaria, was the result of a Russian intrigue, with the aim of uniting Bulgaria to the Russo-Greek Church. This brought Russia into open hostility with the Head of the Greek Church. Moreover, the Greeks, with their hearts set on Byzantium as the capital of a Greek Empire, are opposed to the Panslavic idea which Russia uses as a means of agitation. The following despatch is also from General Ignatiew to M. Novikow :—

"PERA, CONSTANTINOPLE, 14/26 Nov. 1872.

" I wrote to you a few days ago concerning the latest intrigues of our well-beloved brethren in the faith. *The*

*Phanariotes (Greeks), after having forced their Patriarch to hurl the thunders of the Church against the Slavonic Gentiles, are now doing their utmost to get turned out of the bosom of the Church that venerable Prelate who is so worthily seated on the Patriarchal Throne of Jerusalem ; being delighted to have found so worthy an ally as the well-known Khalil Cheriff, they conceived the very ingenious idea of placing seals on all those moveable goods which the Patriarch Cyril owned at Constantinople. I need hardly tell you that I did what I could to frustrate this new instance of Greco-Turk justice. I wrote immediately to C——, telling him to work upon the Arabs and to get them to protest against the illegal decision of the Phanariote Synod of Jerusalem ; I simultaneously wrote to St. Petersburg, and I hope that in time they will fall in with, and put in execution, my old plan, viz., to sequestrate the great estates which the Church of Jerusalem possesses in Russia.*

“ You see, my dear friend, that my position here is far from being an enviable one ; if the present régime lasts for some months more our interests will be gravely compromised, and we shall perhaps be obliged to sacrifice the exarchate (the Bulgarian Church) in order to avoid still greater sacrifices. What a pity that our Synod did not accept three years ago the Convocation of the Ecumenical Council !\*

“ As we were sure of a majority of votes we might have been able to avoid the schism, and to force the Greeks to make concessions. But who could have foreseen the obstinacy of the Patriarch ? It is true, however, that it was not his fault, and that he would be as

\* This was the Schismatical Council of Russians, Greeks, Anglicans, and Protestants, which was proposed at the time the Vatican Council was held in Rome.

yielding to-day as he always was, were he not urged on by the 'Grammarians,' that permanent plague of the Byzantiums.

"The only hope remaining to us is the remodelling of the Ministry, which everybody expects at Bairam.

"Our friend A——, and the kind V. S—— are doing all they can with this end in view: if we succeed, Byzantium will see within her walls a new *Milet Bashi*, and the Greek Patriarch will again hold out his hand to beg for Panslavist gold."

The following is also from General Ignatiew to M. Novikow. •

"PERA, CONSTANTINOPLE, 27 Nov. (9 Dec.), 1872.

"Mehemet Ruchdi Pacha\* has again fallen under the baleful influence of the Minister for Foreign Affairs. Since his nomination to his present office, this statesman has done nothing but oscillate from one side to another, and is for the moment given over, body and soul, to the Magyarophile policy of Khalil and Company.

"You have no doubt already heard of the compliments which the Sultan thought fit to pay his Sadrazain on the occasion of the Bairam audience, and which, repeated everywhere by the 'Jeune Turquie' party and its adherents the Græculi of the Phanar, have produced the most painful impression upon such of the population of Stamboul as are able to appreciate at their proper value Austro-Hungarian humbug and the pompous promises of Khalil.

"The first consequence of Khalil's strengthened position has been *a renewal by the Greeks of their attacks upon the Patriarch of Jerusalem and the Bulgarian Exarch*;

\* The *Mulerdjim*. He became Grand Vizier on the fall of Midhat Pasha, who had replaced the then disgraced and exiled Mahmoud Nedin Pasha.

*these two prelates, who will probably be dismissed as a reward for their sincere devotion to our interests, are the objects of so many attacks from our enemies that I cannot help wondering at their patience. Mgr. Anthime, especially, who could, if he chose to do so, give a very great deal of trouble to the Porte, is acting wonderfully well, and has had the good sense (after the recent insult offered him by that far-sighted Turco-Egyptian Diplomat) to conform himself in all points to the line of conduct that I have drawn for him; however, he will not have long to wait, for considering the suspicious and passionate character of the Sultan, the present state of affairs cannot last more than two—or at most three—months.*

“As for Mgr. Cyrille, his position is a much more serious one. If the Porte sanction his being relieved of his functions, the Synod of Jerusalem will immediately proceed to elect a new Patriarch, and we shall be done out of our rights at the Holy Sepulchre. To prevent such a misfortune as this would be, I have written to P\_\_\_\_\_, C\_\_\_\_\_, and S\_\_\_\_\_, instructing them to carefully work up the population of Syria and Palestine to demand the creation of an Arab Church, separate from the Patriarchate, and of which Mgr. Cyrille would be elected as spiritual chief.

“Not content with stirring up an ecclesiastical agitation, Khalil has had recourse to other means which will give you an idea of his friendship for us. *The news of the robbery of the Roustchouk Post\** has given him the ingenious idea of accusing the Bulgarians of the crime, and of trying to represent them to H. M. as the most dangerous enemies of the Empire. You cannot imagine how much this piece of news has annoyed me. Thanks

\* The Ambassador here alludes to the notorious and only partially mysterious mail-robbery.

to the stupidity of our friend M——, one of the persons who were concerned in this act of brigandage, was affiliated to our agency at Roustchouk, and if he is arrested by the Turkish police, I should be afraid of certain revelations which would certainly do us much harm.

"I am astonished that a man of such good sense as Mr. M—— could have initiated into our cause a person of whose antecedents he was ignorant ; but this unpardonable mistake must be a lesson for us ; and as for me, I have already profited by it to order all our Consuls not in future to initiate any one without previously obtaining an authorisation from me.

"I hear that Khalil has proposed to Mehemet Ruchdi to send to Sofia, as President of the Commission of Enquiry, the too-well-known hangman-in-chief, Midhat Pacha : so that we shall soon hear of more new exploits of this terrible State executioner, who will assuredly not lose the opportunity of sending *ad Patres* some hundreds of unfortunate *ghiaours* !

"Very many thanks for the interesting details you give me on the progress of the Czech struggle (in Austria) ; but what a pity that a cause so noble in its principle should not have been safe from the intrigues of new Judases. The example of Sabina has unfortunately found imitators, and this cannot fail to compromise the holiest cause."

The following letter passed between the same responsible persons. From General Ignatiew to M. Novikow :—

"PERA, CONSTANTINOPLE, 7/19 DEC., 1872.

"Most assuredly the Greeks will not keep quiet ! Since their wretched protector has come into power they are blundering through such a bog of intrigues that one

must be just such a blind and inveterate enemy of truth as Khalil is, if one is to continue to believe the lies daily told him by his friends the money-changers and orators of the Phanar.

"Thanks to the perfidious insinuations of these vile knights of the Galata Exchange, *the Orthodox East is about to lose the eminent prelate who forms the glory of her Church*, and what is still worse, is to see Greeks, who pretend to be lovers of liberty, and who nevertheless implore the protection of Austrians and Prussians, and beg for the intervention of Protestants in their ecclesiastical affairs, whilst they deny this same right to their co-religionaries, the Russians.

"*Their fury against us is still more increased just now by the news of the sequestration of Conventual Estates in Bessarabia*, and this is such a tangible loss to the Phanarist (Greek) Prelates that I'd bet we should very soon see all the old fellows of the Synod at our knees, avowing *culpa nostra* if they were not afraid of the Galata Schoolmasters. For it is the latter, egged on by some banker-orators, and the very clever people of the *Neologos* and the *Phare du Bosphore*, who fan the flames of discord.

"The one thing that would put a stop to this unfortunate system of intrigues is a change of Ministry, or at least the fall of Khalil, the only person who is interested in keeping up religious dissensions.

"From what I learn through the Palace it is no way improbable that before long we may get rid of this intolerable spoil-feast: the old and faithful friend\* of Mme. Novikow's mother lately promised Mme. Ignatiew, to use her influence at the Palace for this purpose.

\* Tiriyal Sultanu, a widow of Sultan Mahmoud.

Another, which passed between the two Ambassadors:—

“ PERA, CONSTANTINOPLE, 13/25 DEC., 1872.

“ Khalil Pasha has kept his word well. He had promised Mgr. Anthime that he would think of the *Greco-Bulgarian question* after the Bairam, and he has done so in his own way.

“ *The Exarch (of the Bulgarian Church) at the Grand Vizir's request, waited on the Minister of Foreign Affairs, to inform him of the wishes of the Bulgarian community, and met with a reception worthy of that statesman.* Instead of listening to the explanation and wishes of the venerable prelate, the Ottoman Minister very haughtily stated that *the relations between the orthodox and Bulgarian Churches not being the same as heretofore, the Porte had decided upon cancelling the firman promulgated under Aali*, (which constituted the national Church of Bulgaria). After having tried in vain to shake Khalil's *parti pris*, the Exarch left the Minister's presence with the conviction that the foulest iniquity was about to be committed.

“ According to my information, Khalil wishes to *cancel the old firman and replace it by another, which would officially recognise the Bulgarians as schismatics, and as such without the pale of the Orthodox Church.* I own that up to the present day I was ignorant of this new quality of Khalil's. We must now therefore add to the list of qualities which we already know he possesses, that of profound theologian and master in dogmatic matters. Wishing to decide a question of purely Christian dogma is so thoroughly ridiculous that I would not believe it if I were not almost a witness of the theological exploits of Reverend Father Khalil.

"I am curious to see how he will dispose of *the incident which will soon arise in the Church of Antioch*. Thanks to our friendly relations with the primates and prelates of this patriarchate, the *Synod of Antioch* will infallibly re-enact the history of Jerusalem, with the difference that the Patriarch will be disowned by his own *Synod* for having gone against us. We shall see what will be the conduct of the learned Turco-Egyptian in this circumstance.

"I need not tell you that *the affair of Antioch will not be the only one*. We shall soon hear that the local authorities of Rutschuk, Widdin, Varna and other Bulgarian towns have great trouble in repressing the public effervescence caused by the unqualifiable partiality of young Turkey. I have already given instructions to our *Consuls and Agents, who will have to abstain from all ostensible intervention*. Let him laugh who wins."

The following Cyphered Telegram from the Russian Consul at Scutari to the Secret Committee in Vienna, alludes to the modus of proselytizing, by means of money, and prayer-books containing prayers for the Czar as the Head of the Church.

"2/13 JANUARY, 1873.

"In accordance with the last instructions I received from the Moscow Committee, I sent a special courier to Prizrend with the sum of 500 ducats for the Bishop and the prayer-books for the Bulgaro-Servian Church.

"This worthy prelate's energy of character and patriotic sentiments entitle us to hope that it will not be long before the national movement takes a decisive step.

"To forward the movement I wrote to our agent at Detchany to do his best to bring about a reconciliation between the orthodox Servians and the Albanians of that

*district.* As two members of the Kiew Committee will be in those places about the beginning of the spring, it is to be hoped that they will contribute greatly towards the success of our plans, the more so as they will be amply provided with the sinews of war."

Here is another cyphered telegram from the Russian Consul at Fuime to the Secret Committee at Vienna. It speaks of the "orthodox" or Russian Church as the instrument for effecting the political annexation of countries to the Russian Empire.

"13/25 JANUARY, 1873.

"I have just received a letter from Mr. M—— informing me of the departure of his Secretary for Banja Lucca. This journey is undertaken with the object of *establishing direct communication between the orthodox clergy of Austrian Servia and that of Bosnia, so as to bring about at some future time the union of these countries under one and the same ecclesiastical authority.*"

There follows a cyphered telegram from the Secret Committee of Moscow, to that of Vienna.

"Moscow, 26 DECEMBER, 1872 (O. S.).

"The Moscow Committee having come to the decision in its secret sitting of December 24th (5th January) of *spreading the ecclesiastical propaganda in Bosnia and the Herzegovina, have allotted 2500 roubles for this object.* In communicating to the Committee at Vienna this decision, I must add that our President begs you to forward this sum immediately to Mostar and Serajevo, and to insist upon the Imperial Consuls, residing in those countries, giving you the most detailed account of the manner in which this project of our Committee will be carried out."

The next is between the two Russian ambassadors,—from General Ignatiew to M. Novikow. It shows the struggle between the Russo-Greek and the Greek Church over the dead body of Bulgaria. It also reveals another means of Russian agitation,—bribes to the “reptile Press.”

“*PERA, CONSTANTINOPLE, 4/16 JANVIER, 1873.*”

“*The contest between the Ecumenical Patriarchate and the Bulgarians has for some time back taken a diplomatic character. While the Greeks have set to work all the intrigues they can invent to compromise the Bulgarians in the eyes of the Porte, the Bulgarians oppose to their adversaries a conduct full of frankness and firmness, based on the consciousness of their strength. The demands of the Greeks may be summed up in four points.*

• “1st. The annulment of the firman decreed under Aali, and the promulgation of a new one by which the Bulgarians are declared schismatics.

“2nd. The change of dress of the Bulgarian clergy.

“3rd. The churches, convents, schools, and other public establishments in provinces having a mixed population, to remain in possession of the Greeks.

“4th. The preservation of the Greek Patriarchate’s right to send its Bishops into Bulgarian provinces.

“I accept with the deepest gratitude your kind proposal regarding the *Clio*, and feel certain that the Imperial Ministry will not refuse to sanction the promise you have given the Editor of this very influential paper. Moreover, if the Prince be stingy over a few thousand roubles, I shall pay out of my own purse the 5000 roubles you have promised the Editor of the *Trieste* paper. Its co-operation will be most useful to us, be-

*cause of its authority among the Christian populations of the Turkish provinces—and the Clio will serve our cause more efficiently than the Bulgarian papers of Roumania and the insignificant Servian journals."*

The religious antagonism is not confined to a triangular duel between the Oriental or Greek Church, the Russo-Greek Church, and Islamism. They are all in antagonism to the Catholic Church; but none so entirely repugnant in principle as the Russo-Greek. Since the silent sufferings of the meek Son of God, from which the sun hid his face, while the earth quaked, and the rocks were rent,—since that time thirty-eight generations of Christians have quarrelled, and hated, and rustled off into Eternity, and have appeared before the Judgment-seat of their crucified Redeemer. Yet the divisions and demoralisations of the schisms continue!

The Roman Catholics have no predilection for the ancient enemy of Christianity. The late Sultan openly protected the Eastern Schism, persecuted the Armenian Catholics, and showed contempt for the Holy Father's remonstrances. They fear, however, the State-Church theory,—the Cæsarism of Russia, with that despot at its head, who has shown such a ferocity in persecuting the Catholics of Poland. If either Turks or Russians must be at Constantinople, Roman Catholics prefer the former. The Turk is tolerant. Even Sir G. Campbell confesses as much. The Russian is fierce and persecuting.

For this reason, also, Catholics feared and detested the Conference, where the astuteness of Russia met with England (who professed to be cordially at one with Russia), and with Prussia and Italy (who were really at one with Russia), and with France and Austria (who were, to say the least, half-heartedly with Russia). The only hope was the stolidity of the Turk, who refused to

accept the measures which the Congress of Russophiles had devised.

The views of the Catholics may be gathered from their organs in the Press. For example: The *Voce della Verita*, Sept. 15, in a leader entitled "The Eastern Question and the Liberty of Europe and the Papacy," says:—

"The Liberal party, the Anti-Christian sects, and all who in Europe profess themselves enemies of the Church and of the Papacy are agitating continually through meetings, relief committees, and by means of the Press, for the cause of the Slavs, which is the cause of the Revolution and of Russia. . . . This organized movement is a sectarian affair, and its religious side is the immense hatred of Liberalism and Freemasonry against Catholicism. It is a singular thing that throughout the whole of Europe not a catholic is to be found who takes the part of the Slavs. . . . It would be easy to prove to these criers of anathema against the Pope as a partizan of the Turks, that it is only want of knowledge of past and contemporary history, which makes them use such language, but we will not do the leaders of the movement the injustice to suppose them so basely ignorant. They know as well as we do for what high and just reasons the Pope, if he does not side for the weak Turk, cannot in the holy interests of the Church, aid the powerful despotic and schismatic Russian of whom Servia and Montenegro are the dead sentinels. The Papacy, in not placing its powerful word at the service of the Slavs, protects the independence and the liberty—the truest, the highest, the dearest liberty of Latin Europe as it erewhile protected them by the splendid epic of the Crusade. . . .

"No one can say that the Turkey of 1876 is a danger to the independence of Europe and liberty of conscience.

But this peril removed from the East by the work of the Pope, has sprung up on another side. On the north, as in other centuries we were threatened by the despotism of the Turk, so now to-day the threats of Muscovite despotism hang over our heads. The Russian atrocities in Poland were infinitely more horrible than those committed in Bulgaria, whereas if the hard necessity of war and apprehensive desire to quench a threatening insurrection forced the Turks to stain themselves with the blood of the Bulgarians, and warm themselves by the flames of their villages, Turkey left, and still leaves to the different peoples subject to her, their own language, a thing dear to a people which feels its own dignity and the love of its independence, their own religion, supreme comfort in this miserable vale of tears, and to a certain extent their distinct nationalities. Nothing of all this in Russia, and yet it has dared to reprove the Pope for not smoothing the way to Constantinople for the despotism of the Czar, from whence he would proceed to invade Europe and dominate the world. What immense blindness in those who prefer to become the slaves of a Caesar rather than the affectionate children of a great father who embraces all the sister nations in the amplitude of a common charity, in the aspiration of a true and holy liberty, the beneficent liberty which Christ came to bring us on earth.

"Civilized and Christian Europe has some reason to prefer at Constantinople the Turk, who is no longer a danger for the Church and for liberty, to the Russian who would drive away both, and from Constantinople would pour on Europe a flood of new barbarians much worse than the old Goths, Vandals, Huns, and Ostrogoths, because decked with a varnish of corrupt modern culture."

The Jews take part with the Turks, on a ground

similar to that of the Roman Catholics ; simply because they find by experience, that they are treated with much more toleration by the Turks, than by the "Christians" of Russia. The Mahomedans and Jews are both circumcised, and acknowledge the law of Moses ; while there is an old enmity still existing between Jews and Christians. The Jews have, in their hands, the greater part of the two great forces of modern Europe,—the two chief means which are used to make Public Opinion—financial power, and the power of the Press. Nearly all the newspapers of Vienna are theirs, and many newspapers in other countries. They are used to make Public Opinion, and Public Opinion is stronger than armies, for it moves armies, or thwarts their advance. Of the financial power an illustration may be given ; *e se non è vero, è ben trovato.* Rothschild was asked if Russia would go to war ? "I cannot afford it now," replied he.

There is another, and most potent factor in this Eastern struggle, or religious war. I mean the Secret Societies, who oppose all religion. Lord Beaconsfield, when explaining the origin of the struggle, said that it was the Secret Societies who declared war upon the Porte. He did not confine his meaning to a few Slav committees in the Turkish provinces ; for he said that every statesman in these days would be foolish who took into account merely the other states in Europe, without also considering the power, the acts, and the aims of the Secret Societies.

These are the words which Lord Beaconsfield spoke at Aylesbury, on Sept. 20, 1876 :—" Servia declared war upon Turkey. That is to say, the Secret Societies of Europe declared war upon Turkey. I can assure you, gentlemen, that in the attempt to conduct the government of this world there are now elements to be considered

which our predecessors had not to deal with. We have now to deal not merely with Emperors, with Princes, and with Ministers. There are the Secret Societies, an element which we must take into account, and which at the last moment may baffle all our arrangements—Societies which have regular agents everywhere, which countenance assassination, and which, if necessary, could produce a massacre."

I will, in this place, content myself with two quotations, the first of which explains the war of 1866, while the second shows the real aim of the war of 1870. Dr. Becker, Rector of the University of Griefswald, at the conclusion of his inaugural address on "The Invasion of Gustavus Adolphus into Catholic Countries,"\* thus summed up what he wished to impress upon his learned audience:—"There must be a war between the Protestant Germany of the North, and Roman Catholic Austria; for, in Austria there reigns the catholicism of the Pope, hostile to the liberty of thought." The second quotation is from the *Universal Gazette*. It repeated that which many newspapers had said while the war of 1870 was being waged:—"On the battlefields near the Rhine, it is not only a war against France which is being carried on; there is also a war against Rome, who holds all the world in slavery;—there is a war against the Catholic clergy. . . . The Protestant Empire of to-day is the antagonist of the old Roman Catholic Empire of Germany." At a somewhat later stage, the same will be exhibited as the basis of the war which is called "The Eastern Question."

There used, in former times, to be wars for the spread of Christianity; and Christianity meant the faithfulness, justice, and mercy of men. Men now are mangled, and

\* May 15, 1866.

cruelly shot down for the cause of "humanity ;" and the ravages of war are accomplished for the "spread of civilisation." Civilisation is said to mean : increased opportunities for pleasure, more acute refinements in enjoyment, and more efficacious methods of killing a greater number of fellow Christians. The real aim of wars, hidden from the multitude under the specious pretexts of humanity and civilisation, are the advance of Russian dominion, and of the power of the Secret Societies,—the implacable enemies of the Catholic Church. The intrigues, and the antagonisms they effect, will cease, when it occurs to Rulers to ask themselves whether it is not better to be just than civilized ; whether it is not more noble to be barbarous, while brave and forbearing, than highly cultured, while sceptical, cowardly, and cruel. As soon as their minds shall have travailed with such a thought, we may hope that those who seek to supplant Religion by culture, and whose aim is the destruction of authority, spiritual and monarchical,—I mean the common enemy of all states, whether called Socialists, Nihilists, Revolutionists, or Secret Societies,—may no longer be permitted to bear sway in Cabinets, and tyrannize in the private affairs of men. The common enemy of all states is nursed in the bosom of all ; and rulers know not where to turn for help. The men who, by chance come into office, know not the real interests of their country. They cannot direct her thoughts, they, perhaps, have not even learned her laws. They may fancy that they know, or they may be aware that they do not know. In either case, their pride prevents them from learning, and makes them dissuade others from investigation. Errors come ; but error, in matters which are kept secret, will always perpetuate itself. Errors come ; errors, if not generated, at least permitted by permanent officials in each department.

Of such heads the Russian Cabinet is not composed. It consists of the ablest men culled from every country, trained to their duties, versed in their proper lore, surely informed by numberless secret spies, and carrying out their designs by sworn and secret agents, and by a venal and servile press. Where can a worthy opponent of that Cabinet be found? There is another body of most able men, culled from every country, tutored by discipline, hardened by suffering; inured to labour, accustomed to persevere, and rich in the acquirements of learning. The Church of Rome is the only power with organisation and intellectual faculties enough to oppose Russia and the Revolutionary party. She has planted her power in every state. She directs men's consciences by presenting to them duty; she works not on Public Opinion by means of specious fallacy. The Vice-Regent of the King of the whole earth, must be the focus of resistance to evil. The only means of resisting the Secret Societies in every land; the Pan-Slavism of the Russo-Greek Church, with a Czar for Head; and the Pan-Eu-tonism of the "Reformed" Churches, with a Kaiser for head, would be, by Federation, to create a Pan-Latinism of the Catholic Church, with the Holy Father for Head. Those are "the interests of England." On July 31, 1876, Mr. Disraeli said his aim was to "maintain the interests of England." Could he have meant this?

This is not a new policy; nor has it escaped a strenuous opposition. It cost Charles X. his throne. In Louis Philippe's time, France was about to form and head a League of the Latin race and the Catholic nations, as a balance to the overpowering might and brute force of Russia and Prussia. But Prussia and England persuaded Louis Philippe (himself a Voltairean) to push a Protestant propaganda in France; and they

blocked the policy which would have made her great. All the Catholics on the Rhine, in Poland, South Germany, Austria, Hungary, Italy, and Spain, and those in the Ottoman Empire, would have looked up to France, as the head of a vast Federation ; and, Algiers being in her hands, the Mediterranean would have been a French lake.

In order to secure a common accord,—a European concert of nations for united action, there must be a moral, an ideal unity. There must be unity of thought, before there can be unity of action. But where Catholicism has been excluded from States, by atheistic policy, there cannot be any unity of thought, nor even of morality. There are divergent aims ; there is a varying morality, namely expediency ; there is not a common interest, because each State seeks its own selfish good. The Latin race has not a predominance of material force, for it to win consideration on the basis of fear. It may have the prestige of moral power, to gain respect by justice. Only Catholic nations can enjoy a hierarchical unity, with a political Federation ; and without both of these, there cannot be any real unity between them.

“But (it may be said) nations are not Catholic ; for the so-called Catholic nations are corrupt ; they do not fulfil the law of Christ, and therefore are not Christian ; much less are they Catholic.” Yes ; there is much truth in the objection. But what does it amount to ? It does not prove that a League of Catholic nations is impossible ; but only that a fearful cataclysm must first take place. De Bonald quotes a prophecy of Rousseau, that the Tartars (Russians) will conquer Europe, and adds : “*Cette Révolution me parait insaillible ; tous les rois de l'Europe travaillent de concert à l'accélérer.*”\* Napoleon the

\* “*Theorie du Pouvoir*,” vii. 518.

Great said : "Dans cinquante ans l'Europe sera république ou cossaque." To Dr. O'Meara, in St. Helena, he said : "In a few years Russia will seize Constantinople, the greater part of Turkey, and all Greece. That, I look upon as certain,—as certain as if it had already happened." He then explained that, in 1812, he was about to reconstitute Poland, with Poniatowski on the throne, as a barrier to Russian ambition. Republican or Cossack!—or both! History teaches us that every demoralized, corrupted nation is purified by an invasion of barbarians, or a people of virgin conquerors. This seems natural when we remember that the progress and development of humanity takes its greatest strides during the destruction of nations, and the overwhelming of thousands of corrupt men, by thousands of barbarians ; because the death of a nation consists in the loss of its religious, moral, and civil life. But the human species consists of many nations ; and the religious, moral, and civil life of the species can never die. The forms of Genera and Species are eternal. Still less can the human race be ended. For the Ruler of the Universe orders the action and reaction of the forces in the world. Nations and Dynasties may fall into decadence and pass away. But the human species advances ever, towards that perfect end for which God made man. The torch is handed from people to people, from nation to nation ; but the Divine Light is never extinguished, and cannot wane. The Chaldean, the Median and Persian, the Greek, the Roman Empires have succeeded each other. Each came on the stage of the world as its forerunner accomplished its mission. Now the Fifth Universal Empire is being "formed without hands," and by a Power which neither Prussian nor Russian, neither sect nor International, can resist. By all their selfish action, they, though blindly

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can only aid the work. This is the ground of prophecy. The history of Europe thus considered must lead to the conclusion that: nations must either return to a purer moral conduct, and the true Faith ; or else the “ civilisation ” of Europe must be trampled on by hordes of Cossacks.

## CHAPTER VII.

## RUSSIAN AGITATIONS.

THIS chapter shall be commenced with words of the present Leader of the House of Commons.\*

"There was a saying, or rather celebrated saying, by one of the last of the great Emperors of the East who held Constantinople before the Turks conquered it. He said that there was this difference between a foreign war and a civil war—that a foreign war, like the heat of summer, is always tolerable, if not beneficial, while a civil war is like the heat of a fever, which is never tolerable and always injurious. I am not sure that he did not speak rather too lightly of foreign wars, and possibly it may be in some cases that a civil war may have something to be said for it, when it comes to be a struggle between two great forces growing up in an Empire which can find no other solution of their difficulties than the melancholy solution of war. But there is *a kind of war which is worse than either*, and that is a war of a mixed character—*a civil war carried on with foreign aid*; a civil war carried on, *not for the purpose simply for which the quarrel is avowed*, for the purpose of obtaining rights, or freedom, or the ascendancy of a Party in the State, but a *war carried on with other designs and objects*. Now *that is the kind of war against which we have most earnestly to contend.*"

\* Sir Stafford Northcote at Bristol, Nov. 13, 1876.

How was it that the insurrection first arose in Herzegovina? Whence came the motive power? Was it a sense of wrongs and injustice long pent up in the breasts of valiant men, which at last became so unendurable, that the love of justice impelled to arms? It did not arise spontaneously. It came from no sense of injustice. It was fomented from without. The Herzegovinians may be brave; but they are few. If they really knew their Moslem rulers to be fierce towards Christians, and unrelenting in their cruelties, would they have ventured to brave the vastly superior forces of the Turks? If the Mussulman rulers have been for centuries, so cruel and unforgiving as we are now told that they are, why should the Herzegovinians only revolt against them now? Because the impulse has come from without. From without the arms have come, which they have used, by order, in rebellion. Russia, and the Slavs of Austria, have supplied the money, the ammunition and the deadly weapons; while the Secret Societies have importuned them to rise. Russia has directed the action of the Secret Societies, by means of her creatures in them.

The Secret Societies, so powerful in 1789, and for some years after, lost power considerably during the succeeding wars. The escape of Napoleon from Elba was their hope. The year 1815 seemed to be their death-wound. The "Holy Alliance" was then formed by the Czar Alexander. It was called "Holy," for the same reason that Russia's intrigues are now said to be in favour of "Christianity." That Alliance was the Union of Christendom, to the exclusion of the Head of the Christian Church, but under the direction of the Head of the Russo-Greek Church. The scope of that Alliance was a declaration that Governments, in case of Revolu-

tion, or even of Sedition, have a right to aid each other against their people. It asserted, for example, that if Hungary should rebel against the Emperor of Austria, Russia might step in to crush the Magyars. In other words, it was the promulgation of the doctrine that any Government, without being attacked, may fight a people which is at peace with it. It was an admission that war is the quarrelling of Rulers, not the defence of Right by nations. Thus all Governments came to be ranged on one side, as the enemies of all their peoples. The Secret Societies (the International, for example; the Freemasons; the Socialists), advance the opposite doctrine. They range all the peoples together, in a common brotherhood, against the Governments. All the Rulers are on one side, and shriek to us that a Power has risen up in their midst,—“the Revolution,” or the Secret Societies,—which is their common enemy. This lies at the root of the wars of modern Europe. The antagonism of these two parties shall be the subject of a subsequent chapter. Here let us confine our attention to the way in which Russia has, with the aid of the Secret Societies, stirred up the agitation she required to justify a war with Turkey. In doing so, we shall first step behind the scenes for a moment, to consider some more Secret Despatches,\* which I have ascertained to be trustworthy. The first is a despatch in cypher from the Central Secret Society in St. Petersburg, to the Secret Committee of Vienna, dated Sept. 14, 1872.

“By order of His Imperial Highness Monseigneur our August President (the Grand Duke Nicholas), the Vienna Committee is invited to send two Plenipotentiary Agents to Neusatz, in order to take part in the Conference which will be held by the Heads of the

\* From “Russian Intrigues.” Ridgway, 1877.

National Party for the choice of candidates to carry out the future elections of the Servian Patriarch. At the same time you will have to *send some devoted and intelligent agents into Bosnia and the Herzegovina, who will arrange with the emissaries of the Mlada Srbadija (Secret Society) for the creation of popular libraries.* If the Committee has not at its disposition any persons capable of carrying out this task, they can address themselves to the Imperial (Russian) Consuls at Ragusa and Serajevo as well as the Vice-Consul at Mostar, who will provide the required agents. These agents, besides exercising a surveillance over the acts and sayings of the Servian emissaries, *should proceed to form in the country a Secret Society, of which the members should bind themselves to fly to arms at the first signal, and to march wherever they may be ordered by the chiefs who will be elected by the Direction Centrale.*"

The next is a cyphered telegram from the same to the same, dated February 12, 1873.

"By order of His Highness, Monseigneur (the Grand Duke Nicholas)—the Vienna Committee is requested *to send immediately one of its members to Cragujevatz to preside at the meetings of the chief circles of the 'national initiative.'* This delegate will be charged with directing the activity of the Clubs towards the end indicated in our despatch of the 18/30 October, 1872. *In consequence he is to demand of the Mrladu Srbadija, that the arms which it shall have received both from the Servian Government and our agency, be sent without loss of time towards the Turkish frontier.*

"Our diplomatic agent at Belgrade will be furnished with the necessary instructions to facilitate the accomplishment of your agent's mission, and to place at his disposition whatever sums of money he may require.

"After having finished his work at Cragujevatz, your delegate will proceed to Bucharest to settle with the chief of the Bulgarian Committee the fresh basis upon which the new clubs shall be established in the towns and smaller places on the right bank of the Danube."

The following cyphered telegram, from the same to the same (dated August 21, 1872), reveals the difficulty which the Russian Government experienced, in keeping hold of the Secret Societies.

"By order of His Imperial Highness Monseigneur (the Grand Duke Nicholas)—the Vienna Committee is requested to send to all the Sub-Committees and Agencies a circular despatch to tranquillize our kindred upon the false reports that our enemies are attempting to spread relative to the interview of the three Emperors at Berlin.

"Sincerely devoted to the Slavic cause, and interested, as always, in the prosperity and future of our kindred, the Imperial Government entertains no such idea as that attributed to it by the Turks—those secular foes of the Slavs—of abandoning the Slavs to their fate, and allying itself by a solemn treaty with Germany and Austria."

From the Procès Verbal of a sitting of the Secret Societies' Moscow Committee, we see that the Moscow branch had received 66,666 roubles from the Russian Government, during the year 1872. The sitting was on the 8th of October, 1872. It closes with the following entry:—

"Upon the proposal of Prince T——, the Committee decided to address to the Exarch (of Bulgaria), through the Imperial Ambassador at Constantinople, a letter of thanks and assurances of the brotherly feelings of the Russian people towards all the Slavs of Turkey, and especially towards the Bulgarians, who firmly uphold the Slav banner against the intrigues of the Phanarists (Greek Church)."

The following is a resolution of the Central Secret Committee in St. Petersburg, which was passed on Dec. 23, 1873 :—

“The Slav Committees in Russia and their agencies abroad were established with the object of protecting the Slav interests and of enabling our brethren to accomplish with greater facility their duty towards the whole race. . . .

“The Committees and Agencies are required to inform our brethren by race that the Slav countries placed under the yoke of the stranger have great need of the help of all their children to fight the traditional enemies of the Slav cause, therefore those who leave their country will lose their right to the help of the Russian Committees.

“Those persons who are compromised in any way with the political authorities of their country, will alone have the right to apply to the Slav Committees to obtain the means of passing into Russia.”

Here is a cyphered telegram from the Russian Vice-Consul in Ragusa to the Secret Society in Vienna, dated Sept. 6, 1872. It alludes to the colporteur propaganda which was being carried on; viz., the distribution of religious books containing prayers for the Czar as Head of the Church, and other books of a less *religious* tendency :—

“As to the letters and petitions for St. Petersburg, I have sent them direct to the Consular Department. This morning two agents of the Servian (Secret) Society ‘Mlada Srpskija’ arrived; they came to see me and said that the directors of the Society had *ordered them to visit the convents of the Herzegovinia and Dalmatia in order to establish popular libraries.*”

The following is a despatch from the Russian Consul

at Belgrade to the Secret Society in Vienna, dated Dec. 13, 1872. It shows us how all the troops and militia of Servia were gained over to the Revolutionary cause, by the Premier joining the "Liberation Society":—

"In accordance with the instructions of the Central Committee dated 18/30 August I have the honour to announce to the Vienna Committee that the formation of the Liberation Society is on the high road to execution. *M. Ristich having accepted the provisional Presidency*, all the officers of the regular troops of the Principality as well as a considerable number of the national militia have hastened to inscribe themselves on the list as Associates.

"Yesterday and to-day there was such a crowd at the offices of the provisional Directors that we have been obliged to open three new agencies.

"1st. At the office of the Mlada Schadja.

"2nd. At the Carivo Nationale.

"3rd. At Mr. Lechjanius.

"To-day I send our J—— to arrange with the Imperial Council in order to commence our work in Bosnia."

The following is a despatch, dated Sept. 2, 1872, from the Russian Consul at Serajevo to the Secret Society in Vienna:—

"The *fêtes* at Belgrade have produced an excellent impression: the patriots of Serajevo were electrified to such an extent that many of the notables came to call upon me, and to assure me that they were ready to sacrifice the half of their fortunes for the purpose of *arming volunteers in the case of war between Turkey and Serbia*.

"Seeing our friends so well disposed, I thought it my duty to congratulate them on their patriotic sentiments, and promised to report on the subject to the

*Imperial Government*: but as they seemed to suppose that war was imminent, I endeavoured to reassure them on this point, though I told them that even if hostilities should not begin immediately *that was no reason for imagining that they would be indefinitely postponed.*

“‘Serbia,’ I told them, ‘is now seriously preparing for a war which cannot be far off, and therefore needs the assistance of all her sons: so you will do well to carry into effect your scheme of armament.’

“After some long conferences between us, they decided to send two members of their Society to Belgrade to hand over to the Prince Milan the sum of money *given by them to their Fatherland.*”

I now give a despatch from the Russian ambassador at Constantinople, General Ignatiew, to Excellency Novikow, at Vienna, dated January 9, 1873:—

“You have, doubtless, read in our local papers, and especially those published in Turkish, that the Porte, taking into consideration *the armaments which have been going on in Servia for some time back*, had again given orders to the Governors of the bordering provinces of that principality, and to the commanders of the troops cantoned in the same provinces, *to be ready for any contingency.* This news and the rumours of the heavy armaments of Turkey, have obliged the Servian Government to apply to the Porte for an explanation. Mr. Cristich, on asking it of Khalil Pacha, was told that all these rumours were unfounded, and that the Government would give orders for their being officially contradicted.

“Notwithstanding this answer, and the official contradiction, the Servians will certainly not be reassured on the warlike propensities of the present Ministry. The Government of the Sultan, *whose information on all that takes place in Servia and the Slav provinces of*

*the north-west of the empire, is, by what I see, accurate enough, are doing their best not to be taken unawares."*

The next is a telegram in cypher, from the secret agency in Belgrade, to its parent Secret Society in Vienna, dated Feb. 18, 1873 :—

*"The arms which the august members of the Imperial Family have sent to Servia are already at Belgrade. Thanks to the zeal and diplomatic adroitness displayed by Monsieur G——, their transport was effected with very great despatch, and without exciting the least suspicion on the riverain authorities.*

*"Monsieur Ristich [Prime Minister of Servia] caused us to be informed yesterday that it has been decided to send fresh emissaries to Prizerène and as far as Okhrida, to give an impulse to the clerical movement, which has become weakened there since the last intrigues of the Phanar.*

*"It would be desirable that G—— and H—— advise Prince Nicolas of Montenegro to send on his side agents to labour for the realization of this Slav project."*

The following is a telegram in cypher, received by the Secret Society in Vienna, from its delegate at Cragujevatz, dated Feb. 27, 1873 :—

*"The chiefs of the national initiative clubs, whom I called together this morning, declared to me that their agents were already installed in the principal localities in Old Servia. The regular news which they receive from them is very encouraging, with the exception of that which comes from the southern part of the province.*

*"After having explained to these gentlemen the views of the Committee and the instructions you ordered me to communicate to them, they placed themselves entirely at my disposal. Two of these gentlemen (Y—— B——*

and M—— D——), who are the most prominent members of the *Mlada Srbdia*, assured me that their society was quite ready to send towards the Turkish frontier the arms they had received formerly.

*"The Servian Government, whilst pretending to ignore what is taking place at Cragujéwatz, is not the less favourably inclined towards these initiative clubs. Four days ago Lieutenant-Colonel Lechjanin (secret member of the *Mlada Srbdia*) brought to our friends 1000 ducats from the Prince."*

Then follows a letter from M. Stramankoff, at the head of the Foreign Office of St. Petersburg, to Excellency Novikow, Russian ambassador at Vienna, dated December 20, 1872 :—

*"As General Ignatiew informs you of all that goes on at Constantinople, it is hardly necessary for me to tell you all the bad news we receive from Tzargrad.*

*"The Ministry of Khalil Pasha was certainly not calculated to give us any hopes of regaining the influence we lost by the fall of Mahmoud Pucha.*

*"From the General's letter you will see that he still holds to the optimism which is the base of his character, but as for myself I may say frankly that I no longer share the rose-coloured hopes of our friends at Constantinople; the Anglo-Austrian intrigue is so powerful there that I cannot hope for Mahmoud's speedy return to office, more especially as the Sultan, whose feeble and vacillatory character we know, seems to have allowed himself to be persuaded that it is necessary to keep in the present Ministry.*

*"Prince Gortschakoff has just written to the General, telling him to suspend, for some little time, all attack upon the Minister for Foreign Affairs and the Grand Vizier: the character of Khalil and the state of opinion*

in Turkey lead us to foresee that before long some favourable circumstance will arise which will prove the incapacity of those two statesmen, and by so doing oblige the Sultan again to entrust the administration of affairs to our friends.

"In the meantime, we consider that it would be advisable to break ground in quite another direction : and as Montenegro and Serbia may be capable of offering us the opportunity we are waiting for, you will concentrate your attention on these two points.

"By favouring the material and moral development of these two outposts of Slavism, we shall be serving our cause more efficaciously than by mixing in a set of Palace intrigues unworthy of our great Country and of the Idea she represents.

" You have no doubt learnt the last decision as to the sequestration of the property belonging to the Church of Jerusalem: although rather late in the day, this measure will be none the less a good lesson to our religious opponents. *The Greeks, let us hope, will understand the utter madness of their attacks upon Russia and the Bulgarians*, particularly when they see the throne of the Ecumenical Patriarch, in whom they take so much pride, dependent upon the goodwill of a man like Khalil, who incites them against us in order the better to indulge his own animosity."

The following despatch, dated "Cettigne, December 22, 1872," is from two more august personages ; from Prince Nicholas of Montenegro, to His Imperial Highness the Grand Duke Constantine of Russia :—

"The sentiments of gracious benevolence and lively interest which your Imperial Highness does not cease to show in my valiant though unfortunate people, embolden me to lay before your Imperial Highness a true state-

ment of the sad position in which we find ourselves, and the efforts almost superhuman to which my Government is obliged to resort to prevent being taken unawares.

"From the two letters which I presumed to address to your Imperial Highness in September and October, you have been able to learn, Monseigneur, what the Colachine affair has cost my Government and the state of isolation in which we are placed by the requirements of a policy hostile to any Slav movement. Since the day when the brave defenders, of the sole asylum of freedom left the Southern Slavs, believed it their duty to hurl themselves against the barbarous foes of our faith, we have been surrounded by an iron girdle, which continually drawn tighter will unhappily end by provoking a struggle far more bloody than that of Colachine.

"The reports of Mr. T—— having informed the Imperial Government upon all the intrigues and machinations of the Turkish authorities in Albania, I need not repeat them, but shall confine myself to adding that, thanks to the employment of as much money as arms, of which my neighbour at Scutari has the disposal, the greatest part of my allies of to-morrow are in default. We shall probably finish by losing the rest if the Imperial Government does not succour us at this so critical a moment of our existence.

"To guard against the mines and ambushes which have been laid along the Albanian frontier, I have despatched numerous agents into the neighbouring districts. My emissaries have been able to penetrate to its remotest corners, and have there obtained some success. But your Imperial Highness will easily understand that these successes in no way guarantee the future, on account of the paucity of our means and the numerous

detachments of troops which occupy the shores of Lake Scutari.

"In this mournful situation, the development of the establishment of Tchernoevitz-Retchka is some consolation. Thanks to the zeal of Messrs. S—— and B——, we have already collected there 12,000 Krenk rifles, 4500 Berdan, 6800 American pistols, 7000 cavalry sabres, and 3 mountain batteries. When the mitrailleuses and mortars, together with the 25,000 American carbines and the munitions of war, which the Imperial Government has promised us, arrive, we shall be in a condition to commence the struggle. Meanwhile I assemble every month at Retchka and Negoche some hundreds of the youth of the interior and neighbouring provinces to exercise them in the management of European arms. Thanks to this system, which is well adapted to the native customs, we shall soon have in case of need more than 30,000 trained men burning to encounter the common enemy.

"The only matter that torments us is the Turkish fortifications to which we are prevented from opposing any obstacle. It is to this very subject that I take the liberty of calling the attention of your Imperial Highness. The advice that we receive from the Imperial Government would greatly assist the development of my country if the Turks remained quiet. Unfortunately they do not. Whilst we are forced to look on with folded arms, our neighbours fortify themselves and adopt the necessary measures for cutting off our advance into the interior of Albania and the Herzegovina. If this state of affairs last ten months it will be absolutely impossible to undertake anything serious against the Turks, whilst the latter will be able easily to penetrate into our territory and repeat the carnage of the last campaign."

The following despatch in cypher also refers to Montenegro, and to Albania. It is dated August 20, 1872, and is from the Russian Consul at Scutari to the Secret Committee at Vienna :—

“The imprisonment of the Albanians who would not, or rather who could not, deliver up to the Turkish authorities the two most influential chiefs of the Mirdites, has caused great excitement in this district, and will, I think, end by embittering the relations between Montenegro and the Christians of this province. The latter, irritated by the constantly increasing oppression of the Turks, and seeing the apparent inaction of the Montenegrin Government—which they attribute to a feeling of fear—may perhaps become reconciled with the Turks, and then be as furious against the Montenegrins as they have been, up to now, devoted to the interests of that little state.

“*To stop this as much as possible, I have sent two of our friends to the Mirdites and the neighbouring tribes with some presents in money and some arms. I have told my agents to reassure our allies, and to promise them a speedy solution of their differences with the Turks.*

“As for the policy of the Montenegrin Cabinet, I have recommended my agents to explain to the Chief, Shion, that *Prince Nicolas is ready to fall upon the Turks, but is waiting only for a plausible pretext to be offered by the latter.*”

The next is from the same to the same, dated November 29, 1872 :—

“B—— P—— has just informed me of the return to Cettigné of the two agents he sent into the south of Albania four months ago.

“The mission confided to these two emissaries was, as

you are aware, to go about the country beyond Dulcigno and there to spread and strengthen the influence of Montenegro.

"This mission owes the undoubted success it has gained to the ability of B——, but *principally to the large sums of money placed at his disposal by order of the Central Committee.*

"Preaching everywhere a crusade against the enemies of Slavo-Albanian independence, B—— and his colleagues were obliged also to *put in this category the Bulgarians, for fear of arousing the latent Greco-phile sympathies of the Albanians.* By this wise and clever line of conduct the Montenegrin emissaries acquired the confidence of the ignorant population of the country of the Geughes, and we have a right to hope that the money spent so generously on this occasion will bear good fruit in the future . . . .

"M—— C—— it appears deceives himself as to the importance and future of his work, which will have without doubt the same fate as the mission of our agents to Corfu and Epirus in 1870.

"Before beginning to work among the people of this province, it is necessary, as Prince Nicolas says (and I am wholly of his opinion), *to get the Archbishop of Yanina removed, and to have him replaced by a more ambitious Prelate, with sympathies less pro-Turkish than those of the present Archbishop.* Otherwise we shall make no progress, and throw away our money with no other result than that of compromising our cause in this country."

The following, also from the Russian Consul at Scutari to the Secret Society at Vienna, dated Nov. 24, 1872, may explain the indignation of the "atrocities" agitators of England against Chefket Pasha, and account for his

having been denounced by name in the despatch from Lord Derby of Sept. 21 :—

“ Our situation here becomes from day to day more unbearable ; in spite of the number of our own partisans amongst the mountaineers, and notwithstanding that the emissaries of Prince Nicolas are everywhere in our district, we find it *very difficult to struggle against the intrigues of Chefket.* Everybody is so much afraid of this Turk that we cannot hope for any diversion in favour of Montenegro.

“ In the interest of our unfortunate brothers by race, it would be well if the Committee wrote to Constantinople to back up my last report to H. E., the ambassador, *since the dismissal of Chefket is the only means of warding off great calamities from this country, and of allowing the seed we have sown to fructify* for the advantage of a people worthy of all protection that we can afford.”

The following is from General Ignatiew at Constantinople to the Khedive of Egypt, dated May 30, 1871. The Russians forget no part of the Turkish territories where they have any hopes of making difficulties, and stirring up an agitation.

“ I beg to thank your Highness for the letter you did me the honour to write to me, dated Cairo, May 8.

“ I consider it my duty at the same time to inform your Highness that the Imperial Consul-General in Egypt has given me an account of the conversation that your Highness honoured him with.

“ I am very much grieved to hear that your Highness gives the news which I forwarded in my letter of April 15 a different purport from that which I intended. If your Highness will kindly remember what I said concerning the information in question, you will see that

I congratulated you on the lucky turn that Eastern affairs were taking. I said that Europe is so exhausted after the last war, that public opinion is so inclined to peace, that the first disturber of the peace would be placed under the ban of Europe. Now, could there be anything more fortunate for your Highness, than that Turkey, stirred up on all sides, should, without any plausible or legitimate excuse, rush headlong against Egypt? While protesting against the invading spirit of the Turk, your Highness' Government would have to hold on for a few days, and intervention would be sure to find its way through all obstacles; it would be demanded even by those who continually set us (Russians) up as the revolutionary missionaries of the East.

"While calling your Highness' attention to all these questions, I beg to state still more clearly the project of the Imperial Government. To ensure the success of our plans, it is urgent that Egypt should still remain undisturbed. *Arm yourselves, prepare for a long war, make offensive and defensive treaties with Greece, Servia, and Roumania* (in which we will unquestionably help you) *and never cease to dispute inch by inch the pretensions of the Suzerainty.* Let the Egyptian Government assume a dignified and inflexible attitude towards the Porte, and it will gain the day. By showing yourselves firm and intractable you will increase the exasperation of the Sultan's Ministers, and fan their irritation to an explosion. *Then will Egypt know and appreciate Russian friendship,* totally unlike French protection, which after urging on to war your Highness' illustrious ancestor, did no more than platonically uphold him, and abandoned him to Ottoman vengeance."

The next despatch between the Russian ambassadors of Constantinople and Vienna shows the animosity

already existing between General Ignatiew and the Young Turkey party, with Midhat Pasha at their head. The learned Softas were already opening the eyes of their country, and proving a stumbling block in the way of General Ignatiew and his intrigues. The despatch is dated from Pera, Dec. 5, 1872 :—

“Bairam has in no way altered the unsettled condition of affairs which I explained to you in my last letter. Notwithstanding all the efforts of sound and enlightened minds the clique of intriguers has carried the day and the ‘*petit crev *’ of Paris (Namyk Pasha) remains in charge of the foreign affairs of the poor sick man whom we are trying to cure in spite of himself.

“I think it useless to give you all the details of the struggle that we have had to sustain against the party of Midhat, supported by my colleagues of the west. You will ask me perhaps what is the origin of this engouement of the ambassadors of the west for a statesman who is a true representative of the old Turkish party and who has no ties with that European civilization of which my colleagues in our Oriental chaos assume to be the disinterested protectors. The sympathy with which they honour him arises simply from the fact that Midhat pursues his hostility to Russia to a ridiculous extreme. *The severity which he showed in Bulgaria, and which I certainly cannot blame in the interests of the Government which he served,* was the principal cause of the popularity which he has acquired with certain Embassies. It is, thanks to these considerations, that Khalil always enjoys the sympathy of my colleagues and that he has been able to maintain himself provisionally in his post notwithstanding the just indignation of the Sultan against his too stupid Minister. The latter instead of serving the true interests of his

adopted country, commits folly upon folly for the mere sake of spiting the Sovereign of his native land and our brethren in race.

"Later still M. Christich (Prime Minister of Servia), confided to me that it becomes almost impossible for him to protect the interests of his country against the ill-will of a *Minister animated by the worst possible sentiments towards the Slavs.*

"Having surrounded himself with individuals belonging to the two famous Young Turkish party, and with Poles newly arrived like crows, he excites the old Phanar, and renders any compromise between the Greeks and Bulgarians impossible. It is certainly true that the fanatics of the Patriarchate make the task that he has undertaken very easy. These degenerate descendants of Jean Chrysostom are delighted to have found a protector on a par with their intrigues.

"I have written lately to our Consuls to withdraw all subsidies and assistance to Greek churches and schools. Perhaps by this means their eyes will be opened, and the sheep who have wandered from the fold under the influence of Phanariote propaganda may be brought back. As to the Bulgarians, I can only praise their tact and *savoir faire*. They thoroughly understood the counsel I gave them by Onou,\* and behave in such a way that our enemies can find nothing to denounce to the Government. *I received yesterday from Prince Nicolas a letter announcing the bad state of his affairs in Albania.* Unfortunately from the enclosed copy you will see that he does not give me the details of the arrests made by Chefkct. Has he written anything to you about it? Mr. H—— writes me in his reports that

\* Mr. Onou, 1st dragoman at the Russian Embassy.

the agents of the Prince lately sent to Scutari were obliged to return at once to Cettigné for fear of being arrested by the police. Have you not some means of arranging this business with your Committee, and of indicating the line of conduct it should take in case of the impossibility of *Montenegro maintaining her agents in Albania*. Have the kindness to communicate to me what you have done in this respect."

That Prince Nicholas of Montenegro, as well as Prince Milan of Servia, were conspiring with the Russian Government and the Secret Societies, has already been made plain. If additional proof were needed, the following telegram, in cypher, from the Russian Consul at Ragusa, to Excellency Novikow, the Russian ambassador at Vienna, dated Dec. 28, 1872, will suffice:—

"Prince Nicolas (of Montenegro), having been informed of the last arrangements of the Central Committee with regard to Montenegro, has begged me to express to the said Committee his deep gratitude. At the same time he sent me an autographic letter for His Highness Monseigneur (the Czarewitch), which I hasten to enclose under flying seal, begging your Excellency to forward it to its destination.

"The letter in question, giving very minute and interesting details of the armaments in the Principality. I think it is unnecessary to trouble your Excellency with further remarks of my own, beyond saying, that lately B—— declared to me that he could do nothing with regard to ammunition without authority from Opuich."

General Ignatiew had tried to bring about a change in the established order of succession to the Sultan's throne. The fundamental law, or *lex regia* of Turkey, required that the oldest member of the Sultan's family,

and not the eldest son, should succeed to the authority of the Califf and the throne of the Sultan. Prince Youssouf Izzedin, the Sultan's son, was proud and violent, and therefore likely to bring confusion into the country, and favour the development of agitations. Moreover, he was well affected towards the Russians, and likely to be guided, even more than Abdul Assiz, his father, by the Russian ambassador. Therefore it was that General Ignatiew conspired to change the fundamental law of Turkey. To this endeavour allusion is made in the following secret despatch from General Ignatiew to Excellency Novikow, dated February 20, 1873 :—

“ So we are in for a change of Ministry, and the new one is a sorry patchwork of the old. ‘ Six for one and half-a-dozen for the other.’ I could hardly express my meaning better than by this trite expression. . . .

“ The coming into power of Essad Pacha is sufficiently strong proof of the tenacity of the Sultan's fixed idea, the new Sudrazan being very devoted to Prince Youssouf, and on very friendly terms with him.

“ Mehemed Rushdi's removal from office, not having been the result of political requirements, but solely of a cabal, got up by the palace ladies, who always had a liking for the bright young general, I cannot as yet define my future intercourse with him. But I am much annoyed, that Khalil, though shaken, is still in office, and consequently busy with his foolish intrigues against Slavism.”

The secret despatches already given will suffice to show to any one who cares to see, and who is honest enough to admit conviction, that Russia has been carefully preparing the ground for future agitations, seditions, rebellions, and war. That money, secret agents, secret societies, the antagonisms of races, her own

church, the name of Christianity have all been her tools to effect her nefarious purposes. In all the provinces of Turkey, the gold has been Russian ; the emissaries have been Russian ; the arms have been Russian ; the traitors, the conspirators, the journals which incited the rebels were in Russian pay. But Russia veils her game, and bides her time, and pretends moderation, and feigns Christianity, while she is sowing the seeds of rebellion and plotting slaughter.

So far we have been wandering through the dark and intricate galleries of the enemy's mines and subterraneous passages. Let us again emerge into daylight to mark the airholes here and there on the upper ground. Russia, who pretends to be the "great conservative power," was working with the Secret Societies. Kara Georgevich was the agent of these societies in Bosnia and Herzegovina. It was the principles of 1789 that he was spreading. Sir A. Buchanan, our ambassador in Vienna, wrote, on February 28th, 1876, to the Earl of Derby\* in the following words : "Count Andrassy showed me to-day one of the medals which Kara Georgevich is said to have distributed 4,000 of in Bosnia and Herzegovina. On the one side is the effigy of Kara Georgevitch, and on the reverse the words, '*Liberty, Fraternity, and Equality.*'" Consul Holmes was then ordered by Lord Derby to explain the causes of the insurrection. In his answer, dated March 10th,† he says that the Secret Society which called itself "the Omladina," maintained an intercourse with the refugees, who had fled when the agitation which Russia had stirred up, began to be watched by the Porte. These refugees, having, on Austrian territory, learned the parts

\* III. of 1876. No. 25.

+ III. of 1876. No. 67.

they were to play, asked for leave to return to the Turkish provinces to put their lessons in practice. The Turks, aware of what had been going on, refused. The other powers put pressure on the Porte, and constrained her to receive the conspirators with open arms.

" Fair pretexts were unfortunately not wanting in the circumstances of their normal condition, and they were used to give an appearance of spontaneity to the movement. The first evident indication of foreign action was given by *the intercourse between the refugees and the Omladina of Servia*, which at once sent agents to confer with them and money to supply their wants. At this time the Prince of Montenegro complained that Servia was plotting to create some kind of disturbance, and that instead of summoning the Herzegovinians to Belgrade, she was endeavouring to fix the responsibility on Montenegro by selecting Grahovo as the head-quarters of the conspiracy. After having arranged their plans and received their instructions the natives of Nevessine asked to be allowed to return to their homes. This was opposed by Dervish Pasha, who had suspicions of what had been going on, *but the Porte was persuaded to give the permission demanded*. Immediately after their return the people of Nevessine began the insurrectionary movement by refusing to receive zaptichs and to pay certain taxes, and put forth every grievance they could allege to justify their conduct."

It is amusing to observe the terror of the two conspirators, Prince Milan of Servia, and Prince Nicholas of Montenegro. The former wished the head-quarters of the conspiracy to be at Grahovo, in order that the guilt of the insurrection might fall on Montenegro; the latter desired to turn the Turkish vengeance off from himself and on to Servia, by inducing the rebels to rendezvous

at Belgrade. While these plots were ripening, what was the part which Russia was playing? The part of a great conservative power again! The Prince of Servia conspired with Russia and the Secret Societies. Prince Gortchakow begged the other powers to support the Prince of Servia against the Secret Societies,—as if they were enemies. He even went so far as to terrify Austria, by revealing to her the workings of the Secret Societies,—those horrid revolutionists,—in the Austrian provinces. Lord A. Loftus wrote this to Lord Derby from St. Petersburgh, on March 28th, 1876.\*

“In regard to Servia, Prince Gortchakow stated that their interest was *to support Prince Milan against the ‘Omladina’ and the violent revolutionary party* who were plotting his overthrow.

“He had lately drawn the attention of the Austrian Cabinet to the secret workings of this party, not only in Servia but in the adjoining Austrian Provinces, as also to the intrigues of Kara Georgevitch and his followers. His Highness had recommended that these revolutionary proceedings and elements should be carefully watched, and that they should be put down with a strong hand.”

Sir Henry Elliot, a little later, on May 4th, 1876, reported † the active operations of the Secret Societies in Bulgaria. He was, probably, well aware that the leader and instigator of them was Russia: “It was known that revolutionary agents were working actively among the Bulgarians, and that arms and ammunition have latterly been introduced in considerable quantities.” It has ever been the policy and practice of Russia to appear as the “Great Conservative Power” while she was fomenting revolution; as solicitous about Christianity, while plot-

\* III. of 1876. No. 100.

+ III. of 1876. No. 252.

ting the downfall of religion; as careful of "humanity" while encouraging insurrection and massacre. She has encouraged her victims to trust in her as the friend and refuge who is to save them from her own intrigues. That policy was revealed by a secret despatch of Count Pozzo di Borgo in 1825 :—\*

"It would be sufficient to make them understand through unacknowledged agents (*par des agents non avoués*) that their safety depends on the resolution taken by his Majesty the Emperor; that they ought to prepare to follow his directions according to the course of events, and that in the meantime they may defend themselves from the Turks by all the means in their power, with the greater prospect of success as the attitude of Russia would prevent the Porte from directing all her forces against them."

As the unsuspecting traveller in India was on his way, he was joined by an inoffensive and polished person, who desired that they should travel together on the lonely part of the road, as he was afraid of the Thugs. Presently another came up, and warned the two of those bloodthirsty robbers, and the three proceeded together—the rich and stupid merchant, between the two Thugs, advanced to a certain doom. Such is the support of Russia and the Secret Societies to all that trust in them. In 1828, Count Pozzo di Borgo recommended, in regard to Turkey, the very policy which is now being pursued :—

"We will allow the Christians to combat their tyrants, and we will raise up against our enemy all the tempests he invokes, as they become a part of our natural defence, and a means of forcing him to submit to those conditions

\* From the "*Recueil des documents relatifs à la Russie.*"

which our honour and safety require that we should impose upon him."

Last November,\* Consul General White explained to Lord Derby † the close connection between the Czar of Russia and the Secret Societies. Those societies enjoyed the position of a Royal Society ; and their violation of international law, and of neutrality, in sending money, arms, ammunition, soldiers, and officers, to aid the insurgents was publicly approved by the despot whose word is law. As the name of Christianity serves to cover Russian intrigues, as her Church is the instrument of revolutionary propagandism, so the Red Cross of Geneva covers the transit of officers and secures the unimpeded transport of ammunition and arms to the insurgents. This is the despatch of Consul General White :—

" 2. The societies which have been sending money for the purpose of keeping up the war in Servia are bodies enjoying a *quasi* recognition on the part of the Imperial family, something like our Royal Societies at home, and as far as I am cognizant of Russian legislation it depends very much on an expression of the will of the reigning sovereign, the present Emperor having in a recent speech at Moscow spoken favourably of the Russian volunteers serving in Servia. His Majesty has thus given a legislative approbation of their having been sent to fight here—a precedent which Russia may have occasion to regret some day, if officers belonging to a neutral nation should ever lead hostile soldiers against a Russian army.

" From an international point of view two points may be noticed in the action of the Slavonic Committees in Russia as highly objectionable, viz., the enlistment which

\* Nov. 25, 1876.

† I. of 1877. No. 1086.

has been openly carried on by them in Russia for the Servian army, though it is pretended that, as no Foreign Enlistment Act exists in Russia, no municipal law is thereby violated.

"The second reprehensible practice has consisted in an abuse of the Convention of Geneva by conveying to Servia, under the symbols of the Red Cross, warlike apparel, and probably small arms and other portable material from Russia, whilst officers in uniform travelled thence through Hungary and Roumania to the seat of war under the protection of the Russian Red Cross Societies and with certificates delivered by them.

"The funds sent here by these and by Slavonic Committees have been exclusively managed and distributed here either by General Tcherniaieff or by agents sent for the purpose from Moscow to St. Petersburg. These funds were available for the pay and expenses of the Russian volunteers; but I presume the Russian authorities do not consider any of these acts as breaches of neutrality, or else I cannot account for the fact that official encouragement was given in all parts of the Empire to patronize and assist the collection of funds which have been thus used or abused quite openly."

Prince Gortchakow informed the powers of Europe that the object of the Czar was peace, and that the voyage of General Ignatiev had but one aim, "a pacific solution." \* Yet, in the same breath, he said that she had mobilized 500,000 men, incurred enormous expenditure, and caused the stagnation of her trade. These enormous armaments, and expensive demonstrations of war, were made, forsooth, without any desire of aggrandizement or hope of recompense;—only for the suffering

\* VIII. of 1877. Earl of Derby. March 13, 1877.

"Christian populations of Turkey," and in the cause of "humanity;" and the only return which the Czar ventured to hope for was "some improvement of the condition of the Christian population." *Credat Iudeus!*

Let us look, *ab extra*, and without further knowledge than the Blue Books have furnished, to see how the sufferings of the Christian populations arose. The Porte \* openly accused Russia, as early as August, 1875, of having caused the whole of it in execution of a deep-laid and long-planned scheme of intrigue. These were his words :—“Enfin tous ces mouvements donnent lieu à penser que l'insurrection éclatée dans cette partie de l'Empire ne peut être autre chose que le commencement de l'exécution d'un plan arrêté de longue main.”

Sir Henry Elliot, on February 14, 1876, gives the same explanation of that which Russia pretended to deplore. The Russian consuls, he said, were the foci of insurrection, and the Russian consulates “the open resort of the insurgent chiefs.” This † is his despatch to the Earl of Derby :—

“The account of the encouragement and countenance given to the insurgents at Ragusa greatly exceeds all that I was prepared for.

“*The Russian Consulate is the open resort of the insurgent chiefs; their correspondence is sent to the Consul who is a party to all their projects, and associates himself intimately with them.*

“He does not appear to make an attempt to conceal the part he is playing, for on the occasion of the death of the Chief Maxime, in one of the late encounters, the Russian flag at the Consulate was hoisted at half-mast, and M. Jonine himself joined the funeral procession. . . .

\* II. of 1876. No. 11. Safvet Pasha, Aug. 10, 1875.

† III. of 1876. No. 11.

"Some of the wounded when asked why they continue to struggle, when the Porte is ready to grant all their demands, have answered plainly that they are bound to go on as long as they are told by Russia to do so.

"The assurances given at St. Petersburgh of the wish of the Imperial Government that the insurgents would lay down their arms, must naturally go for nothing as long as its official Representative, with whom they are in communication, encourages them to go on."

We remember the underhand intrigues and half-revealed conspiracies which Prince Nicholas of Montenegro was carrying on? Here \* is what our ambassador at St. Petersburgh wrote to Lord Derby on Februa'y 29, 1876:—"With the intimacy existing between Russia and the Prince of Montenegro, it is not likely that any engagements of a political nature would have been taken by the Prince of Montenegro without the knowledge of the Imperial Government." So then, the acts of Montenegro were the acts of Russia; and Montenegro is now galvanized into seditious life, now falls into a political coma, as Russia manipulates the apparatus.

It appears that Austria was stupid enough to co-operate with Russia, at the first, in fomenting the Slav insurrections. Here † is what Consul Holmes wrote on March 10, 1876, concerning the causes of the insurrection:—

"The Turks promised redress and every possible satisfaction, but without success, and the promoters of the insurrection divided into bands and spread over the country, raising the villages in every direction, destroying the houses of the inhabitants, and forcing them to

\* III. of 1876. No. 30.

† III. of 1876. No. 67, p. 40.

take up arms. The Turks were quite unable to prevent this, as the small force they could command was barely sufficient to protect the towns, and they could not send a single battalion against the insurgent bands, who were thus quite free to dictate to the unprotected and unarmed *Christian* population, the greater part of whom rose in arms simply because they had no alternative.

" As the insurrection spread the Dalmatians began to show the most enthusiastic sympathy with the insurgents by joining them in bands, and furnishing them with arms, ammunition, and provisions. No such sympathy was manifested during the insurrection in 1860—61. The Montenegrins also began to join them; and then the districts of Piva, Drobsniak, Baniani, and Zupci, which have enjoyed perfect liberty and, in consequence of arrangements with the Porte, have been annually receiving certain sums of money from the Government ever since 1862, also rose in arms and joined the revolt. This is supposed to have been partly at the instigation of Montenegro and partly from a turbulent nature in sympathy with their fellow-Christians. Since that moment, though the Prince Nicolas on the one side, and the Austrian Government on the other, have loudly asserted their neutrality and their friendship for the Porte, both the Montenegrins and the Dalmatians have openly given every possible aid to the insurgents, and have, in fact, done everything that declared enemies to Turkey could have effected short of sending their regular troops to take part in the insurrection.

" The so-called insurrection in Bosnia might be better termed an *invasion by bands openly formed in Austrian Croatia and Servia*.

" It has never extended beyond the range of their operations, and cannot be called a popular movement.

"The promise of an entire change of the policy which has hitherto been pursued by Austria and Montenegro will, I hope, if seriously carried out, speedily effect a pacification, which, however, might have been obtained in the same manner any time during the last four months."

The Turks had done everything to satisfy any just demands, and to terminate any honest revolt for the protection of suppressed rights. But this insurrection was the result of intrigue. The Christians could not complain of oppression by the Turks ; because the Turks were over-powered by numbers, and were unable even to protect the Christian populations, which the rebels were massacring under the specious pretext of "protecting the Christian populations." Austria must bear her share of responsibility. Austria and Montenegro had promised the Powers that they would cease to foment the rebellion. On June 24, Lord Derby wrote \* to our ambassador at Vienna to complain of the open assistance given by the Austrian Government to the rebellious subjects of the Porte :—

"Assuming the correctness of the information contained in Mr. Monson's despatch of the 14th instant, which has passed through your Excellency's hands, it is clear that *Dalmatia is still the main basis for the transport of supplies to Montenegro, destined ultimately for the use of the insurgents*, and those acting with them in their operations in Herzegovina. Mr. Monson states that *the port of Cattaro has recently been re-opened for the disembarkation of military stores on their way to Montenegro*; that Prince Nikita's troops are armed with rifles, purchased from Austria, and brought on board

\* III. of 1876.

vessels chartered from a company enjoying an Imperial subvention ; that Ragusa is daily visited by armed insurgents ; that it is notorious that *Austrian subjects took part against the Turks in the battles at the Douga Pass* ; and that the insurrection is fomented by the *Panslavist Committees, who, under the shelter of Austrian territory, collect and forward munitions of war, and exert their influence to prevent the refugees who are willing to return to their homes from re-crossing the frontier.*

*"If these reports are to be trusted, and it is difficult to believe that an intelligent observer can be mistaken who speaks of what is daily passing under his own eyes, it is obvious that should the Austrian frontier be effectually sealed, and the Panslavist Committees be suppressed, the work of pacification, which Count Andrassy so earnestly wishes to promote, would be much simplified."*

This illegal concord, this co-operation in intrigue is further shown by the fact that, while the Austrian port of Cattaro was open for the import of arms and ammunition for the insurgents, Austria, at the bidding of Russia, closed her port of Klek against the Turks. We learned that up to the end of June, the Austrian frontier was open for the passage of arms and rebels, and Austria refused, or at least neglected, to guard it. Prince Gortchakow, as we find by a despatch of Lord A. Loftus, of April 30, 1876,\* seemed to think that it had been closed against the insurgents, and used that as an argument for shutting the port of Klek against Turkey :—

"From certain expressions which fell from Prince Gortchakow I have reason to think that his Highness

\* III. of 1876. No. 250.

has strongly urged on Count Andrassy the necessity of closing the port of Klek, and of preventing it from being utilized by the Porte as a basis of military operations.

"It is not the first time that Prince Gortchakow has spoken to me in this sense. On the present occasion his Highness observed that as Austria had closed her frontier against the insurgents, the access to Klek should be equally closed to the Porte for military purposes.

"Prince Gortchakow stated that he held strictly to the principle of material non-intervention."

The Russian Chancellor, having induced Austria to close the port of Klek, and thus stop the arrival of men and munitions of war to the Turkish army, now says that, as Turkey, in obedience, to Lord Derby's commands, endeavours to defend herself, he (Prince Gortchakow) will not suggest that Montenegro,—who was conspiring and fomenting the rebellion, and furnishing supplies to the rebels,—should remain neutral. Further, he hinted that Prince Nicolas of Montenegro might have to carry on war more openly; although he urged the European powers to shriek minatory at the Porte, in order to frighten her into giving way to the insurgents. This\* is Lord A. Loftus's despatch to Lord Derby, dated April 30, 1876:—

"Prince Gortchakow then informed me, in reference to the communication I had made, that, under the circumstances he had related to me, and in view of the menacing attitude which the Porte still continued to observe towards Montenegro, he could take no further steps in regard to inducing the Prince of Montenegro to maintain his neutrality, nor indeed could he answer that the Prince of Montenegro may not be forced by circumstances into action.

"His Highness said that he considered, on the contrary, the gravity of the situation required that the European Powers should hold the most energetic language to the Porte, with a view to the adoption of such concessions as will reasonably satisfy the insurgents, and thereby give peace to her disaffected subjects."

We next learn from Consul Holmes that the Panslavist Committees and Russia furnished money to maintain the rebellion, while their aim was, first : to weaken the general consideration of Turkey, and destroy her credit (as General Ignatiew, to a great extent, succeeded in doing, by running the late Sultan into all sorts of profligate expenditure, and by inducing the Sultan to suspend the payment of interest on the debts) ; secondly, their aim was to embroil Austria, their ally, their accomplice, their tool,—which was very natural, as the creation of a Panslavist Empire means the dismemberment of Austria. This is Consul Holmes's despatch\* :—“As to Russia, also, the sincerity of Prince Gortchakow and the Government is not questioned, but it is said that *the Slav Committees and thousands in Russia contribute money to keep up the revolt.* Their desire is said to be a wish *to destroy the strength and credit of Turkey, and to embroil Austria in hopeless internal difficulties, for ulterior designs not yet quite apparent.*”

So far did the Russians carry their desire to discredit the Porte that, as we learn from Sir H. Elliot,† they made every boon, which was granted to the insurgents by Turkey, appear to have come from the Western Powers and Russia herself. Yet Russia, all the while, took care that these boons should be such as to cause discontent,

\* III. of 1876. No. 262. May 5, 1876.

† I. of 1877. No. 1083. Nov., 1876.

and to sow the seeds of future agitations in other parts of the Ottoman Empire :—

“ *The anxiety of the Russian Government to make it appear that whatever is done for the Christians is done by the Powers, and not by the Porte, is as marked as ever. The object is to weaken the authority of the Sultan, and to teach the populations that they have only the foreign Governments to look to for protection, which cannot be the wish of the Governments which sincerely desire the maintenance of this Empire at the same time as the removal of the grievances which lead to discontent and insurrection. . . .*

“ *The grievances to be removed exist in all parts of European Turkey, and the remedies must be applied to all alike, unless the seeds of future insurrections are to be sown in other provinces, which are entitled to equal consideration, but which, not being Slav, are regarded with indifference by Russia.*”

While the Russians would have it appear that they were supporting the cause of “ Humanity ” and “ Christian civilisation,” against the ferocious cruelties and atrocities of the Turks, we find that the satellites and emissaries of Russia were those that carried out an “ atrocious policy,” and burned, ravaged, and killed peaceful Christian populations that refused to join the rebellion. Thus,\* Sir Henry Elliot wrote, on May 9, 1876 :—

“ There is, I believe, no doubt of the correctness of what Mr. Dupuis states of the leaders in the affair at Otloukeui (where the disturbance commenced) being Servians or other emissaries of the revolutionary committees.

“ . . . The organizers of the movements pursue the same atrocious policy as was followed in the Herzegovina,

\* III. of 1876. No. 255.

by burning and ravaging all villages, whether Mussulman or Christian, if the inhabitants refuse to join them. . . .

"Outrages committed upon the peaceful Mussulmans, and especially upon the women and children, may provoke among the Mahomedans a spirit of fanaticism and revenge likely to lead to similar acts of retaliation, which it may be very difficult to restrain, although the Government declare their determination to do all in their power to prevent it."

We next learn\* from a despatch of the Earl of Derby, dated May 10, 1876, that Montenegro, whom Russia refused to restrain, or even ask to be neutral, and on whom the European Powers would not permit Turkey to make an attack in self-defence,—this protected criminal, Montenegro, at once showed a still more decidedly hostile attitude towards Turkey. These are Lord Derby's words :—

"I transmit to your Excellency a copy of a telegram from the Porte (dated April 26), which was communicated to me by the Turkish Ambassador on the 27th ultimo, remonstrating against *the hostile attitude shown by Montenegro towards Turkey*.

"Upon the receipt of this communication I despatched my telegram to your Excellency of the 28th, and I informed Musurus Pasha in reply that a telegram had been sent to you and to the British Representatives at the Courts of the other Powers, acquainting you with the contents of the Turkish telegram, and stating that Her Majesty's Government considered that *the demands of the Porte were just and reasonable*, and they trusted that the other Governments would concur with Her Majesty's Government in this opinion, and *would strongly advise the Prince of Montenegro accordingly*.

\* III. of 1876. No. 225.

"I added that Her Majesty's Government considered that, *as the Porte had disclaimed any intention of attacking Montenegro, the latter should be called upon to observe an efficient neutrality.*"

Lord Derby regarded the Porte as just and reasonable ; and he trusted that Russia and Austria would strongly advise Montenegro to be quiet ! This was in May. He knew of the conspiracy, into which Montenegro and Servia had entered, with Austria and Russia ; he was aware how Russia and Austria had supplied fuel to the fire, and with infinite trouble, fanned it into flames, and yet he hoped they would quench it at his request ! The last sentence of the above quotation reveals a peculiar animus in Lord Derby. It was the duty of Montenegro,—a state ostensibly at peace with the Porte, nay more, a vassal state,—to maintain a strict neutrality. Yet Montenegro was only to be *advised* to be neutral, on the ground that the Porte had no intention of making war in self-defence ; while the Porte, on the other hand, was *ordered* to desist from attacking that rebel state, which had been levying war all the while upon the Porte ; and yet no promise of the future neutrality of Montenegro was conveyed to the Porte. The following is the telegram from Safvet Pasha, dated April 26, 1876 :—

"My telegram of the 23rd instant will have acquainted you how little foundation there is in the rumours which have been in circulation as to an alleged intention of aggression on our part against Montenegro. . . . What have we done, in fact, up to the present time, in the smallest degree inconsistent with the unshaken *confidence we have placed in the promises of moral co-operation kindly given to us by the Powers*, with a view to the speedy pacification of our insurgent provinces, and the *assurances we have so often received from them as to the absolute and*

*perfect neutrality of Montenegro towards the insurrection? Have we not all along showed the greatest deference to the friendly advice of the Governments of Europe by adopting their suggestions relative to complementary reforms to be adopted in Bosnia and the Herzegovina; . . . . by allowing all due facilities for the refugees returning to their homes and to their occupations; by behaving with the most striking moderation in all the changes of fortune of the insurrection, and this in the teeth of public opinion, which is weary of all the atrocities committed by the rebel bands, and of the indefinite prolongation of a strife, the suppression of which it considers too much restricted. . . . It will, however, be acknowledged that the insurrection, far from being pacified, seems to raise its head with a troop of pretensions entirely inadmissible, and to be becoming stronger and stronger. It cannot, indeed, be denied that, as stated by the reports of our Commander-in-Chief, the bands of rebels are increasing in number, and that even Montenegrins have taken part in the struggle."*

Hussein Avni Pasha saw plainly the real state of affairs, and knew that Montenegro and Servia were only being nursed, and prepared for an attack on the Porte. He strongly urged an immediate war on both vassal states. The armies of those principalities were then unprepared, and both of them could have been subdued in a fortnight or three weeks. The rebellion would thus have been crushed, before Russia had finished her preparations. Unhappily the Sultan listened to the ambassadors of European Powers, who were his false friends, and he restrained his troops and gave a respite to the insurgents, of which they were not slow to profit. Russia, by means of Europe, kept Turkey in check, until her own plans were matured; and then Servia and

Montenegro, at Russia's bidding, declared war, and invaded Turkey under the command of Russian officers. If the Porte had not trusted to Foreign Powers, and had not allowed herself to be led like a sheep to the slaughter, the bands of the insurgents, instead of swelling, like a flooded torrent, would have quickly dwindled and disappeared. Lord Derby had given her good counsel, "to put down the insurrection with rigour." Yet he joined at once the other Powers, and did all he could to restrain her from defending herself!

We have not yet arrived at the war between the two principalities and the Porte. Judge the urgency with which the Porte was bidden not to defend herself! Here are three telegrams \* from the Earl of Derby to Sir H. Elliot, on the same day, May 11, 1876:—

(1.) "Her Majesty's Government approve the advice given by your Excellency to the Grand Vizier against making an attack upon Montenegro, as reported in your despatch of the 20th ultimo."

(2.) "Her Majesty's Government approve the advice given by your Excellency to the Turkish Minister of War, urging the imprudence of any precipitate action against Montenegro, as reported in your despatch of the 21st ultimo."

(3.) "With reference to your despatch of the 28th ultimo, commenting on the inaccurate statement of the Russian Government that your Excellency had not joined your colleagues in protesting against the contemplated attack upon Montenegro, and recapitulating your Excellency's proceedings on that occasion, I have to express the approval of Her Majesty's Government of the action taken by your Excellency in that matter."

. A fortnight later (May 18) Lord Derby seems to have awoke from a coma, or somnambulist state into which Count Schouvaloff had mesmerised him. It now dawned upon him, that the course he had been led to pursue was certain to continue and increase the agitation. Of what use is it (he said) to tell Turkey to hold her hand? It is Montenegro that has to be restrained. “Some further conversation followed, in the course of which I told Count Beust that I had no plan to propose, but that *it seemed to me idle to talk of putting an end to the war as long as the Prince and people of Montenegro were allowed to give it active support and assistance*, as they were doing now, *being at the same time guarded by the intervention of the Powers from all fear of retribution on the part of Turkey.*”\* Now Lord Derby is again “clothed and in his right mind.” But it must have been difficult for others to know, from moment to moment, what policy he was pursuing, and on what line his ambassadors should follow. Unless, indeed, he adopted that useful practice of labelling every despatch or telegram or other baggage, with the words, “This side up.” This side, viz.: “It is idle to talk of peace while Montenegro and you are fomenting the rebellion; it is ruining the Porte to restrain her from self-defence.” That would have been the right side to keep up. For nearly a month this side was kept up,—this wholesome feeling lasted. Perhaps, it might have been a conclusion at which he had arrived; a judgment to which, by reasoning, he had come. Possibly! He actually had, at all events, the courage to tell the Russian ambassador that Russia favoured the insurgents; and that agents (consuls) of the Russian Government encouraged the sedition.†

\* III. of 1876. No. 266.

+ III. of 1876. No. 427.

This he informs us by a despatch to Lord A. Loftus on June 14, 1876 :—

“In the course of a long and interesting conversation which I held with the Russian Ambassador on the 12th instant, he expressed regret at the general distrust which appeared to be felt in England as to the designs of his Government, thinking, as he said, that the character and antecedents of the Emperor were a sufficient guarantee for his pacific intentions.

“I assured his Excellency, in reply, that we did not doubt, and never had doubted, the desire of the Emperor for the maintenance of peace ; he was well known to be opposed on principle to a warlike policy, which, moreover, would be obviously opposed to the interests of Russia at the present moment ; but *I reminded his Excellency that the language and conduct of Russian Agents had not always been in accordance with what I could not doubt was the intention of the Government, and that the sympathy generally felt in Russia for the insurgent population of Turkey was a matter of notoriety.*”

On the same day he found, on a careful examination of his conscience, that “now no doubt remained” of Montenegro’s conspiracy ;—he says nothing of Russia ; and he felt conscious, also, that Russia had made a cat-s-paw of him in getting him to restrain the Porte from a manly defence, while he encouraged the insurgents in their sedition, by teaching them to look to foreign Governments, and ignore their own.\* This is Lord Derby’s second despatch of June 14 :—

“Whatever may have been the origin of the insurrection, there can now be no doubt that *it is fomented from without*, and that the efforts of the Turkish Govern-

\* III. of 1876. No. 428.

ment are baffled in a military sense by the warnings addressed to the Porte to respect Montenegro, which is practically the focus of the insurrection; and in a political sense, by the projects continually put forward with the object of making the insurgents look to foreign Powers, and not to their own Government, for protection and guarantees, thus effectually discouraging any arrangement between the insurgents and the Porte."

Within a week (June 29) he wrote to Count Schouvaloff, the Russian Ambassador, telling him that the pretexts put forward so often by Russia, of oppression of the Christians by the Turks, and of abuses, and of a want of reforms, were utterly false; and that the agitation had come "from without,"—from the machinations of a foreign power.\* This is the despatch:—

"Her Majesty's Government cannot, however, regard the insurrection in Bosnia and the Herzegovina as being exclusively or principally a struggle directed against local oppression, whether in religious or civil matters. The reports which they have received show that it arose from other causes, and is now fomented and maintained for purposes which are obviously of a general and political rather than of a local and administrative character. In support of this view, I may mention the fact that the Roman Catholic population have not taken part in the movement, and that those Christians who have not joined the insurgent bands have continued throughout the recent troubles to live unmolested."

On the 2nd of July, war broke out between Turkey and her two vassal states. The Servians and Montenegrins, being ready, at once marched into Turkey, pillaging, burning, and massacring. The Turks were about to send some gunboats up the Danube to attack Bel-

\* III. of 1876. No. 506.

grade,—which would have put an end to the war. This the other states prevented, on the ground that the Danube was a “neutral stream,” although it runs through Turkish territory. In three days Lord Derby had again got the wrong side of his policy up.

Before hurrying on, we must recall a curious circumstance, which made some stir at the time. On the 12th of October, Russia resisted the Turkish proposal for a six months’ armistice, which Lord Derby supported. Prince Gortchakov telegraphed from Livadia on Oct. 14, saying that Russia “insisted” on an “armistice of a month or six weeks.”\* Lord Derby was evidently brought to his wits’ end. What did he do? We have it in his own words, in the summary despatch to Lord A. Loftus on Oct. 30, 1876:—

“Under these circumstances *Her Majesty’s Government thought it right to make an appeal to that of Germany*, which had hitherto remained uncommitted to either view. I accordingly requested the German Ambassador to lay the matter before the Cabinet of Berlin, and to inquire whether they saw an opportunity of exerting their influence to procure the acceptance of some compromise which might avert the danger, now to all appearance imminent, of an open rupture between Turkey and Russia.”

The 16th was the date on which he made the appeal for help to Germany; and Prince Bismarck replied on the 19th. Now, on the 16th there appeared a leading article in the *Times*, which was called, in Berlin, Lord Derby’s “cry of weakness and despair.”\* The article ran thus: Prince Bismarck is “the one man who can avert the catastrophe. . . . It is not too late to keep back Russia; and if any country in the world can thus save the world,

\* See *Daily News* of Oct. 19.

it is Germany. . . . It depends on Prince Bismark whether that power will be used. One plain word from him would stop Russia, even on the brink of the abyss, &c. Let him only say that Germany will not permit Russia, &c. Let Prince Bismark only speak, &c. The best way to avoid war may be to boldly face the possibilities of it. . . . If a great struggle should break out, she may be dragged into it in spite of herself. . . . No state has more at stake than Germany." Does not such an act as this by an English Minister of State involve a loss of consideration for the whole of this country ? That an English Minister for Foreign Affairs should so humbly plead for life to a German Minister, would be degrading enough. If the article in the *Times* was his, what shall we say of it ?

We are now speaking of the Russian agitations. Here is an address from the focus of the insurrection and the centre of the atrocities :—an address from the inhabitants of Philippopolis, dated Nov. 24, 1876. This plainly informs the world that the insurrection was the outcome of a long and carefully prepared plan ; and that Philippopolis was the place selected for the explosion, with the aim that the country South of the Balkans should be comprised in the New Slav Empire, and that the 1st and 2nd lines of defence, between Russia and Constantinople, should be in the hands of Russia. The address\* is as follows :—

" You are aware that the Bulgarian insurrection broke out in our province, with the sole object of representing this essential part of Thrace as a Slavonic country, and including the Greek town of Philippopolis with the surrounding villages in the Bulgarian Kingdom which the leaders dream of founding in the East."

\* II. of 1876. No. 54, p. 41.

I have before said, that the Greeks object to a Pan-slavic Empire, not because of the lawlessness of the inception, not because they support or are friendly to Turkish rule, but simply because they want Constantinople or Byzantium as their own capital. Moreover, General Ignatiew's secret despatches will have revealed the animosity that exists between the Slav, or Russo-Greek Church, and the Eastern schism or Greek Church.

Before September, it had already become apparent to our Ambassador in Constantinople, that Russia was averse to peace, unless it should be brought about in a way that would establish a right of interference in Turkish affairs, and of intervention between the Suzeraine and his vassals. A Precedent, at least, for such intervention must be made. In September this conclusion, at which our Ambassador had arrived, was fully confirmed by the Russian Chargé d'Affaires :—\*

“A conversation which I had this afternoon with the Russian Chargé d'Affaires, would have satisfied me, if I had entertained any doubt on the subject, that *his Government would do their utmost to prevent the conclusion of any peace between the Porte and Servia, and Montenegro*, which was not arrived at through the mediation or intervention of the foreign Powers.”

Further on, in the same despatch, he announced seven points of the greatest importance :—

(1.) That the continued agitation is having the effect, which was doubtless intended, of exhausting the resources of Turkey.

(2.) That Russia has determined that no peace shall be concluded, unless it should be such as would establish

\* II. of 1877. No. 217. Sir Henry Elliot to the Earl of Derby, Sept. 5, 1876.

a right of interference in the future,—that is, unless it should contradict the constant policy of the British Government.

(3.) That the conditions of peace should contain an European Guarantee in favour of the insurgents, which, also, would be a reversal of the British policy.

(4.) That an autonomous state should be constituted, which should comprise the second line of defence of the Ottoman Empire (*viz.*, the Southern slope of the Balkans); and, as this autonomy would be due to Russian exertions, it would in fact be a quasi Russian state; it would also acknowledge itself a part of the Russo-Greek Church.

(5.) That the influence of Russia, in such an autonomous state, would be paramount.

(6.) That if such a proposal, by Russia, to form an autonomous state should be vetoed by the other Powers, the refusal, also, would sow the seeds of many future troubles.

(7.) That not only the Turks, but the Bulgarians, acknowledge that the insurrection has been caused and fomented by the intrigues of Russia.

The following is the portion of the despatch alluded to:—

“ During this time it is evident that a drain upon the resources of Turkey must continue, and *reduce her to a state of exhaustion*.

“ Your Lordships will be able to form a more correct judgment than I can of the objects of the Russian Government, but I believe we should not be greatly mistaken in assuming them to be as follows:—

“ 1. The conclusion of a peace through the mediation of the great Powers, which would give it enough of a European character to warrant *an interference in the*

*future questions* which may arise between the Porte and the Principalities.

" 2. That the arrangements to be made respecting Bosnia and the Herzegovina should be so closely connected with the conditions of the peace as to amount to the *European guarantee* always advocated in favour of the insurgent provinces, against which Her Majesty's Government have throughout set their face.

" 3. Perhaps, an attempt to establish an *autonomic vassal Principality* in Bulgaria.

" If this last proposition, which has been assiduously held before the eyes of the Bulgarians by Russian emissaries as the object to be kept in view, be once seriously advocated by the Russian Government, it will, even if rejected by all the other Powers, sow the seeds of much future trouble, and will raise to a high pitch in that province the influence of Russia, which is at present so seriously menaced by the failure of an insurrection which Turks and Bulgarians agree in looking upon as having been fomented by her."

It will not surprise any one to find that Italy was always busy in seconding the intrigues of Russia, whilst all the while pretending to be an independent and unprejudiced power. Lord Derby ordered our minister in Rome to urge the Italian Government not to oppose the Armistice, and to refrain from thus encouraging the war, and the commencement of European complications.\* This was his despatch :—

" With reference to your telegram of yesterday, I have to instruct you to ask the Italian Government what grounds they have for belief that it will be ruin to Servia and Montenegro to accept armistice, and urge upon them that the refusal of Italian Government may have

\* I. of 1877. No. 618, p. 464. Earl of Derby. Oct. 13, 1876.

disastrous consequences in showing divisions among the Powers, and *encouraging the prosecution of the war by Servia, and the continuance of bloodshed with possible European complications.*"

In the index to the Papers, vol. i. of 1877, referring to No. 639, on p. 470, we find entered "desire of Signor Melegari, not to be thought to be following the lead of Russia." On turning to that page it will be seen that that portion of the despatch has been suppressed, while, by the carelessness of some clerk, the entry in the index remains. The Italian Green-Book gives a despatch of Count Melegari to the Italian Ambassador at Constantinople, dated Nov. 30, 1876. It contains the instructions to the Italian envoy. The summing up of the whole is a curious confirmation of what I conclude to be the part assigned to Italy. Italy was the procuress or pander for Russia ; her business was to lead poor Salisbury into Ignatiew's trap. These are the words :—

" But if, as I believe, during the few days which divide us from the first meeting of the Plenipotentiaries at Constantinople, nothing shall occur to modify the situation, as it now appears to us, it is not probable that I may have to modify sensibly by telegraph these general instructions ; to which I will only add, in conclusion, that *the rules traced for you will be perfectly interpreted if you endeavour to establish a perfect intelligence between the English Plenipotentiaries and the Russian Ambassador*, applying yourself to maintain between the same that reciprocal confidence which alone can insure sufficient authority to the work of the Conference.

" Accept, &c.,

" MELEGARI."

Two despatches from Consul-General White, who is

resident in Servia,\* prove the amount of Russian influence in Servia to be equal to her influence in Montenegro, and in Moldavia and Wallachia. Autonomous states are quasi-Russian states. They await the nod and beck of the Russian Consul :—

(1.) "My private conversations with some members of the Government, and also with a few of my colleagues, have convinced me that it would be quite useless to press its acceptance for so long a term on the Servian Government, unless the Court of Russia can be induced in the meantime to recommend it here."

"My Russian colleague, M. Kartzoff, tells me that he has no instructions as yet on the subject, and it would not be advisable to expose this proposal to certain failure by moving in the matter without his support.

(2.) "M. Kartzoff, Russian Representative, says that he has not yet received instructions from the Emperor Alexander to recommend Prince Milan to accept the long armistice of six months as proposed by the Porte. No chance of acceptance without his efficient support."

Any unprejudiced person, who has read all these despatches, will have concluded that Russia, while pretending a disinterested regard for the Christian subjects of the Porte, and a pure fervour in the cause of "humanity," was really carrying on a war under the cloak of peace, and the false guise of religious feeling. But it is truly astonishing to find that Lord Derby and Lord Salisbury openly confessed as much, without one word of honest indignation at the frauds, the impostures, the thimble-rigging, the shufflings, the prevarications, the lies, the long course of duplicity and malingering ; at those repeated acts which amounted to a war, but which were carried on under protestations of peace, and

\* I. of 1877. No. 857 and No. 634. Oct. 13 and 14, 1876.

hypocritical pretensions to Christianity. Lord Salisbury\* wrote to Lord Derby the following words :—

“The principal object of my mission—the *conclusion of a peace* between Russia and Turkey—has not been attained.”

The object of his mission was to conclude a peace. Yet Lord Salisbury on that very mission (as we find from Count Melegari’s despatch of Nov. 30, if we did not amply know it before from our own Blue Books) said his “resolution was to second the ideas of Russia.” This is the passage :—

“Substantially, the impressions which His Majesty’s Ambassadors have recently transmitted to me are confirmed by those which I received myself this morning after a long colloquy with Lord Salisbury. I feel no doubt whatever as to the peaceful disposition of the British Government, and its *resolution to second the ideas of Russia* for the introduction of efficacious reforms in the Slav Provinces of the Ottoman Empire, and to secure herself by opportune guarantees against the danger that such reforms may remain, like so many others, a dead letter.”

Why did he not rather denounce the lawlessness of Russia, and put in his protest, and so clear himself from all complicity in the crime ? Lord Derby astonishes me still more :† for we find him writing on January 10, 1877, during the mission which was to terminate the war between Russia and Turkey, these fatuous words for the consideration of the Sultan :—

“For these reasons I thought it would be wise policy on the part of the Sultan and his advisers to accept conditions which they might think painful and disadvan-

\* II. of 1877. No. 232, p. 377. Jan. 22, 1877.

† II. of 1877, p. 184. No. 152.

tageous, rather than *risk a rupture* with Russia, and its almost inevitable consequences."

No wonder is it that the Turks speak of Lord Derby as "the drum"—all skin and wind, and used only for making a noise! Did Lord Derby, perhaps, differ from Lord Salisbury, in the view that there was war all this time between Russia and the Porte? No! In presence of the assembled ambassadors of Europe, when signing that Protocol at which Time and Europe have already begun to point the slowly-moving finger of scorn, and laugh derisive jeers,—at that time Lord Derby made a solemn declaration, duly chronicled in the Book of Fate, and said it should be void: "In the event of the object proposed not being attained,—namely, reciprocal disarmament on the part of Russia and Turkey, *and peace between them.*" So then they were at war; a hideous subterranean war of extermination; not in the dark labyrinths of European diplomacy, but upon Turkish soil, and with hypocrisy and Secret Societies, prayer-books and bribes, massacres and "Holy Church" for weapons. This evidently was not a day with Lord Derby for the right side to be up. His baggage had been tumbled over.

On October 11th, 1876, the right side was up. He then remonstrated, through our ambassador at St. Petersburg, against the influx of "volunteers" from Russia. The sympathy, he timidly hinted, which may be evinced in favour of a popular cause, should be limited in extent, by international law, to relief for the sufferings of the wounded, viz.: lint and spermaceti ointment. But the Russians had sent a military expedition of 15,000 men already, through Roumanian (that is, Turkish) territory; while the officers who joined it, received promises that, at the termination of the contest, they should not only be

reinstated in the Russian army ; but also (and this was a heavy bribe which was held out to them for joining) that they should be confirmed in any rank they might attain in the Servian army. If Russia, said he, is really desirous (did he doubt it ?) to terminate the struggle, as she always protests that she is, let her discountenance this influx of volunteers. But she did not discountenance the influx of volunteers ; she encouraged it, and the Czar at Moscow gave it the greatest possible countenance by Cæsar's word. Therefore Russia was not anxious for peace, and falsely protested, when she said she was. Has such a logical process passed through Lord Derby's mind ? Here\* are his words, dated October 11, 1876 :—

“ I informed your Excellency in my despatch of the 27th ultimo that I had thought it right to call the attention of the Russian Ambassador to the inconvenience and danger attendant upon the *extraordinary influx of Russian volunteers* into Servia. The extent to which this influx has taken place is well known to your Excellency, and is, indeed, a matter of notoriety ; for there has been little or no attempt at concealment.

“ The inclosed copies of despatches from Her Majesty's Agent and Consul-General at Bucharest will show the embarrassment which has been caused to the Roumanian Government by the passage through their territory of a band of 300 Russian volunteers in such a manner as almost to amount to a *military demonstration*, and the steps which they have been compelled to take to avoid the recurrence of an incident which might give legitimate ground of remonstrance to the Porte.

“ Her Majesty's Government consider that the Government of Prince Charles have some right to complain that their conscientious efforts to remain neutral in the present

\* I. of 1877. Earl of Derby to Lord A. Loftus. No. 583.

struggle, and not to give cause for the addition of fresh complications to those already existing, should be thwarted by the acts of private individuals, the subjects of a neighbouring and neutral State. If the transit of this body of volunteers through Roumanian territory approached so nearly to the *appearance of a military expedition*, its departure from the Russian frontier could scarcely bear a different signification.

"The Government of Great Britain would be the last to suggest the repression of *sympathy with a popular cause so long as it does not exceed the limits prescribed by international law*. They have themselves done what lay in their power to assist the efforts made from England to *relieve the sufferings of the wounded in the present contest*. But the presence of Russian officers and soldiers in the Servian army has assumed proportions which fall little short of national assistance. It is stated that upwards of 15,000 *Russian subjects* have now joined the Servian cause, and it has even been reported that *the officers who have resigned their commissions in the Russian army for this purpose have received promises of reinstatement in their former rank on their return to Russia*.

"*If the Emperor of Russia is as sincerely desirous of a speedy and peaceful termination of the present disastrous struggle as Her Majesty's Government believe him to be, he can scarcely be insensible to the difficulties which are thus thrown in the way of a settlement. The assistance so openly given to Servia, with the presumed cognizance and permission of the Russian authorities, must tend to excite irritation in the minds of the Turkish Ministers and to make them suspicious of all attempts at pacification as only concealing designs for the benefit of their opponents*"

This was repeated in another despatch to Lord A. Loftus on Oct. 30. There was indeed "little or no attempt at concealment;" for the Russian Generals, Novoseloff, and Dochoturoff, and Tchernaeff, arrived at Belgrade, through Roumania, in full uniform; as did also numbers of Russian troops. Russian civil officials, who were intended to administrate Bulgaria, were nominated and arrived also at Belgrade. Moreover, Lord Derby was not left in any doubt as to the way in which the desires of the Russian Government tended; for the common soldiers, who wished to go to Servia to fight the Turks, received passage money from the Government, and were allowed to draw their pay from Russia, while serving in Servia. Before the Conference, as many as 50,000 Russian troops (it is said) had assembled in Servia.

Yet the Turks met with successes against this lawless band of filibusters and freebooters (they deserve no better term). At once Russia induced the Powers to impose a ten days' Armistice on the Turks; and, shame on us, England, misled by the sound of the words "humanity" and "Christianity," was fain to join;—that is, Lord Derby did. The interval was employed by Tchernaeff, in making entrenchments, and bringing up reinforcements. Surely now the Russo-Servian freebooters will be victorious? At the end of the Armistice, the successes of the Turks returned. The Russians, therefore, again urged an Armistice, to save their friends. The Turks were in such bad winter quarters, that half their men would have perished. They were compelled to refuse the Armistice. The Servians had good winter quarters in Alexinatz. The Turks made great efforts, and advanced their victorious standards. Lord Derby, however, at the instance of Russia, commanded Sir Henry

Elliot to press the Turks, as vigorously as he could, to agree to the proposed Armistice : adding a command to Sir Henry Elliot that he should break off communications and leave Constantinople, if the Turks refused to agree to the Armistice.\* This command was repeated the next day. Sir H. Elliot was so shocked that he would not comply with Lord Derby's philo-Russian telegram. "Say I am ill ; I cannot go." Sir H. Elliot was at that moment attacked with a peculiar, but not inconvenient malady, called "The Ambassador's illness ;"—"*Gravement indisposé*," in diplomatic language. Mr. Jocelyn was sent to Safvet Pasha, and delivered the message. The Turks had said they would agree to an armistice of five months. France, Austria, and England approved of this proposal. It would save the Turks from the severity of winter, to which the Servians, in Alexinatz, would not be subject. That was the very thing the Russians wanted them not to be saved from. Russia, therefore, objected, on the ground of her great solicitude for the financial and commercial position of Europe ! She refused a longer term than six weeks. The great mastiff, Germany, and the Italian grey-hound, of course, wagged their tails and followed Russia. This† was the telegram from Prince Gortchakow to Count Schouvaloff, which caused those two telegrams from Lord Derby, which so shocked Sir H. Elliot :—

" We do not think an armistice of six months necessary or favourable to the conclusion of a lasting peace which we desire. We cannot put pressure on Servia and Montenegro to make them consent to such a prolonged uncertainty of the difficulties of their position ; lastly,

\* I. of 1877. No. 516 and No. 517. Oct. 4 and 5 ; and see Despatch No. 800, of Oct. 30.

† I. of 1877. No. 630. Oct. 2.

we hold that the financial and commercial position of the whole of Europe, already intolerable, would suffer still more by this delay."

Lord Derby seems, moreover, to have been deceived as to the true nature and bearings of the question. He seems to have imagined that Servia, after her defeats, and Montenegro, would be glad of a cessation of hostilities. He ignored the fact that they were but puppets or marionettes, which danced as Russia whistled and pulled the strings. Yet he did address himself to Russia as, in some sense, their motive power; and the Russian Ambassador said he had no doubt that Russia would make the two puppets dance to the tune of "*La ci darem la mano.*" Thus \* Lord Derby wrote to Lord A. Loftus:—

*"From the insurgents, I did not think that much trouble was to be anticipated. The Prince of Montenegro, too, had lately shown a disposition for peace, and his acceptance of the armistice might reasonably be counted upon. It was only from the side of Servia that I saw cause to apprehend difficulties. There were now in the Servian army, from all accounts, not less than from 10,000 to 12,000 foreigners, most of whom were Russians. It was not to be expected that these foreign volunteers could be in favour of a speedy pacification or of any measures likely to lead to such a result. I thought there was some occasion to fear the effect which the feeling of so large and powerful a body might have upon the decisions of the Servian Government, and I trusted that the Russian Government would use all their influence at Belgrade to counteract any warlike disposition. If they could do so, I thought there could be little doubt of success.*

“Count Schouvaloff told me he would at once report

\* I. of 1877. No. 587.

what I had stated to Prince Gortchakow, and that *he had no doubt his Government would act as I requested*. He himself felt sanguine of the acceptance of the armistice by Servia, as the Servian Government, when refusing the offer to prolong the suspension of arms, had stated their willingness to conclude a regular armistice.

*"I said that the time had now arrived to show whether they were sincere in that statement.* I concluded by reminding his Excellency of a former conversation, in which he had said that *it lay with England to induce Turkey to agree to an armistice, and with Russia to bring Servia to accept it.* I said Her Majesty's Government had now done their part and they looked to Russia to perform hers."

Yes, England had done the part assigned to her! she had seconded Russia; she had yielded Federative power to Russia; and so she had given a powerful incentive to the future aggressions of Russia.

Italy had, as Signor Melegari acknowledged, been opposed to a six weeks' proposal. She was evidently not sufficiently acquainted with the Russian scheme when she did so, and had not received the Russian orders. As soon as she received them, she too, as I have already said, readily seconded Russia,\* on "the purely humanitarian point of view."

Then Mr. Malet "urged that the refusal of the Italian Government to recommend the acceptance of the armistice might have disastrous consequences, in showing that there were dissenters among the Powers, and in encouraging the prosecution of the war by Servia, and the continuance of bloodshed, with the possibility of European complications." . . . Signor Melegari, then, "proceeded to elaborate the objections already made by him

\* I. of 1877. No. 699. Oct. 14, 1876.

which I mentioned in my despatch of the 12th instant, and he declared that if he now made difficulties, it was *purely from the humanitarian point of view*, as he could not contemplate the possibility of negotiations being protracted during the winter without shuddering at the consequences to the suffering populations of the Provinces and the Principalities."

At this very moment, Lord Derby received intelligence from our Ambassador at Vienna, of what was taking place in Servia.\* It was in the form of an extract from "a semi-official journal," called the "Presse":—

"*The Russian Committees continue to pay their attention to the relief of the military wants of Servia.* The deficiency in the number of officers has been entirely remedied since the 1st of September, at which date there were already 479 Russian officers in the Servian army. Tcherniaieff then turned the attention of the Committees to the fact that they were in urgent want of educated non-commissioned officers, and at the present moment the number of Russian non-commissioned officers in the Morava army alone amounts to 592, half of whom have received the medal for "bravery."

"The next gap to be filled up was in the cavalry. Accordingly, 1,800 Cossacks have arrived within the last four weeks, some of them splendidly mounted, and quite equal to the Turkish cavalry, even to the well-known Tcherkessen.

"Lastly, the artillery was taken into consideration; for, though it has been excellently worked during the war, the Servian guns were found to be too small to be of much use. This deficiency has also now been par-

\* I. of 1877. No. 700. Sir A. Buchanan to the Earl of Derby. Vienna, Oct. 15, 1876.

tially remedied. Two batteries of mitrailleuses and two batteries of heavy guns have arrived from Moscow, and were yesterday despatched to Deligrad, where they are to be worked by Russian artillerymen. A heavy battery has also been sent off to-day to the Ibar army, in charge of two Russian officers.

"The Russian Lieutenant Mussin Puschkin, a relation of the celebrated Russian poet Puschkin, has greatly distinguished himself by blowing up a bridge which had been thrown over the Morava by the Turks, and has to-day received his appointment as a captain in reward for his services. He is also to be Commandant of the Sotnia of Cossacks, who are to form the Prince's body-guard at head-quarters.

"Count Lewackoff is to receive the command of the cavalry in the Drina army. Very large quantities of ammunition have arrived the last few days through Roumania, and twelve cases of swords and 22,000 muskets have just been sent in the same way."

The immediate effect of the adhesion of England to the Russian demands was that the Porte gave way, and agreed to a two months' armistice. Moreover, General Ignatiew, knowing of the support of England, at once repaired to the Sultan, sought an interview, and insulted his Imperial Majesty, by saying that if the Porte would accept the six weeks' armistice, he, General Ignatiew, would telegraph to order Servia and Montenegro to stop fighting;\* thus allowing that the war was being carried on merely in obedience to Russian commands, which were equally potent to stop it whenever Russia, in her own good pleasure, should choose to do so. England, as Lord Derby avowed in his despatch of October 30, 1876, having received "a check" from Russia, now withdrew

\* "The Northern Question," p. 52.

entirely from the field. The Turks pushed on, and captured the Russo-Servian entrenchments, Alexinatz, and Deligrad. The Turks having consented to a two months' armistice, were presented with the Russian ultimatum, demanding what they had already granted. The object was to make it appear that the Porte had given way before Russian might. The effect of this, as Ignatiew knew, was a loss of Social power in Turkey, from the indignation of the population ; and an increase of Federative power for Russia from the General Consideration which is based on fear.

Looking back on these occurrences, what does Lord Derby now say of Russian diplomacy ? Happily we have, in our own persons, already judged the conduct of the Russian Government. By negligence we let the Alabama leave Birkenhead. She was unarmed. We left the matter to Arbitration ; and the Arbitrators of all nations decided that every neutral is bound to prevent its subjects from giving any aid to a belligerent. Then, *ex post facto*, we were condemned to pay £3,000,000 to the United States, because our diligence and watchfulness had been somewhat slack. But Russia instigated revolt and sent aid, armed men and officers and money and ammunition. Yet not an envoy at Constantinople had the manliness or honesty to protest against this breach of International Law.

## CHAPTER VIII.

## THE "ATROCITY" AGITATION.

WE must now turn from the agitations which were, with infinite labour, produced in Turkey, in order to consider that which, during last autumn, blazed up like a straw-yard in England,—ephemeral flame, and much blinding smoke. Of that paroxysm of hysterical philanthropy and rugged explosion of sentimentalism, we might truly have said : "*Passione movemur et zelum putamus. Parva in aliis reprehendimus et majora nostra pertransimus.*" We have blown rebels from great guns in India, knowing that they, according to their belief, regarded such a destruction of the body as eternal damnation to the soul. Yet we had no meetings to protest against such cruelty, or to repent for our share in it. In former centuries our crimes and cruelties in Ireland were hideous. The description of them harrows the soul. Have we ever as a nation repented in sack-cloth and ashes, in order to purge from our souls the crimes that are visited "to the third and fourth generation"? They were rebels, it is true. So they were in Bulgaria. Even while the "atrocity" flame was at its highest, famine and poverty, appalling suffering and death, overwhelmed hundreds of thousands in India. Did our humanitarian feelings cause meetings to be called throughout Great Britain? No. In the same land of Hindoostan, colossal pageants, gorgeous and

extravagant as the descriptions in "Lothair," were being paraded almost before the eyes of the sufferers. Why? Because that last year, without Conference, Army or Fleet, the mere Title of Empress was, as with a talisman, to have stopped the Russian advance, which this year alarms us. "*Passione movemur et zelum putumus.*"

Grant that the Turks acted with the barbarity of tyrants, and the fatuity of idiots,—injuring their own cause in the eyes of Europe, and oppressing their rebel rayahs. Yet what have such isolated facts to do with the question of non-interference? how can they destroy rights under Treaties and International Law? This was the question which Sir H. Elliot put to Lord Derby on September 4, 1876 :—\*

"To the accusation of being a blind partizan of the Turks, I will only answer that my conduct here has never been guided by any sentimental affection for them, but by a firm determination to uphold the interests of Great Britain to the utmost of my power; and that those interests are deeply engaged in preventing the disruption of the Turkish Empire is a conviction which I share in common with the most eminent statesmen who have directed our foreign policy, but which appears now to be abandoned by shallow politicians or persons who have allowed their feelings of revolted humanity to make them forget the capital interests involved in the question.

"We may, and must, feel indignant at the needless and monstrous severity with which the Bulgarian insurrection was put down, but the necessity which exists for England to prevent changes from occurring here which would be most detrimental to ourselves, is not affected

\* I. of 1877. No. 221.

by the question whether it was 10,000 or 20,000 persons who perished in the suppression.

"We have been upholding what we know to be a semi-civilized nation, liable under certain circumstances to be carried into fearful excesses ; but the fact of this having just now been strikingly brought home to us all cannot be a sufficient reason for abandoning a policy which is the only one that can be followed with a due regard to our own interests."

The vigor, with which Lord Derby told the Turks to put down the insurrection, may be deplored. The repentance and amendment of the Turks, after Lord Derby blamed their laxity, for having been the cause of their peril, may be matter of sorrow. Yet the question remains : How can that affect our interests ? how can it change the danger of a Russian advance, into comparative safety ? How can it, therefore, have altered our duty, and turned our policy ?

Yet it did so. It made the Foreign Secretary confess to an aching void in his breast, a hopeless want of purpose in his mind. He told the Deputation that he was anxiously waiting to receive instruction from his "employers," and orders from his masters ; he complained that he generally received that instruction and those orders too late. He asked for an expression of Public Opinion to frame his policy ; he desired agitation in the Provinces to shape his course, and to give him energy. Thus he repudiated his responsibility. He denied his Royal Mistress, whose minister he was, and is. He acted like a shopkeeper, who wishes to know what wares his customers may wish to find in his shop. Lord Derby went into the market-place, and took his policy from the multitude ! The Russian and pro-Russian agitation did its work.

It is curious to see what colour was given to the agitation ; what arguments were used to attain the purpose. Mr. Gladstone at the St. James's Hall Conference, on Dec. 8th, 1876, argued thus : A Treaty was made between the seven great Powers against interference in the affairs of Turkey; and a still more explicit and binding Treaty was concluded between Austria, France, and England, by which they conjointly and severally bound themselves to regard any interference as a *Casus Belli*. Yet Turkey made certain verbal promises previous to the signing of the former Treaty, and therefore both Treaties are "null and void." At Frome, on Jan. 23rd, and at Taunton, on Jan. 29th, 1877, he repeated the same argument. We may therefore suppose that it is the only argument which that able orator could devise.\* He rests his whole case, it will be observed, on one point :

\* His speech at Taunton stated this case as follows :—"They (the six Powers) took the engagement of Turkey that she would rule her Christian subjects justly, and in the same way as her Mahomedan subjects ; and under the Treaty of Paris they declared that they would not individually or collectively interfere with her in the fulfilment of that engagement. . . . The vital question for us is this : are the Treaties of 1856 in force or are they not ? Are they in force (I mean not as to the honourable obligations they may entail among the Powers that have observed them), but are they in force between us and Turkey ? My opinion is given in a sentence : Turkey has entirely broken those Treaties and trampled them under foot. I recognize in them no force whatever, so far as regards investing her with any titles towards us with regard to her independence and integrity, and her admission into the family of European nations. . . ."

After speaking of the Treaty of Paris of 1856, he then alluded to the second "Treaty more stringent still, passed a few months after the Treaty of Paris, and between Austria, France and England. . . . If these Treaties are in force, then we are bound towards Turkey, not only to the general recognition of its general independence and integrity, but likewise to that which is much more important, viz., to a several as well as a joint guarantee. In truth, it is impossible for engagements—national engagements—to be stronger. . . . If the Treaties are in force, you are bound hand and foot by them. . . . This is to a great extent the hinge of the whole subject; and to this in a great degree the future policy of England may very possibly turn."

are the two Treaties binding ; or have they become void, by certain conduct (not provided for in the contract) of one of the signatories to one of the Treaties ? That question has been discussed in the first chapter ; where I have also shown that, even if the Treaties were not binding, still we are bound by International law. The "atrocities" agitation, therefore, as far as Our policy was concerned, was valueless. Yet it did reduce the Social power of England, and caused Lord Derby to change his policy. He confessed, moreover, that it had reduced our Federative power, as well as the General Consideration of the country on the basis of justice.\*

. In the debate in the House of Commons this year, Feb. 16th, Mr. Gladstone used the same argument as he had used in the St. James's Hall Conference, at Taunton, and at Frome. He was answered by the fact that the verbal promises of Turkey were expressly excluded from the scope of the contract, by a clause in the contract itself. The ground next taken up was that the first Treaty of 1856 was between the Porte on the one part, and the six Powers on the other part. In reply to this it was shown that the Treaty was made, not in the behoof of Turkey, but for the common good of Europe, and more especially of England ; and that it was made against the Russian spirit of aggression. On March 27th, the ground was again changed by Mr. Forster (who declared himself a friend to Russia) and Mr. Gladstone. They quoted the above despatch of Sir H. Elliot,† and said the meaning of it was that we should consider the interests of England, rather than give effect to a sentimental indignation against the Turks because of their cruelties. This they contradicted. They advanced, therefore, *ipso dicto*, the

\* I. of 1877. No. 159.

† Sept. 4.

contradictory proposition ; namely, that the interests of Great Britain should give way to our rage against the Turks ; that the interests of England should be set aside, because of alleged Turkish atrocities. Let us put an analogous case. At Inkermann, the English held the key of the allied encampment of French, Turks, and Sardinians. Our men were being shot down ; when the French came up at a *pas de charge*, and saved the position. Now what would have been said if the French had refused to come to the rescue, on the ground that one of the English Colonels had been too severe on some men in his regiment ? What would have been said if all the allied armies had thereupon been swept into the sea ? The cases are parallel. The alleged cruelties of the Turks could not, therefore, affect the duty of the Government towards the nation (the duty of protecting British interests) ; nor yet the duties of the British nation towards the Turks (the duty of fulfilling our contract).

Yet an agitation was got up in favour of that illogical position ; while no agitation was got up against Russia. Yet atrocities occurred in the very capital of Russia. The "*Times* Correspondent's letter of Jan. 25th, 1877," on "the revolutionary demonstration" of Dec. 18th, 1876, in the Cathedral of Kasan, gives the following quotation from the Russian newspaper "*Vpered*" :—

"The greater part of the meeting had previously retired, and those who remained were mostly unconcerned spectators. Upon these innocents the police wreaked their vengeance. Women were dragged along by the hair of their heads and cut down with swords. A desperate resistance was made by both men and women. Assisted by spies and porters, the police eventually arrested 21 men and 11 women. They were treated in the most barbarous manner, and locked up in a space hardly

allowing of standing room. The brutal treatment awarded, extended even to a woman in an advanced state of pregnancy. When the prisoners were led past the Anitchkoff Palace—the residence of the Grand Duke Cesarewitch—one of them, a peasant boy, cried out, ‘Hurrah for Liberty ; for Land and Liberty !’ He was immediately knocked down, and, it is said, is dead.”

The *Times* Correspondent adds the pertinent remark :

“Where the papers are under absolute control and petty conspiracies treated as State affairs, it is but too natural to indulge in wild suspicion. If the impending trials are public, we shall, perhaps, learn a little more about what has passed.”

The Bulgarians, paid and incited by Russia, revolted against the Porte ; and England sobs for their misery. The Poles were worn out with a century of Russian oppression, and revolted in 1863 ; and yet England said : “Shame be on the Poles.” Yet the cruelties inflicted by the Russian Government were far greater and far more extensive than any cruelties of individual Turks, and there were none perpetrated by order of the Porte. As many as 989 Poles were executed for political offences during that revolt ; and 67,700 Poles were exiled to Siberia. The few Poles that remained were subjected to every kind of disability and oppression.\* They may not buy land. Their language is forbidden. Their Bishops and priests have been banished. Their Churches have been closed, and the people have been deprived of the Sacraments. For all this England did not drop a tear, nor heave a sigh ! Diplomacy was quiescent. No Conference was assembled. Russia was not commanded, by Europe, to reform. The violations of Treaties and of promises without number, in regard to Poland, were not

\* e.g. the Ukase of Dec. 10, 1863.

held up to public reprobation. No international Commission was appointed to see justice done. Not even a Constitution was promulgated for Poland; and that for which Russia pledged her word at the Congresses of Vienna and Paris, has never been required at her hand. Why did we not say a word for that poor persecuted race, when, at their last gasp, they made a courageous stand for their liberty? Or when we heard of the Prussian atrocities at Bazeilles, why were we silent? We had no agitation because of a whole village of poor French who were burned alive. Or when the Circassians were prostrate, with the hand of their stern oppressor clutching their throats, why did we not move? or why did we shout for autonomy in Bulgaria, and refuse it in Ireland? Our conduct has been like one who cries at charity sermons, and calls from house to house with a collecting card, and then goes home to get drunk, and give his wife a black eye. Why was this? I will tell you. It was our interest to be quiescent before, and there were no paid agitators to stir us up. It is our interest to be quiescent now,—nay, rather to fight against Russia,—but there have been agitators to stir us up against Turkey. And we have allowed ourselves to become agitated, when that was done which we desired. Did not the Prime Minister, on July 31st, 1876,\* speak the mind of the nation, when he said: "The Government . . . could not conceal from themselves the gravity of the situation, owing to the weakness exhibited by the Porte in dealing with the insurrection in its early stages."

The agitation no doubt prevented England from going to war in favour of Turkey. It had two other effects: (1) it increased, in England, the feeling in favour of

\* Hansard, ccxxxii. p. 205.

what is called “sacerdotalism ;” and (2) it pledged the country and Government to the principle of autonomous states. First : with regard to sacerdotalism. It will have been observed that the atrocity agitation was warmly shared in by the Anglican clergy,—especially the High Church and Ritualists. They defend their innovations on two principles : antiquity and catholicity. They, it is said, tried a short time ago to enter into negotiations with the Head of the Catholic Church, in order to secure a recognition by that Church, and an alliance with Her. They met with a rebuff. Not alliance, but submission was necessary. They have turned to the “Orthodox” Church of Russia, which will accept them and leave them as much ritualism as they like, and which permits the clergy to marry, and which has gorgeous ceremonies and observances, and which practices confession, and establishes convents and monasteries, and hates both Protestantism and Popery. That is why the Ritualists joined in the pro-Russian agitation. They desire a junction with the Russian Church. Secondly : with regard to autonomous provinces. The hope, or delusion, held out to us was that a belt of self-administrating or autonomous provinces, between Russia and Turkey, would remain independent and be a bar to Russian progress. But there is at present just such a stop-gap of autonomous provinces ; and yet Moldavia, Wallachia, and Servia are no bar to Russian advance ; they are the tools with which Russia works. It is true that Count Nesselrode wrote, on Feb., 1830, that it is entirely “contrary to the views of Russia to substitute for the Ottoman Empire, states which would ere long, become rivals of her own power, civilisation, industry, and wealth.” The Czar Nicholas, also, said to Sir Hamilton Seymour, that he would never agree to the

formation of independent states on the Danube. It is the practice of Russian diplomacy to feign an opposition to a project which she desires her enemies to support and carry out. She lets those, who desire to oppose her, be the blind instruments to work out her policy. If Russia conquers a province, of course she no longer desires it to become autonomous ; she pretends to desire autonomy, in order to conquer. Although the provinces,—Servia, Montenegro, Bosnia, Herzegovina,—were mere puppets of Russia, we find that they were fighting “not for administrative reforms but for independence or autonomy,” while “the Porte was willing to grant reforms, but would certainly not concede autonomy.” So Lord Derby wrote to Lord A. Loftus.\* Seven days later,† Lord Derby writes to our Ambassador in St. Petersburg, to proclaim his agreement with the Russian Government, and inclines to “the plan of vassal and tributary autonomous states,” which Prince Gortchakow had suggested to him. He adds the astounding argument in favour of such a plan, that “such an arrangement would not alter the political and territorial *status quo* of Turkey,” while it would “lighten the financial burden” which weighs down the resources of Turkey. On the 27th of June, he was informed by the Austrian Government ‡ that they would not hear of autonomy, as the mixture of religions and races rendered self-government impossible. The “attempt to establish any form of self-government would be followed by a struggle between the religions, ending in mutual extermination.” Did it ever occur to Lord Derby that the Russian Cabinet is prudent —even astute ? If so, he must have guessed that they

\* III. of 1876. No. 427. June 14, 1876.

† III. of 1876. No. 476. June 21.

‡ III. of 1876. No. 497.

habitually choose means which are adapted to the end they have in view—to convulse. Moreover, the Austrian Government remarked that other provinces were much fitter to receive the blessings of self-government than the insurgent provinces, and that the gift of self-government to the latter would certainly cause the insurrection to "spread instead of dying out." It appears that, as Lord Derby on June 21 had been carried away by Prince Gortchakow, so on June 27, he had completely veered round and was with the Austrians; for on June 30 we find him writing to Lord A. Loftus \* to say that he had received an explanation from Count Schouvaloff of the expression "*autonomie vassale et tributaire*," by which he understood to mean "simply an administrative autonomy" without any sovereignty or separate ruler, as there was in Servia and Montenegro. On the 28th of June, indeed,† he rehearsed to Count Schouvaloff all the Austrian objections to autonomy, and professed his readiness to "give a large measure of real freedom," and admitted that he did not see how differences of religion could offer any obstacle, or constitute any argument against it. He had, however, made one good step and discovered the inconvenience of using "vague and general terms, such as that of local autonomy." On Sept. 14,‡ he has learned that Sir H. Elliot agreed with Sir A. Buchanan on the unsuitableness of autonomy, and said that "it never has been advocated by any person, acquainted with the conditions of Bosnia, *who wishes a durable state of things to be established there*;" and that it would be "*the inevitable cause of future trouble*," and would be "ill-looked upon by neighbouring states, without pleasing any of the "inhabitants, Mussulman or

\* III. of 1876. No. 519

† III. of 1876. No. 502.

‡ I. of 1877. No. 310.

Christian ;" and lastly, that it was advocated by Russia only because it "*will be productive of future trouble.*" In a later despatch \* Sir H. Elliot informs Lord Derby that if autonomy were given to the Slav provinces it would have the undoubted effect of "weakening Turkey fatally," and would render the Turkish Government "so powerless as before long to lead to a state of anarchy."

Again, on October 28† Lord Derby learns that Russia will not hear of autonomy being given to the Greek provinces also ; why ? because then it would not be productive of future agitation. That was what Lord Derby had learned of the probable effect in Turkey of forming autonomous provinces ; yet we find him, on September 11,‡ proposing to Russia, as one of his "bases of pacification," "administrative reforms in the nature of local autonomy for Bosnia and the Herzegovina," and something "of a similar kind" for Bulgaria. On the same day he thus explained his meaning to the double deputation :—

"Egypt has one Constitution, the districts of Lebanon have another ; Crete has a system of local self-government which has worked very well ; and every one of those arrangements has been settled with the concurrence, more or less, of the guaranteeing Powers. *You will not find a word from me or my colleagues which tends to show hostility upon our part in principle to any further extension of that kind of arrangement* which circumstances may render necessary. One of the last that was brought about, in 1867, was the abandonment by the Porte of its right to keep a garrison in Belgrade, and that was brought about by the united action of the Powers."

This clearly means that he was in favour, or at least not opposed to a complete or political autonomy, such

\* No. 850. Oct. 24. † No. 789, p. 550. ‡ I. of 1877. No. 197.

as that enjoyed by Crete, Egypt, the Lebanon, and ~~Servia~~<sup>Yugoslavia</sup>. On the 27th he told the Mansion House deputation that a complete or political autonomy was an absurd chimæra, of which no sane man had ever dreamed ; and that all he ever meant was the old English local self-government, viz. : a vestry and parish beadle. These were his words :—

" I look upon that plan of complete autonomy—a plan, as it is, of the creation of a fresh group of tributary States—as one outside the range of practical politics. There is not a single Government, whatever its sympathies and whatever its ideas, there is not a single Government in Europe which has at any time proposed or entertained that scheme, and if I were now to propose it I am convinced that I should stand alone. . . . It is quite possible, while rejecting the idea of political autonomy, to accept the idea of local or administrative autonomy. I do not particularly like the phrase ; it is not an English one. It is very vague and elastic in meaning, and for my own part I very much prefer the plain English phrase of local self-government."

On the 2nd of Nov.\* Lord Derby's eyes ought to have been opened by the address to him from the inhabitants of Philippopolis. They plainly told him that the "atrocities," which were the proximate cause of the agitation in favour of the creation of autonomous provinces, had been expressly brought about in their town, in order that the Southern slopes of the Balkan, as well as Bulgaria, might be included in one autonomous province. On Nov. 4 † Our Ambassador at Vienna corroborated Lord A. Loftus's report, as to the aim of the Czar, and said : " The real question is, how far the changes Russia may now endeavour to impose upon the Porte

\* II. of 1877. No. 51, p. 40.

† I. of 1877. No. 871, p. 598.

may tend to facilitate her future acquisition of the Bosphorus." On Nov. 12 the Greek Metropolitan of Philippopolis addressed these words to Lord Derby :—

" Vous n'ignorez pas que l'insurrection Bulgare a éclaté dans notre province, à scule fin de représenter cette partie essentielle de la Thrace comme pays Slave et de comprendre la ville Grecque de Philippopoli avec les villages environnans dans le Royaume Bulgare que les meneurs rêvent de fonder en Orient."

On the 7th of Dec.\* our Ambassador at Constantinople again warns Lord Derby, by retailing a conversation with the Patriarch.

" His object was to express, on behalf of the large Christian community of which he is the head, the hope that the Conference will not insist upon the Porte conceding to the provinces which had risen against the Government privileges which would be denied to those which had remained quiet, but which were entitled to equal consideration.

" The Patriarch replied that his people were much excited, and said that if, in order to secure the sympathy of the European Powers, it was necessary to rise in insurrection, there would be no difficulty in getting up such a movement."

Sir H. Elliot, knowing the weak and vacillating character of his superior, was not satisfied with one grave warning, nor with repeated warnings. Again, on Dec. 15,† he wrote :—

" I have the honour to enclose the copy of an address which the Greek Synod and the Permanent National Council have requested the OEcumenical Patriarch to present to the Porte against the concession of special privileges to the Slav provinces.

\* II. of 1877. No. 52.

† II. of 1877. No. 102.

"The necessity of resisting anything of the kind appears to be becoming daily stronger among the Mussulmans, and to be participated in by the Turkish Ministers.

"I am informed that, at a late Council, one of them declared that, although a war with Russia would be attended by immense danger to the Empire, by consenting to a special administration of the Slav provinces, they would be taking *a slow but certain poison*; and, of the two alternatives, they should not hesitate to adopt the first.

"The sentiment was unanimously approved by the whole of his colleagues, and, unless I am misinformed, it represents *the feeling of the entire nation, both Mussulman and Christian*."

The Marquis of Salisbury also was to be seen to. The minister of Greece "interviewed" him; as we find by the following \* despatch to Lord Derby, dated Dec. 26:—

"The Minister of Greece called upon me yesterday, and presented me with a Memorial, which I have the honour to enclose.

"He expressed himself at the same time in warm terms against the injustice which he conceived was about to be inflicted upon the Greek subjects of the Porte if the suggestions of the six Powers were accepted. *Special advantages were about to be conferred on the provinces that had rebelled*, which would not be granted to those which had remained tranquil. This, he thought, would, in any case, be an injustice, and would *operate as an encouragement to rebellion*. But the case of the Greek Provinces of Turkey, he maintained, was especially hard, because it was only owing to the promises of England that they had not placed themselves in the privileged category by an insurrection."

\* II. of 1877. No. 137.

After all these warnings, after all these remonstrances, after knowing full well that the grant of autonomy would surely lead to further insurrections, and be the certain cause of war, Lord Salisbury, with the entire sanction of Lord Derby, continued, with reiterated objurgations, to endeavour to force it upon the Sultan ; and, at the close of the Conference, he asserted that the Conference had been appointed merely to establish Autonomy. He has succeeded in producing the war, after having committed all Europe in favour of autonomy.

But Lord Derby meant, by "vassal and tributary autonomy," only parochial institutions ! Yet the extraordinary thing is that these parochial institutions were supposed to be "guarantees against the exercise of arbitrary authority !" Both in Russia and in Turkey they have already the most complete self-government of the village communities ; although there is in both States an "exercise of arbitrary authority." The fact is that Lord Derby had inadvertently assented to the necessity of autonomous tributary states, and then found it somewhat awkward to back out of his hasty admission. Hence the shuffling.

In Lord Derby's despatch of September 11, we see that he had arranged with Count Schouvaloff that "guarantees" were to be demanded as one of the "bases of pacification." This word "guarantees" has been in everybody's mouth for months past ; and yet no one, probably, has defined it for himself. We find that it is a bale of Russian goods. It was handed by Count Schouvaloff to the Earl of Derby, who accepted it and used it in the manufacture of "the English proposals." A slight acquaintance with the history of the last two hundred years will show that Russia has been perpetually exacting "guarantees ;" by which she means pacific

warfare. "I am not at war ! oh dear, no ! I am a sincere lover of peace ; but in the interests of humanity I must have guarantees that you will govern your provinces well ; that is, I will occupy them and govern them in your name ; for your government is incurably, irretrievably, and intolerably bad ; yet I will prop it up and preserve it, if you will permit me peacefully and in a friendly spirit, to occupy your provinces until your incurable government of those provinces has been cured." Russia advances by inventing fallacies ; and other nations are lost by accepting and using them. It is always by confusion of ideas that evil men progress. For example, "they call good, evil ; and evil, good ; they take light for darkness, and darkness for light." Confusion of Babel, or Babylon ; a confusion of tongues is a tremendous engine of degradation. Then let us ask ourselves in this case, how a sovereign can give guarantees, while retaining his sovereignty intact ? In a financial operation, one man may give a guarantee to another, by handing over some bond or other property, or by entering into an engagement which can be enforced in a superior court of law. In the former case the man parts with the power over his property ; in the other he acknowledges a superior. Did you mean to require of the Sultan that he should hand over to Russia a few of his provinces ? That would be occupation or conquest by Russia. Or did you mean that the Sultan should acknowledge as superior to him, and as ruling him, an international commission of the Powers ? Then he would be no longer sovereign ; his territory would be ruled by an extra-national government. We must conclude, therefore, that when Lord Derby got "guarantees" into his head, it became thenceforth a "*chimæra bombitans in vacuo.*"

## CHAPTER IX.

## RULERS AND PEOPLE.

As I before observed, the “Holy” Alliance was a consolidation of sovereigns against what they deemed to be their common enemy,—the People; just as the Secret Societies (which are not national, but “international”) make the Peoples, of the world, a solid mass against all the Sovereigns, and all authority. Unless justice or right had been discarded, neither the one consolidation nor the other could be. A just ruler,—one who uniformly respects the rights, and desires the well-being of his subjects,—finds his strength in his people. When a people has not learned to disregard right or justice,—that is, when a people is righteous, it will support the legitimate authority of its sovereign, and not band itself with other nations for wrong-doing.

The policy of the “Holy” Alliance has infected rulers to this day. For example: in 1848, Charles Albert wrote to our minister at Turin, to say that he interfered in Italy, only because he put himself at the head of the Italian movement, in order to restrain it, and to prevent it from becoming revolutionary.\* There have been numberless examples of kings and despots as revolutionists. They have allied themselves with the Secret Societies, or Revolution, “in order to make it respectable,” and “to restrain it” from that which is the aim of the

\* Affairs of Italy. 1849.

Secret Societies. Crowned heads, thereby, have as yet only shown themselves to be dupes, and made themselves tools. They have made respectable, and furthered, and strengthened those principles which are necessarily the subversion of all thrones, of all religion, and of every authority, civil or spiritual, and of the foundations of society itself. By falling in with the Schemes of the Revolution, you can never take the power out of secret hands. It is the power that they want ; not the pleasure of poking their elbows into your ribs at a champagne supper. Foolish Rulers ! you think to gain Social Power by allying yourselves with principles which are essentially destructive of Social Power.

Let us, however, come down to the particular question under review ; and witness the loss of Social Power in various countries, and the growing power of peoples which are consolidated by secret oaths. Lord Derby\* felt the loss of Social Power which was due to the pro-Russian agitation, and helplessly quailed before it, and complained :—

“ It is my duty to inform you that any sympathy which was previously felt here towards that country (the Porte) has been completely destroyed by the recent lamentable occurrences in Bulgaria. The accounts of outrages and excesses committed by the Turkish troops upon an unhappy, and for the most part unresisting population, has roused an universal feeling of indignation in all classes of English society, and to such a pitch has this risen that in the extreme case of Russia declaring war against Turkey, Her Majesty’s Government would find it practically impossible to interfere in defence of the Ottoman Empire. Such an event,

\* I. of 1877. No. 159. Telegraphed to Sir H. Elliot on Aug. 22, but sent in a despatch dated Sept. 5, 1876.

*by which the sympathies of the nation would be brought into direct opposition to its Treaty engagements, would place England in a most unsatisfactory, and even humiliating position, yet it is impossible to say that if the present conflict continues the contingency may not arise. The speedy conclusion of a peace, under any circumstances most desirable, becomes from these considerations a matter of urgent necessity."*

That is : the "sympathies of the nation" are making the people scamper towards the brink of a dark abyss of injustice and base dishonesty, and Lord Derby will join in the stampede, and plunge into the "unsatisfactory and humiliating position"! My Lord Derby, would it not have been better, either to have arrested the suicidal flight, or to have resigned your office and retained your honour? Lord Derby deplored the universal burst of indignation, because he saw in it the destruction of the true policy of the country. He saw that a line would be taken which would be fatal to our interests. The true Statesman would have endeavoured to stem the torrent ; he would have warned the people, and cried out against the danger. Failing to turn the tide, he would have said, "I have warned you, and you will not hear ; I have pointed to the danger, and you will not look ; you will find in your policy your death ; but never shall mine be the hand which will point the dagger, and strike the fatal blow." What did Lord Derby say ? "The sympathies of the country run counter to us ; they will incur dishonour, they will falsify their pledges ; so let us, who are their guardians and guides, stand by and look on."

The following was (as stated by the Under Secretary for Foreign Affairs, on February 16th, 1877) Sir Henry Elliot's answer to Lord Derby's despatch. He accused

the Newspaper Press of having entered into a conspiracy to force the British Government to change its ancient and constant policy, to cease from respecting the independence and integrity of the Ottoman Empire, and to take up arms in favour of the "Christian" insurgents. This change of policy (he said) would be the destruction of the very Christians whom we should then be pretending to protect. The aim of the conspiracy was therefore, not to protect the "Christians," but to give the country over to Russia. These are the words of Sir H. Elliot,—the man who, from his experience, knows more of the Eastern question than any one else in Great Britain :\*—

"I am assured that the unconcealed object of some of the newspaper correspondents in the tone they have adopted, is to create in England such a strong current of public opinion against the Turks, as to oblige Her Majesty's Government ultimately to abandon the policy which has at all times been followed towards this country; to cease from allowing themselves to be regarded as interested in its maintenance; and to assume the position of protectors of the Christians against their Mussulman oppressors.

"Although I have frequently stated it to your Lordship, I must be allowed to repeat that *any attempt to drive the Turks back will prove the utter destruction of whole Christian populations.*

"Their expulsion could be readily effected by large European armies, but those little know the character of this people who can suppose that they would retire without *mussacking every Christian man, woman, and child*, and reducing the whole country to a desert.

"It is easy enough to say that the Turk must be

\* I. of 1877. No. 172. Aug. 29, 1876.

driven out of such and such a province ; but if those who advocate it were at all aware of what it would entail upon the Christians, both in European and Asiatic Turkey, they would hardly speak of it so lightly."

On the same day, Lord Derby telegraphed again his views, in amplification of his former telegraphic message and despatch. He said that even if Russia were to declare war against the Porte, he could no longer find it possible to support the latter ; and that as he would not support Russia, the only course was to force a humiliating peace.\* These were his words :—

"I think it right to mention, for your guidance, that the impression produced here by events in Bulgaria has completely destroyed sympathy with Turkey. The feeling is universal and so strong that even if Russia were to declare war against the Porte, Her Majesty's Government would find it practically impossible to interfere.

*"Any such event would place England in a most unsatisfactory situation. Peace is therefore urgently necessary. Use your discretion as to the language which you shall hold ; but you will see how essential it is that the Turkish Ministers should be alive to the situation, and that you cannot be too strong in urging upon the Porte a conciliatory disposition."*

Having contented himself with stating that, as he would not do his duty, peace was necessary, he proceeded to enforce it by a threat. In doing so, he calmly contemplated the immediate "ruin" of an ally, and the ultimate destruction of England.

"Your Excellency should warn the Turkish Ministers that if they reject the proposal for an armistice, Her Majesty's Government *can do no more to avert the ruin*

\* VI. of 1877. Aug. 29, 1876.

which they will have brought on the Empire. It is not possible to exaggerate the gravity of the situation."\*

That was the new policy, or rather unworthy shift, which the Earl of Derby devised. The next step, which became necessary, was to devise some general principle or axiom, by which his conduct could be defended. It was this : The Russian intrigues had brought about a rebellion : the Earl of Derby had three times urged, on the Porte, the necessity of using more vigor in suppressing the rebellion ; that vigor necessarily meant bloodshed ; the bloodshed having occurred, the rights and duties of every government had *ipso facto* become transmogrified, and the rebels had acquired a right to reparation, a right to see the Turkish Government punished in a most exemplary and signal manner, and a right to "guarantees" against putting down any future rebellion which Russia might cause. This announcement he made to the two deputations of September 11th, 1876, and thereby eased his unquiet conscience, let us hope :—

"The unfortunate Bulgarians who have suffered so much *have a right to such reparation as it is now possible to make* ; *they have a right*, undoubtedly, to the signal, conspicuous, and exemplary *punishment* of those who have been the offenders ; and the Government have a right to take such steps as may *secure the people from a recurrence* of similar atrocities. . . . I do not at all wish to disguise the fact that what has happened in Bulgaria has, to a certain extent, changed the position, not only of our own Government, but of every European Government in regard to its rights and its duties."

The Earl of Beaconsfield did not invent a maxim to

\* I. of 1877. No. 164. Sept. 6, 1876.

excuse his conscience. He merely confessed, to his former constituents in Aylesbury, on September 20th, his inability to do otherwise. He may have been thinking of his "*too timorous colleagues*" in the Cabinet, when he used the words: "You cannot do always that which is just and right." That doubtless was as far as he could be got to go, in order to satisfy the immoral decision of a majority in the Cabinet.

As soon as the Prime Minister had thus been got to commit himself, Lord Derby expounded his new principles to Sir H. Elliot,\* in a despatch which diplomatists aver to have overleapt all due limits of diplomatic decorum. To please the populace of England, Lord Derby addressed the Sultan as no longer an independent Sovereign, but as the poor relation or country cousin of England. Sir H. Elliot was commanded, metaphorically, to spit, in the Sultan's face, denunciations of his officers, demands for reparation, trials, degradations, and "*striking examples*." So far it was bad enough; but the ground and basis of the whole argument was far worse. The Sultan was told there was something superior to him, to which he must humbly bow down, and obey;—a something which, as we all know, is manufactured by "*newspaper correspondents*," and which, if it can override a Sultan and autocrat, must also override every constitutional Sovereign. The autocrat, the Calif of Islamism, "*cannot contend with the public opinion of other countries*!" These were Lord Derby's words:—

"The Porte *cannot afford to contend with the public opinion of other countries*, nor can it suppose that the Government of Great Britain or any of the Signatory Powers of the Treaty of Paris can show indifference to the sufferings of the Bulgarian peasantry under this

\* I. of 1877. No. 316, Sept. 21, 1876.

outbreak of vindictive cruelty. No political considerations would justify the toleration of such acts ; and one of the foremost conditions for the settlement of the questions now pending must be that ample reparation shall be afforded to the sufferers, and their future security guaranteed.

"In order that the views of Her Majesty's Government may be impressed in the most effective manner upon the Sovereign who has recently been called to the Ottoman Throne, Her Majesty's Government desire that your Excellency will demand a personal audience of the Sultan, and communicate to His Majesty in substance the result of Mr. Baring's inquiries, mentioning by name *Shefket Pashu*, Hafiz Pasha, Tossoun Bey, Achmet Agha, and the other officials *whose conduct he has denounced*.

"Your Excellency will, in the name of the Queen and Her Majesty's Government, call for reparation and justice, and urge that the rebuilding of the houses and churches should be begun at once, and necessary assistance given for the restoration of the woollen and other industries, as well as provision made for the relief of those who have been reduced to poverty ; and, above all, you will point out that it is a matter of absolute necessity that the eighty women should be found and restored to their families.

"Your Excellency will likewise urge that *striking examples* should be made on the spot of those who have connived at or taken part in the atrocities. The persons who have been decorated or promoted under a false impression of their conduct should be *tried and degraded*, where this has not been done already, and every effort made to restore public confidence."

Lord Derby, in writing a despatch, which was at once

inserted in all the English papers—a despatch written to gratify the passions of the multitude and to gain Social power in England,—Lord Derby, I say, never reflected that if the Sultan listened to it, he would immediately be bereft of all Social power in Turkey. In the excited state of public opinion in Turkey, it would have been dangerous enough to listen to it, without returning insult for insult; yet Lord Derby published it in the newspapers! More than that; by writing the despatch, Lord Derby threw away much of the Federative power of England, for the sake of his own immediate popularity.

It will be remembered that Lord Derby refused to give more than “a general support” to the Andrassy note; and that he consented to yield that much “with reluctance,” because it interfered with the independence and integrity of the Ottoman Empire; and he did so only because the Porte had urgently requested him. The new policy, which he now invented, quite cut that ground from under his feet. He was conscious of it. For\* he used the acceptance of the Andrassy note as a proof that the present proposals of Russia were “compatible with the independence of the Ottoman Empire.” This was his despatch to our Ambassador in Constantinople:—

“I remarked to his Excellency that I could not see how his Government could maintain that proposals for the better government of these Provinces were *incompatible with the independence of the Ottoman Empire*, inasmuch as in February last the Porte had accepted the main proposals in *Count Andrassy’s note* of the 30th of December, 1875, and had engaged to carry them out,

\* I. of 1877. No. 358. Sept. 22, 1876.

and declared itself determined to put them in force in the two Provinces in all their integrity.

"The Porte had also, at various times, agreed, at the instance of and in communication with the Powers, to special systems of government for the Lebanon, Crete, and other Provinces, and it was too late now to raise objections to such a course on the ground that it would endanger the independence of Turkey. The Powers had not abandoned the right to urge upon the Sultan the proper treatment of his Christian subjects, and recent events had shown that the exercise of this right was now more than ever necessary. I had never failed to intimate that an effective reform of the administration of the disturbed Provinces with securities for its proper execution was a condition on which *the mediating Powers must insist as necessary* to a full and satisfactory pacification."

The end of this despatch shows us that Count Schouvaloff had again been to him, and had dropped a new fallacy into the rapidly receptive mind of the noble Earl. The six Powers were "Mediators." As we shall hereafter see, this fallacy, now sown, soon sprouted, and grew, and bore an evil fruit. Here it will be enough to remark, that the association of the five Powers with Russia, in order to force certain schemes on the Porte, was utterly inconsistent with the idea of mediation. A mediator must be impartial; a mediator must show no leaning to either side; a mediator must not have committed himself to any doctrine; a mediator must look to justice alone in his award. In the present case we had ignored Russian intrigues; we had mentioned, in order to condone, Russia's lawless acts, and her hostile character; we had, by our cordial co-operation in all Russia's plans, even paralyzed all our own efforts to

persuade Turkey. Moreover, a mediator is not one who "must insist as necessary." We may further say, with St. Paul, that a "mediator is one alone"; and that the association of the six Powers looks much more like a conspiracy or a confederacy of swindlers, than a mediation.

Alas for Lord Derby! How are the mighty fallen! —How did he come to change his policy? At the beginning of the "atrocity" agitation, he let us into the secret: To please the people is his desire! He complained that "he does not always receive his instructions from his employers beforehand." Was he not a minister of the Crown, a servant of the Queen? or was he a slave of the multitude? Why should he complain that he "does not receive his instructions beforehand, but is left to guess what it is that they would desire him to do; and he ascertains their real feeling when he finds that he has gone against it." Oh! what a fulsome, cringing manner of subserviency! Following the lead of the *ignobile vulgus*, the *mobile vulgus*, has caused you, my Lord, to lay yourself open to the implied rebuke of the Chancellor of the Exchequer, when he spoke of "uncertainty of purpose, and uncertainty of language." Your luggage has been a little too often turned over and over on the platform; the porters no longer respect your large characters: "This side up."

Sir Stafford Northcote was fully alive to the value of Social power. He spoke on September 17, in a more manly strain, and even showed contempt for the "atrocity meetings." Yet he said, "we can have no moral strength,—the government of this country can have no moral strength, unless it knows that it has the support of the people of this country in what it is doing. . . . I am perfectly well aware that no

policy can hope to be successful, which is not a policy that carries with it the hearts and sympathies of the people."

Let us quit the subject of the relations of rulers and people in England, and contemplate those relations in Turkey. Islamism arose in 622 A.D., and spread rapidly in every direction. Why did it spread so rapidly? Let anyone who desires an answer to this question, read the Bampton Lecture, by a Protestant divine, Dr. White, in the year 1788. It is a model of language and of reasoning. Islamism spread by reason of the many divisions of Christianity, and the bitter animosities of contending sects; it spread because of their immorality, their baseness, their degradation, their disregard of the law of God, their great superstition. The corruptions of Christianity brought the scourge of Christianity. That this is always so, everyone will know who cares to study the "Statesman's Manual," written by Isaiah, or the one by Jeremiah. Thirty-eight generations have passed away since 622, and Christianity in the East is full of corruptions, shams, falsehoods, superstitions, and bickerings.

The Turks, too, had become corrupt. They too had begun to forsake their religion and disregard law. But a new party has sprung up among them, called the Softas. They profess to adhere rigidly to the law of Islam. Sir H. Elliot \* speaks of the Softas as "students of the Koran, who are variously estimated at from 5000 to 6000." On May 12,† Sir H. Elliot wrote this despatch:—

"An immediate and marked improvement took place in the aspect of things here upon the announcement of

\* I. of 1877. No. 256. May 9, 1876.

+ I. of 1877. No. 288.

the change of Grand Viziers, and comparative confidence was restored.

"Many circumstances which have come to my knowledge have fully confirmed me in the conviction I had already conveyed to your Lordship, that the demonstration was directed against the Sultan and Mahmoud Pasha, and that no hostile design was entertained against the Christians. . . . .

"The visible leaders of the movement were the Softas, or students of the Koran, a determined and energetic body of men, numbering, as far as I can ascertain, between 5000 and 6000, who are, however, able to exercise influence over many others. . . . .

"Although the present movement has for the moment passed off quietly, its importance and possible future consequences are not to be overlooked.

"The Softas have learned their own strength, and having once succeeded in intimidating the Sovereign, may be tempted to renew the experiment."

Again on May 18,\* he wrote:—

"There is every reason to believe that the Softas will not rest content with their present success, but that, assisted by many leading men, they are bent on some further political movement, the object of which is to obtain a modified Constitution."

It was, I think, on the 10th of May, 1876, that the Grand Vizier, Mahmoud Pasha, was hurled from his place. It was the Softas who achieved this. The Softas knew that he was the tool of General Ignatiew, and that he had encouraged the Sultan in his luxury and reckless expenditure, and had discredited the Empire by a refusal to pay the interest on the debts. This was the second step towards retrieving Turkey from ruin; the

\* I. of 1877. No. 338.

first step having been the formation of the little band who call themselves Softas. On the 22nd of May, Mr. David Urquhart wrote to ask assistance for the Softas, and said\* :—“The Softas, your brethren at Constantinople, have just achieved a great victory,—they have saved their country about to fall into an abyss, and Europe from a conflagration which would only have left ruins.” On May 30, the Sultan Abdul Assiz was deposed by the Softas, or Young Turkish party. Five days before† Sir Henry Elliot wrote the following despatch :—

“Although immediate confidence was restored when the demonstration of the Softas brought about the dismissal of Mahmoud Pasha, there is every appearance of the movement being the prelude to something far more serious.

“I have been at much pains to ascertain the objects and intentions of the Softas, who may at present be regarded as to a *very great degree representing the intelligent public opinion of the capital, if not of the Empire.*

“Their wish, I might perhaps say their determination, is to obtain the entire reform of the administration, which alone can save the Empire from the total and speedy ruin with which it is threatened.

“Mahmoud Pasha was looked upon as *directly responsible for a large share in the present desperate state of affairs*; it was he, they say, who during his first administration *encouraged the Sultan in all his caprices*, being only anxious to retain His Majesty’s favour, and totally indifferent to the welfare of his country. . . . .

\* “Diplomatic Review.” July, 1876.

† I. of 1877. No. 345. May 25, 1876.

"The reproach, is, no doubt, in a great degree well founded.

"The first object, therefore, of the Softas, was to procure the dismissal of the obnoxious Vizier, and in this they were successful, although they did not succeed in procuring the nomination of Midhat Pasha, who, as the champion of the reforming party, is the only man in whom much confidence is placed. . . . .

"The word 'Constitution' is now in every mouth, without there being any well defined understanding what it means, except that it signifies the establishment of some popular or national control over the present purely arbitrary will of the Sovereign.

*"The Softas, knowing themselves to be supported by the bulk of the nation, Christian as well as Mussulman,* in calling for this control, will not, I believe, desist in their efforts till they have obtained it, and should the Sultan resolutely refuse to grant it, an attempt to depose him appears to me almost inevitable.

"Texts from the Koran are circulated with a view to proving to the faithful that the form of Government sanctioned by it is *properly democratic*, and that the absolute authority now wielded by the Sovereign is a usurpation of the rights of the people, and a contravention of the Holy Law.

"Both texts and precedents are appealed to to show that allegiance is not due to the Sovereign who neglects the interests of the State.

"The disaffection runs through every class, and no one now thinks of trying to conceal his opinion.

"Among the porters in the streets, the boatmen on the Bosphorus, and Pashas who have filled or are now filling the very highest posts, civil or military, the same language is held, and I should be at a loss to name a single

quarter in which the Sultan could with any confidence look for support against a well-organized attempt to depose him.

"Generals and Admirals declare that both officers and men of the two services share the feelings of the public, and that they would certainly not act against the Softas in any movement they might make.

"Relying upon this, some of the more adventurous believe that they could carry out a revolution without bloodshed or disturbance; but the risk is in truth far greater than they calculate, for if the Minister of War, either from feelings of loyalty or from motives of personal ambition, were to stand by the Sultan, any revolutionary movement must be followed by frightful consequences.

"At present the *harmony between the Mussulmans and Christians is perfect*, and a thorough understanding exists between the Softas and a large portion of the Greeks of Constantinople; but if serious disturbances were once to occur, religious fanaticism might very quickly be excited."

Five days after this despatch was written, the Sultan was deposed, without blood being shed. (As the Softas love the Law, they, of course, exploded according to rule.) The plan had been for some time prepared. The suddenness of the execution was due to the fact that General Ignatiew had persuaded Abdul Assiz to permit Constantinople to be occupied, "in the cause of order," by 60,000 Russian troops, who were ready to sail on receipt of a telegram. The British fleet arrived at Besika Bay on the 28th; the Sultan was deposed on the night of the 30th. Turkey was saved; and Constantinople is not yet in the hands of Russia. It will be only what is due

to Mr. Urquhart to quote the following letter of June 8\* :—

"In the month of February, Mahmoud Pasha would have been overthrown had it not been for this intervention (of the British Embassy). I was so far from suspecting what was doing at Constantinople, and I reckoned so entirely upon the sincerity of Mr. Disraeli, first, in his intention to abrogate the Declaration of Paris, then, in his opposition to Russia, indicated by his refusal to take part in the Conference at St. Petersburg, that I imparted confidentially to a member of the Cabinet the measures in course of preparation : 1st, for the overthrow of the Grand Vizier : 2nd, for the liquidation of the debt : 3rd, for the suppression of the revolt : 4th, for the re-establishment of the Great Council.

"If England, directed by the man—the exceptional man—who is at the head of her Government, had wished to support Turkey and to arrest Russia, nothing would have been more simple or easy."

It is necessary, in judging of this act, to remember that the Sultan had become a traitor to his country, and the people were about to fall into the hands of their enemies. The Porte had, therefore, lost the *raison d'être* of a Government, and had ceased to be legal. Secondly, we must bear in mind that, throughout the Ottoman Empire, there had been a total loss of Social power. The Sultan's Government had no support whatever. It was tantamount to anarchy, although there was not a trace of lawlessness. By the deposition of the Sultan, the state of anarchy passed away, a regular Government led the people, and the Social power began to return. That the former condition of the Empire, into which General Ignatiew and Mahmoud had brought it, was in

\* "Diplomatic Review." July, 1876.

the highest degree dangerous to the Christian populations, is proved by\* a despatch of Sir H. Elliot on May 7:—

“It is impossible to be blind to the fact that the irritation of the Turkish populations has reached a pitch at which little is required to place the Christians in many parts of the Empire in a position of the greatest jeopardy. . . .

“The European Governments could, no doubt, enforce any decisions they might arrive at, but they could not do so without imminent risk to the lives of the Christian populations, if their proposals were such that the public opinion of the Mussulmans forced the Porte to resist them.”

As soon as confidence and the Social power of the Porte had been restored, the six Powers, under the lead of General Ignatiew, began again to destroy them. Sir H. Elliot† telegraphed so much to Lord Derby on September 23, 1876. It will be remembered that General Ignatiew was urging that reforms and even Autonomy should be granted to the Slav provinces, while he was as strenuous in his efforts to prevent the Greek populations from enjoying the same advantages. It will always be borne in mind that when the fullest reforms were, by the promulgation of the Constitution, extended to the whole Empire, General Ignatiew and his friends in England and other countries, jeered at it and tried to laugh it down. This is Sir H. Elliot’s telegram:—

“The belief that the Sclav Provinces which have been in insurrection are about to be endowed with special privileges through the intervention of the Powers is beginning to produce a strong feeling of discontent among the Greeks.

“They say that it will be a lesson to them that, if

\* III. of 1876. No. 253.

+ I. of 1877. No. 364

they are to expect anything, they must rise against the Government.

"Unless the Porte can be persuaded to adopt for the whole Empire, or at least for the European portion of it, measures of reform analogous to those to be given to the northern provinces, the seed of certain future trouble will be sown."

There were also other means of destroying the content which had returned to the Ottoman Empire. We remember the threats of coercion ; the assertion that the six Powers would "insist" on reforms ; the proposal of Russia to occupy Bulgaria, while Austria entered Bosnia ; the insulting and threatening despatch of Lord Derby on September 21 ; his menaces to leave Turkey to its fate and the "ruin" which impended over it ? Well : what did\* Lord Derby himself write on September 26 ?—

"I thought, moreover, that, in the actual state of men's minds, there was considerable danger in employing threats of material force. They could not fail to produce irritation at Constantinople, and might have the effect of inducing the Sultan and his advisers, who are now disposed to act with great prudence, to change their course and rush into war. Were such threats to become publicly known in Turkey, they would have the worst effect on the Mahomedan population, and might not improbably lead to outbreaks by which the Christian population would suffer.

"The Russian Government should also consider the unfortunate impression that would be produced on the public mind throughout Europe. All the world were, at this moment, prepared for a peaceable solution. Menaces of the kind proposed by Prince Gortchakow would

\* I. of 1877. No. 408, p. 318.

produce a general feeling of alarm and uneasiness, from which all interests would suffer."

The conclusion of this extract is remarkable. A little above, I have given a despatch in which Lord Derby told the Sultan that there was something called "Public Opinion" above him, to which, in all humility, he had better bow down. Here the great Autocrat, the Czar, the "Vicar of Christ," (as he calls himself), is told the same thing. Verily, those who manufacture Public Opinion have a very uncomfortable amount of power. We need not again hear, in the House of Commons, a resolution that : "The power of the Crown has increased, is increasing, and must be restrained." There appears to be another power, far greater than the Crown, which "has increased and is increasing."

When the Marquis of Salisbury went to Constantinople he saw the certain effects of even "suggesting terms distasteful to the Mussulmans;" namely, a destruction of the content, the quiet, the patience of the population ; a loss of the Social power of the Government, and a massacre of the Christians. Yet he joined in urging in a haughty manner (not merely in "suggesting") the most distasteful terms on the Porte. General Ignatiew told him that the only sufficient guarantee was occupation. Of course ; that is the meaning of the word when applied to a Sovereign. He had been warned that a threat of coercion would cause the massacre of the Christians, and total anarchy in Turkey. Yet he proposed occupation by Belgian troops. Only a sense of law in the Turks, for which no one had given them credit, prevented the dire effects from following. Here \* is what Lord Salisbury wrote to Lord Derby :—

"It seemed to him more than possible that, when

terms distasteful to the Mussulmans were suggested by the Conference and pressed by it upon the Porte, there would be, either with or without the instigation of the central authority, an outbreak of religious passion, which might be followed by terrible results. . . . . There was every ground for fearing that, if any measures were insisted on injurious to the religious prejudices of the Mahomedans, another massacre would ensue. . . . .

"General Ignatiew said that he doubted whether any conviction that might be forced upon the Ministers of the Porte or any efforts on their part would furnish the requisite guarantees against the dangers of the moment; and he urged the adoption of some sort of military occupation, as the only means of obtaining a trustworthy security."

There were other means of bringing about a Reign of Terror in Turkey and a total destruction of the Empire: an attempt to disarm the population. Disarmament was urged. Here\* is a telegram from Lord Salisbury to Lord Derby:—

"Holmes says that he thinks that Mussulmans would rise if disarmament were attempted. Some kind of disarmament will certainly be pressed in the Conference. Statement therefore made by us in Conference, that our Consuls disbelieve the danger of massacre must be somewhat qualified."

Another means of producing convulsion and a loss of Social power in the Ottoman Empire, would be the consent of the Sultan to some concessions towards the demands of Russia and the five Powers. No one was more earnest than Lord Salisbury, in his endeavours to wring some concessions from the Sultan. This† is what Lord Salisbury wrote to Lord Derby:—

\* II. of 1877. No. 59. Dec. 15, 1876.

† II. of 1877. No. 138. Dec. 26, 1876.

"I had the honour of a long audience with his Imperial Majesty the Sultan this afternoon. It should have taken place at an earlier period, but was postponed in consequence of the state of His Majesty's health.

"The conversation touched upon the Conference, and upon *the difficulties that His Majesty might feel in acceding to the suggestions of the Plenipotentiaries*. His remarks, however, were of the most general character, and my expression of a wish to ascertain the particular nature of his objections, failed to induce his Majesty to criticize the proposals of the Plenipotentiaries in detail.

"He dwelt much upon *the indignation that any concession would arouse among his people, and spoke of his own life as being in danger*; but no indication of his opinion upon any one of the various proposals of the Plenipotentiaries could be gathered from His Majesty's remarks."

Any concessions would be not only a loss of Social power, but would cause the people to rise in rebellion and take away the Sultan's life. Yet the Conference sat on, in hopes of obtaining concessions; they reduced their "irreducible minimum," by degrees, in hopes of concessions; they harangued, they coaxed, they threatened, they objurgated, they screamed out warning and curses, in hopes of gaining some concessions; they threatened to leave, and left; and no concessions were granted. The Sultan was ruled by his people, and that people was not ruled by newspapers.

Yes; let us call to mind which proposals were knocked off from the "irreducible minimum;" let us bethink ourselves which were retained, and pressed eagerly on the Sultan, at the last, by threats and by cajolery, by England and France and Russia, by prayers and menaces and warnings, in order to obtain from the Porte

a concession of them. The three points which were not given up, were the very three which, if conceded, would have been most certain to have caused the people of Turkey to rise against their rulers. This\* is what our ambassador wrote to Lord Derby :—

“The only really important points upon which serious difficulty seems likely to be encountered are those relating to the Valis (or Provincial Governors), to the International Commission, and to the formation of a militia (international or foreign).

“He could not, he said, consent by any written official document to subordinate the authority of the Sovereign in the selection of the Governor in his dominions to the approval of foreign powers.”

Lord Derby, however,† continued to press the Sultan, by means of an autograph letter which he had obtained from Her Majesty, to accept and concede the three proposals which would have been most fatal to his throne. This we learn from Sir Henry Elliot’s reply, on July 11 :—

“I took advantage of the audience granted to me yesterday by the Sultan to deliver the Queen’s letter, to impress earnestly on His Majesty the necessity of accepting without further delay the proposals unanimously submitted to the Porte by the European Powers. . . . .

“The conversation turned almost entirely upon the proposed International Commission. . . . . Although the Sultan shows much confidence in Her Majesty’s Government, and a wish to be guided by their advice, it is to be remembered that *the decision of the Porte will in reality rest with his Ministers*; but we may, I think, calculate

\* II. of 1877. No. 207, p. 272. Jan. 8, 1877.

† II. of 1877. No. 208.

that any concessions consented to by them will at least meet with no opposition from the Sultan."

The concluding sentence has a great import. A little while before, it was for the Sultan to concede and deny, to lose or retain, as he judged best after advice, the Social power which was necessary for his authority. A constitution was promulgated and a Parliament formed. The decision now rested with the Parliamentary Ministers, and the Sultan must wait upon their judgment. Yet it is easier, by means of the ministers of a majority, to retain Social power. It is not difficult, thereby, to achieve many things, otherwise fatal, without a loss of Social power. There is such a thing as absolute Government by a Parliament ; while, without a Parliament, the fear of losing Social power, often prevents a Government, which is absolute in appearance, from being absolute in fact.

The Constitution, however, carried out, for the whole Empire, all the reforms that were necessary for the disturbed Provinces—except the appointment, by the Six Powers, of the Provincial Governors ; the Extrnational Government of Turkey by an International Commission ; and the occupation by a "militia" consisting (partly, at least,) of foreign officers and soldiers. Such "reforms" would be violations of the sovereignty or independence of the Porte, and would cause a total loss of Social power. Every other necessary reform was covered by the Constitution. "But," said Lord Salisbury, "the Constitution cannot be in work for some years, and we must have *immediate measures*." The Sultan had promulgated the laws calculated to effect the necessary reforms, and intended, by means of his executive power, to see them carried out. This did not satisfy Lord Salisbury. He wished for "*immediate measures*."

What could this term possibly mean? Not internal reforms, for he had rejected them. There was nothing else for it to mean except, foreign legislation and external coercion ; —Extranational government and occupation. The term "*immediate measures*" must have come from Ignatiew ; it is such a neat and plausible fallacy. It involved all that Russia desired, and yet seemed so very reasonable and very moderate. Here \* is Lord Salisbury's naïve despatch :—

“ I had the honour of an audience of the Sultan to-day, at which I explained to his Majesty the proposals of the Plenipotentiaries in the modified form in which they are embodied in the *résumé mitigé*. I went through them point by point, and stated the reasons for which they were made.

“ His Majesty took exception to many of them, chiefly on the ground that they were rendered unnecessary by the promulgation of the new Constitution.

“ I pointed out that, according to European experience, the Constitution could not be in full work for several years, and that *immediate measures* were necessary to prevent further outbreaks, which would afford fresh opportunities for the hostile intrigues of the enemies of Turkey.

“ The Sultan’s chief objections were to the guarantees, which he said were thought dishonourable by his people, who would not consent to them.”

The conclusion of this extract compared with the conclusion of the last, shows us that the Sultan was kept from dishonour by the calm judgment of his people ; just as the British Ministry were pushed into dishonour † by the agitation of the British people.

\* II. of 1877. No. 224. Jan. 14, 1877.

† I. of 1877. No. 159.

It was probably the Softas who kept the Sultan straight. At all events, as we see by a despatch from Lord Salisbury of January, 18,\* that Midhat had managed it. He was evidently possessed of much knowledge of Parliamentary Government; he was aware how, by a Parliament, a Prime Minister can govern his Sovereign. These are Lord Salisbury's words:—

"There is no doubt that the Sultan was anxious to accept the terms of the Powers, but the Grand Vizier was resolved upon resistance, and brought the proposals before the Council in such a form that their rejection was a foregone conclusion."

The Grand Vizier himself was governed by the people; for in the state of public opinion no Minister could yield an inch or make the slightest concession; † and hisses, jeers, and curses filled the air as the Conference closed its sittings, and the trembling envoys sought safety on their steamers. Yet the Turkish people again was thought to be governed by the "Public Opinion of Europe," which would, it was said, assuredly prevent the Turks from recommencing the war! ‡

Let us pass to the relations between Ruler and people in Russia. Radical impiety,—Nihilism has spread throughout the educated classes in Russia, and has undermined all the foundations of religion and morality. The Nihilist Society began in 1860, in the Universities of St. Petersburg and Moscow. In 1873 the Nihilists commenced their propaganda among the peasants, to whom the Nihilists preached the necessity of putting down the nobility and abolishing property. It appears

\* II. of 1877. No. 226, p. 310.

† *Times*. Jan. 26, 1877.

‡ I. of 1877. No. 656, p. 478.

from Count Tolstoy's circular, and M. Gicharew's inquiry, that these principles have spread over the whole of Russia except Poland. M. Gicharew reported that severity is of no avail against the conspiracy ; and yet he cannot devise any other means of putting it down. The *Tagblatt* informed its readers that there is also a Secret Society, with very extensive ramifications, called the *Kramy Valet*. Its aim is to get rid of the Czar, and to set up five Republics, united by Federation.

All the Socialistic sects deny the relations and loosen the ties which exist between men. They weaken by disintegration, and destroy by demoralisation, every nation which has abandoned the principles of Christianity, and become an atheistical society. Socialism is the torpedo which lies under the ship of state, and is ready to explode at any moment. Since the elections in Germany, Socialism has been the Emperor's terror. Both Russia and Germany are floating over such torpedoes. They are falling to pieces through their own demoralising principles, and disorganising doctrines. Both of them have denied the existence of any authority external to the State and above it ; and in both a social war is ready. Socialism and Nihilism will destroy them. With regard to Russia, I may offer the following short quotation\* :—

“ Those very same Slav Committees which have taken up the Slav cause most warmly have been found to be, or, at any rate, are under very heavy suspicion of being likewise the most zealous advocates of a thorough political and social reorganization of Russia—that is a subversion, more or less, of all that exists now, so that a fostering and encouragement of the Slav idea was indirectly a fostering and encouragement of these political

\* *Times*. Jan. 30 1877.

and social aspirations. The fact that one of the Bulgarian Committees actually introduced into its programme the future organization of Bulgaria as a Republic was well calculated to damp the ardour of the Czar for the Bulgarian cause. But, on the other side, it is just this danger of the advanced political social ideas which is urged by the advocates of war as the strongest argument for war. By taking the Panslav cause in hand, Russia can maintain complete control over it, while the authority gained by the dynasty and Government, as having settled the future of the whole Slav world, would flatter Russian national feeling, and divert it for a very long time from all those political and social theories which people are now brooding over."

It was asserted by Lord Derby\* that the Czar "sincerely desired peace," but that "the violence of Public opinion in Russia, put a pressure upon the Cabinet of St. Petersburg." Probably the contrary was the truth. The newspapers in that country, at all events, seem to be the slavish, obedient echoes of the Government. It is true that Count Schouvaloff† made excuses for the number of Russian soldiers who had "volunteered" for Servia (which he called "emigration"), by saying that it would have been impossible for the Emperor to check it, "without an immense loss of popularity and influence. The state of public feeling in Russia was something to which the excitement here (England) bore no comparison." If that was true, it is plain that it is the Secret Societies who govern Russia, and that the Czar is not really leading them on towards forming a Panslavist Empire. *Credat Iudeus!*

\* III. of 1876. No. 481. June 22, 1876; and I. of 1877. No. 552, p. 410. Oct. 9, 1876.

† I. of 1877. No. 423, p. 328. Sept. 27, 1876.

There are two dangers which menace Europe; and both of them are found, in their extreme, in Russia and Germany: I mean anarchy, and despotism. The despotism of Russia is worse than that of any Eastern potentate since the time of the Chaldæans. It is in character the same as that of the Egyptian Empire of the Pharaohs, the Assyrian, the Chaldæan, and the Medo-Persian; and worse than that of the Grecian and Roman Empires. Will a European war make Europe become Cossack? If so, those will have to rue it who now, while advocating radical principles, are also loud in their outcry for alliance with Russia. How is it that the extreme Radical party is also the Russophile or "Cossack party"? Because their principles are not contradictory, not even repugnant to Russian principles. Both of them are contradictory to Catholic principles. The same principle underlies both of them,—I mean the negation of God's authority over all things in civil affairs;—while the circumstances alone are found to differ. Both deny the existence of any law above the state, and any rule except the will of man. The only difference is that there is, in despotism, only one man whose will is supreme, and the origin of law and right; while in the other case it is "the people" of which the same is said. It is one principle which makes, of a king, an unlimited despot; and of every one of the people, an anarchist. A demagogue on the throne is a despot; while a despot in a mob, is a demagogue.

It is because the principles are the same that we see Revolution and military despotism alternating, in a country which has ever harboured one of them. The crushing weight of the one, produces the other; while the nation flies from anarchy to produce a despotism.

That is the wraith on the nation which harbours, in its breast, the principle which underlies both. True liberty and healthy authority can be secured by a common submission, to the King of Kings, by both rulers and people.  
*Si vos Filius liberavit, verè liberi eritis.\**

\* Jno. viii. 36.

## CHAPTER X.

## THE EUROPEAN CONCERT.

WE have seen the intrigues, and the lawlessness of Russia, in carrying out, cautiously, and laboriously, and persistently, the process of ruining, and dismembering the Turkish Empire. Russia has destroyed the General Consideration of the Porte, by fraud ; Russia has injured the Social power of the Porte, by wheedling ; Russia has undermined the Federative power of the Porte, and stripped her of every friend and ally, by means of false suggestions and insidious whispers. As the friends of Turkey dropped off, Russia gained courage in her machinations and chicanery. That was seen on October 24, 1876 ; and the warning was given.\* Russian aggressions increased because Russia "had come to the conclusion that Turkey is finally abandoned by all the Powers." On the Second Reading of the Royal Titles Bill,† Mr. Disraeli said : "Sir, while we have been occupied with these matters, there have been greater changes going on in the very heart of Asia,—greater changes than even the conquest of India itself. There is a country of vast extent, which has been known hitherto only by its having sent forth hordes to conquer the world. That country has, at last, been vanquished, and the frontiers of Russia,—I will not say, a Rival Power,—but the frontiers of Russia are only a few days' march from those of Her Majesty

\* I. of 1877. No. 850, p. 586.

† March 23, 1876.

in India. *Sir, I am not of that school which views the advances of Russia in Asia with deep misgivings; I think that Asia is large enough for the destinies of both Russia and England.*" The Royal Titles Bill was brought in, he said, to stop the advances of Russia; it was at the same time a menace and a loss of power for Russia; because Russia is now only a few days' march from India. If he had stopped there, he would have gained in Federative power; and all those Asiatic Powers,—Turkey, Persia, Affghan,—which dread the advances of Russia, would have become the allies of England. England would have been their hope and protector. He wrecked it all by his anxiety not to be thought to belong to "a school" which views those advances with misgivings. No, he said, let Russia conquer Turkey, Persia, Affghan, for Asia is large enough for both of us!

Last year, on the 14th of July, Lord Derby used these words to the two deputations which waited on him :—

"If any one thing is certain in this world, it is certain that the Emperor of Russia, upon whose personal will and disposition more turns than upon that of any other man, is a sincere lover of peace. . . . And if I require any additional evidence of what I am saying, I should find it in the fact of that understanding to which I may refer, because it has been made public in the papers—I mean that understanding recently arrived at between the Emperor of Austria and the Emperor of Russia in their recent interview, which proceeds entirely upon the bases which you laid down, and which I assent to—namely, that of rigid and absolute non-intervention while this struggle continues."

Again, on Sept. 17, in Scotland's capital, the present leader of the House, made the same mistake :—

*"Why, when you talk of the jealousy that this country is supposed to feel towards Russia, and of that jealousy having in some way hampered the proceedings which have occurred, allow me to remind you that throughout all these proceedings, up to the time of these unfortunate transactions to which I have referred, we were in cordial co-operation with Russia, as well as the other Powers of Europe. At the time when these troubles first broke forth, about a year ago, in Herzegovina, all the six Powers—all the great Powers of Europe—were united in their action."*

If the six Powers were, in truth, united in their action against Turkey, then they were united in base intrigues, and open violation of the Law of Nations. But they were not united. There was no concord among the rulers; there was no unity except in the aim of the Secret Societies. Three days afterwards (Sept. 20) Lord Beaconsfield, at Aylesbury, again employed himself in frittering away the Federative Power of England:—

*"I will say that there never was anything more monstrous in invention than the story which has been generally circulated that at this time we were carrying on a sort of war with Russia; that everything she proposed we opposed, and that everything we suggested she circumvented. From the moment that we declined, and gave our reasons why we declined, entering into the Berlin Memorandum, there was, on the whole, I should say, on the part of every one of the Great Powers, cordial attempts to act with us in every way which would bring about a satisfactory termination; but by no Power have we been met so cordially as by Russia."*

It must not be supposed that, in moments of anxiety and suspense, such as those that made up last year, and the beginning of this year, the English papers were

unstudied by the Turks. Lest, however, these utterances of cordial friendship with their enemy should have escaped them, our ambassador in Constantinople was made to show to our ancient ally,—the Porte,—the amount of our enmity towards our ancient friend.

"With reference to Sir A. Buchanan's telegram, nothing can be more distinct than the terms in which I warned the Porte that no assistance was to be expected from Her Majesty's Government against an attack by Russia; and I have not seen nor had any communication with Halil Pasha for more than a month. Public feeling here is, however, daily becoming more dangerous; and if the Turks, *believing themselves abandoned by every one*, give way to despair, it is impossible to say what the consequences may be." \*

Then came the warning of Oct. 24, to which I have just alluded. It said that the increase of Federative power thus given to Russia, only served to increase her aggressions; while the loss of Turkey's Federative power rendered her desperate, and was likely to lead to war or perhaps to a massacre of the Christians. Even after these warnings, Sir Stafford Northcote, on Colston's Day,† at Bristol, used these words:—

"I think it is highly probable and highly natural that the Emperor of Russia, especially viewing the excitement which has prevailed in large portions of his dominions and among those who are often referred to as the secret societies, or the Slavonic Committees, who have had so much to do in fomenting the recent Servian War,—that the Emperor has been anxious to prove to his own people that he is not neglecting the cause which they have at

\* I. of 1877. No. 511, p. 390. Telegram of Oct. 4, 1876, from Sir H. Elliot.

† Nov. 13.

heart, and that it is not necessary for them to have recourse to all the irregular and mischievous outbreaks ; but that he is determined as the Ruler of the State, and by his ambassador to the forthcoming Conference, prepared to deal in this grave time in the spirit of fair and reasonable conciliation."

At Liverpool, on Jan. 24, this year, at a time when all our influence with Turkey, and our moral support for Turkey, were required, and when the known crimes of Russia demanded discountenance and denunciation, and an endeavour to detach other Powers from alliance with her,—Sir Stafford said :—“ We have been accused of an unworthy jealousy of Russia. In answer to that accusation, we have but this to say ; it is false.” Thus was our Federative power in the East frittered away by Ministers who ought to have known that it was all required to withstand the spirit of Russian aggression, and the conspiracies of the Secret Societies. Did they prefer the friendship of Russia ? Did they assist Barabas the Robber because they believed that his cordiality was sincere ? No ; that cordiality was a sham ; the European concert, the concord of the great Powers was only a make-believe. For a shadow you have thrown away our alliances in the East ! While you were pretending friendship with the Czar, as a sincere lover of peace, what did Prince Gortchakow \* tell you ? “ Prince Gortchakow said, ‘ *La parole est aux canons*, et il faut attendre une dizaine de jours pour savoir l’issue du combat.’ I found Prince Gortchakow anxious to maintain the existing concert of the European Powers, and to avoid any complications which might produce discord among them.” Of course Russia wished to maintain the Federative power she had acquired,—the

\* III. of 1876. No. 162. April 20, 1876.

assistance of all the European Powers against Turkey. So he said : You agree with me, you are concerting measures with me in my efforts against Turkey, where cannons alone shall roar out my message.

The concord was however a sham, and Russia knew it. The Russian Government was irritated at our refusal of the Berlin Memorandum<sup>\*</sup> on that very ground ; it showed how hollow was the agreement. The Russian Government had evidently charged the English Government with a policy of isolation ; for we find † Lord Derby, on June 14, defending himself to the Russian ambassador, and saying : "It is not a part of the system or policy of England to take up a position of isolation in Eastern matters." Why did he, after saying this to Count Schouvaloff, find it necessary to assure Prince Gortchakow also ? Because the concert was a sham, and Lord Derby wished to keep up the appearance of concord. The fact is, that united action in the name of Christianity, must always and of necessity be a delusion ; for Christianity itself is not one ; the churches are in conflict ; and, by Christianity, every one means his own Church. Being an impossibility, united action in the name of Christianity can only be proposed in hypocrisy, or suggested in fraud. "I have come to send, not peace, but a sword." Into that hypocrisy we fell, whenever we said, through our Ministers, or in Ministerial papers, "we are cordially with Russia ; we will never side with Turkey." All the world shrugged their shoulders and sneered. The millions in Asia and India said to themselves that we were afraid, and shrank from a contest with Russia ; that British pluck was gone ; that we owned ourselves to be weak and no longer able

\* III. of 1876. No. 357. May 26.

† III. of 1876. No. 427.

to defend our interests ; and that we must lean upon a strong, barbarian, unscrupulous Power for our support.

How anxious France was to keep up deceptive appearances ! \* On June 16, Lord Lyons reported a conversation with the Duc De Cazes.

"The Duke urged that the hopes of a speedy pacification of Bosnia and the Herzegovina would be very much increased, if it could be made apparent both to the Porte and the insurgents that there was complete accord between the six Powers. . . . .

"The Duke said that he must once more beg me to impress upon Her Majesty's Government his anxious desire that some means might be devised of making a declaration of the union of Great Britain with the other Powers."

Three days after,† Prince Gortchakow expressed the Czar's desire for a "European concert." On the 22nd,‡ Lord Derby wrote to Austria to say that the English Government must "abstain from taking part in the work of pacification." The next day Lord Lyons had another conversation with the Duc De Cazes, who§ "again urged the importance of establishing a complete accord between the Six Great Powers (to the exclusion of Turkey, then) on the Eastern Question, and of making that accord apparent." He added :—

"The one thing, however, to which the Duc De Cazes himself attached importance was, he said, the adoption of some measure in common, which would make the union of the six Powers evident. A collective warning to Servia had occurred to him as a measure useful in itself and conducive to this end ; but, in truth, the form

\* III. of 1876. No. 460. † III. of 1876. No. 472. June 19.

‡ III. of 1876. No. 481.

§ III. of 1876. No. 486. June 23.

in which the union of the Powers manifested itself was with him a very secondary consideration."

To that despatch Lord Derby returned a very proper answer :\* Yes ; all very well ; if Russia, whose complete power over Servia is so well known, will prove the truth of her protestations and the sincerity of her professions, by stopping the hostility of Servia against Turkey, and recalling "the foreign agitators and agents of Slav Committees."

England, however, was brought round, and got to agree to the bases to which I have already alluded. Russia then declared that as the Porte had refused them, she would act alone against Turkey, laying all the blame on the want of union between the six Great Powers.† This is found in a despatch of Lord Derby to Lord A. Loftus,—

"He remarks that the Turkish Foreign Minister adheres inflexibly to the term of six months, and rejects the system of autonomy and the proposed Protocol ; thus indirectly refusing the basis proposed by England, and affirming the sufficiency of the reforms promised by the Porte.

"Prince Gortchakow asks whether this defiance of all Europe is to be accepted ; Russia, his Highness says, certainly will not do so. *No Power is more desirous of a general European agreement in the interests of humanity and civilization.* Russia has no interested views in this question, but there are limits which cannot be passed consistently with honour and dignity. The Russian Government leave their conduct to the judgment of history.

"His Highness believes that *the obstinacy of the*

\* III. of 1876. No. 496. June 27.

† I. of 1877. No. 703. Oct. 18, 1876.

*Porte would cease if it were not encouraged by the absence of union among the Powers."*

The fact is that the five Powers made pretence of a cordial agreement with Russia, and joined with her in order to thwart her ; and they pretended to abandon Turkey in order to keep up the false appearance. But they did not deceive Russia, while they alienated Turkey. They were made the tools of Russia, and received the hisses of Turkey. They lost Federative Power on both sides. Or, shall we say that each of the Five Great Powers wished to thwart Russian ambition, and advance its own particular ends ? Yes ; every one was a false friend and insidious foe. Every one stealthily trod the dark and tortuous lanes of diplomacy, in shoes of felt and face in domino, with a dagger clutched under the ample cloak of specious candour and pretended humanity. Yet the result has been a loss of Federative power for us, both in Russia and in Turkey, and a loss of Social power in England, which an unwavering policy would have secured. Europe, we were told, was cordially united ; while Turkey was a sick man, effete, broken down, weak, impoverished, and imbecile. How was it, then, that Turkey alone has successfully withstood the whole of Europe combined ? Because Europe was not combined. Because of the jealousies and antagonisms of the European Powers. Because Europe is hopelessly divided, and weakened by disease. For Europe the remedial measures are required, more than for Turkey. Prince Gortchakow, in his Circular of January 19, 1877,\* complained of the failure of Russia's "endeavours to bring about an European concert," and of "Diplomatic action having been interrupted," between the six Great Powers, in regard to the Eastern question. Yet Lord Derby

\* VIII. of 1877.

tried to bring about such a Concert, and proposed the Conference with that object. On November 11 he refused to accept the Turkish reforms with that object,\* and said :—“ Since concert among the Powers is imperative, and the only means left of arriving at it is by a Conference, &c.” What he failed to see was, that any concert must have been a conspiracy. It must have been an agreement to break the law. Lord Beaconsfield, on September 20, spoke of the war which was instigated, ordered, maintained by Russia as : “ this outrageous and wicked war ! for of all the wars that ever were waged, there never was a war less justifiable than the war made by Servia against the Porte . . . . There is not the slightest doubt that, as regards the relations between Servia and the Porte, not only every principle of international law, not only every principle of public morality, but every principle of honour was outraged.” If this was true, Lord Derby’s aim should have been to have guarded himself from becoming an accomplice in the crime, and to have detached those who were taking part in it.

Germany has been suspected of wanting to discredit Russia, and to weaken her by urging her on to war. It has been said that she does not approve of the increasing preponderance of Russia on her flank, and of the mouths of the Danube in her hand. Yet we must not forget the fish-hook which Russia has in the jaws of Germany. Germany may wish to involve Russia in a war, but not so much to weaken Russia, as to seize Holland or Switzerland for herself. Talleyrand’s maxim, we have often seen in practice :—

“ Prussia and Russia will henceforth be combined for the purpose of carrying out distinct objects of aggression.

In such a concert they will be possessed of means sufficient to baffle the penetration, or to overrule the resistance of the other Cabinets. Prussia will seek to extend her influence over the smaller states of Germany. Russia to expand towards the East ; and they will lend their hands mutually to each other to effect these purposes."

Russia and Germany represent the brute force of Europe ; and they understand each other ; while the other Powers, having abandoned principles, are unable to band themselves together, and cannot see their common interest. Russia, it is true, cannot advance without Germany's leave. Yet she is \* advancing ; and therefore they understand each other, and Germany will have her *quid pro quo*. Austria can prevent the advance of Russia, except Germany will fight on the side of Russia ; and even then she could do it if France, and England, and Denmark would join with her. But Austria does not prevent. As to Italy ; she is the little dog of Russia,† and hopes for a morsel to be chucked to her by Russia. She hopes for the Trentina. But what is Italy to us ? If we had not lost Federative Power by proclaiming our conspiracy with Russia, there might perhaps have been an alliance with France, Austria, Turkey, Denmark and ourselves. Then a rebellion in Poland, and an outbreak of Asiatic tribes would have awed the bandits and made them quiet. By proclaiming our cordial concert with Russia, we gave her all our weight and moral influence in her demands and actions, and have done all we could to shake the firmness of Turkey, and to determine, on the wrong side, the wavering of Austria. Russia has been at war with Turkey since the end of 1875,—while

\* April 26, 1877.

† I. of 1877. No. 708. Oct. 16. Also No. 667.

pretending a friendship for her, and a humanitarian desire for the welfare of the Christians. For Russia, being weak, but naturally astute, must convulse in order to subdue, and confuse with a view to convulse.

## CHAPTER XI.

## THE SOWING OF MISTRUST, AND THE CROP OF ANIMOSITIES.

WE began by enjoying the most cordial confidence on the part of Turkey. On May 31 there was "among all classes, an enthusiasm for Great Britain."\* On July 17, in the House of Commons, Lord Beaconsfield said he "would not say remonstrating with the Turkish Government," for "the Turkish Government is most anxious to be guided by the advice of the British Ambassador." Sir H. Elliot † telegraphed the same on August 27. On September 18 ‡ the Porte stated its willingness "to abide by the decision of the Powers." Then came, by dint of experience, a change in the mind of the Porte. On December 10 § we learned that "the influence of Her Majesty's Government is not what it was." Why? because they had "a feeling of distrust of anything we may recommend in concert with Russia." Lord Salisbury was then at Constantinople. The despatch continues thus :—

"The declaration of important personages that the Turks must be driven out of Europe causes a feeling of distrust against anything we may recommend in concert with Russia.

"Convinced that Russia intends to attack it, the

\* III. of 1876. No. 393. Sir H. Elliot.      † II. of 1877. No. 89.  
 ‡ II. of 1877. No. 294.      § II. of 1877. No. 83.

whole nation has resolved to offer the best resistance in its power, and that resistance will certainly be stubborn, though probably futile ; but the Turks say that there would be less discredit in being driven by force from their territories than in being cajoled out of them.

"The Christian populations are as unanimously opposed to the threatened Russian aggression as the Turks, for they know it to be undertaken in the interest of a particular nationality, which they dread and at the same time despise."

We have therefore lost all influence in Turkey ; and we did not gain any on the other side. For Lord Derby\* tells us that "Her Majesty's Government can scarcely expect that any advice which Great Britain could give, would meet, under present circumstances, with the same attention in Belgrade as the counsels of the other Powers," so much so, that the presence of an English consul in Belgrade was "scarcely required." Even Austria and Germany have learned to mistrust us ; they admitted that they suspected England of playing double.† The Russian ambassador, as Lord Derby informed us, also insinuated that, while pretending a cordial co-operation with Russia, we had encouraged the Porte to resist the Russian demands. Prince Gortchakow, at Livadia, openly asserted the same.‡ Even in England it was freely reported that the Prime Minister sent directions to our ambassador, to thwart the pro-Russian endeavours of Lord Salisbury at the Conference. That probably is the essential character of diplomacy. Mr. Gladstone said at Frome : "When we say our indignation is aroused against the wrong, we mean it. *We do not use*

\* H. of 1876. No. 386. June 7.

† I. of 1877. No. 330, p. 219. Sept. 9, 1876.

‡ I. of 1877. No. 1010, p. 713. Nov. 23, 1876.

*the language of diplomacy, but we speak from the heart.*" So then the language of diplomacy is only from the teeth, outwards. What wonder that there should be mistrust? Russia laid her hand on her heart and protested, over and over again, that she means not conquest, that she desires not territory ; all she desires, and desires most disinterestedly, is the welfare of the Portc's Christian subjects. England bows and lays her hand on her heart and protests, with a sneer on her lips, that she fully and cordially believes her dear friend ; while she thinks of the treatment of the Poles, and Russia's conduct in Khiva. Then Lord Derby turns to the two flunkies, Servia and Montenegro, and says, as his reason for not accepting the Berlin Memorandum, that he cannot trust them to observe their part of the contract.\* Austria distrusts Russia, and Hungary hates the Slavs. France looks askance, with terror on her brow, at Germany, who is preparing to spring at her when her back is turned. Verily : *Decipere et decipi, saeculum vocatur.*

Even Turkey is distrusted. A Home Secretary can speak of a "waste paper currency of Turkish promises ;" and truly there have, in former days, been showers of promises, and Hatti-Humayouns, and firmans, like the coloured sparks from a rocket ; and they have become extinct as soon. We, also, are distrusted ; for Lord Salisbury comes home from Constantinople, and makes a speech in which he acknowledges that we have "backed a bill," but do not intend to pay it. All the fine web of pretexts which diplomacy has been weaving ; all the pretences and soft speeches about humanity and Christianity, by which the winter has been whiled away, while fine weather has been awaited to shoot down humanity, to

\* Nos. 273 and 259.

destroy Christians, to make the fields barren and desolate, to watch the flames of churches wrecked and dwellings burned ;—do not these things exacerbate factions, embitter men's hearts, and destroy all trust in Princes and confidence in men ?

Lord Derby told the Turks to “rely on their own resources to suppress the insurrection,” and to use “vigorous measures.”\* Then he restrained the Porte from attacking the Prince of Montenegro, who was concentrating his troops to attack Turkey.† Next‡ he accused the Turks of “weakness and apathy in dealing with the insurrection.” Does this conduct tend to increase confidence in Great Britain. On October 5 three telegrams are sent to Sir H. Elliot,§ telling him “to leave Constantinople in case of refusal ;” but adding that he was nevertheless not to do so “without first referring home for instructions.” A fourth telegram on the same day commanded Sir H. Elliot to tell the Porte the first part of the telegram,—that ordering him to leave ; but to suppress the latter part, which told him not to leave. Does not such conduct create mistrust ? What did the other states of Europe think of it ? The Italian Government || asked if it was “merely a threat,” and reminded Lord Derby “that we are not playing with children whom we could frighten with a ghost, and that certainly the threat was a serious one.” Sir H. Elliot telegraphed on October 7 ¶ the result of trying to frighten the Porte with Lord Derby’s ghost. The Sultan said “he could hardly understand how proposals, which might have been expected from Russia, could have been made by Her Majesty’s Government.”

\* H. of 1876. No. 15 and No. 73. † No. 219. April 29, 1876.

| H. of 1876. No. 278. May 19.

§ I. of 1877. No. 516. || I. of 1877. No. 602, p. 152.

¶ I. of 1877. No. 338, p. 103.

I have already sufficiently alluded to the deceptions on the part of Russia in pretending a solicitude for Christians, while she was persecuting those of Chclm ; and on the part of the five Great Powers in asserting that they were cordially agreed with Russia, while they were only hanging on to her skirts in order to keep her back. There was another deception contained in a despatch of Lord Derby to Lord Salisbury \* concerning the projected foreign occupation, by Belgian troops, of Turkish territory. It is in the following terms :—

“ With reference to my previous despatch of to-day’s date, I have to inform your Excellency that Her Majesty’s Government consider that it would be desirable, if possible, that the introduction of the Belgian force should appear to be made at the request of the Porte.”

To the occupation by 6,000 Belgian troops,—the disarmament of the population and the consequent resistance and insurrection of the Mahomedans, was a necessary condition precedent. So was the destruction of the Sultan’s Sovereignty, by foreign dictation as to the appropriation of the revenue of those provinces; for control of the purse is the source of power. Thus England, in December, 1876, proposed to settle the question on a basis which was in contradiction to her existing engagements, and to her assurances to the Porte in 1875. That was not the only deception in it; for Ignatiew flattered Lord Salisbury and put him forward to fulfil the obnoxious task, and then slipped behind the scenes and told the Turks that Russia was the true friend of Turkey, while, as they plainly saw, England was her true enemy ; and that his (Ignatiew’s) labour was to

\* II. of 1877. No. 66, p. 53. Dec. 18.

mitigate the rigorous requirements of England. Thus, in fraud, he made England the enemy of her old ally, and an ally of her old enemy.

The Conference itself was nothing but a snare and deception. The first basis of it was, that the Independence and integrity of the Ottoman Empire should be respected. Yet the International Commission, the appointment of the Provincial Governors by the foreign Powers, and the occupation by foreign soldiery, were in flagrant contradiction to this basis. The second basis was that each of the six Powers should make a solemn Declaration abjuring the acquisition of any advantage. This Declaration was not made by any one of the Powers. Another stipulation was that the Representatives of the Porte should take part in the discussions; yet all the work was done at the Russian Embassy, and the Representatives of the Porte were excluded. Another basis was that the *status quo ante* should be observed. Yet the six Powers, in contradiction to this basis, insisted on cessions of territory to Montenegro and Servia. Another condition was that only moral and not material guarantees were to be demanded of the Porte. Yet this condition was openly violated by Lord Salisbury, as we see by his own statement, which is given in the following words in the 5th Protocol :—\*

“ *The Marquis of Salisbury*, recalling the fact that in the English programme guarantees were insisted on against bad government in Bulgaria, regrets finding nothing in the speech of his Excellency Safvet Pasha which sufficiently corresponds to this idea. In the eyes of his Lordship this idea could only be realized by detaching from the central authority various powers which ought to belong to the provincial authorities.

\* II. of 1877, p. 322.

Lord Salisbury would wish, in particular, that, with the view of securing the independence of the Vali, he should not be easily removed."

We find this even more explicitly repeated in the 6th Protocol :—\*

"*The Marquis of Salisbury* wished note to be taken that the Ottoman Plenipotentiaries discarded all other guarantees than moral ones, and offered no others except time and the existing and future laws."

What greater frauds could have been perpetrated by horsedealers or stockjobbers than that? How can we complain if we have lost the General Consideration of Europe, when we resort to such great injustice?

I have alluded to the Russian ambassador stepping behind the scenes. I mentioned a rumour that the Prime Minister had encouraged the Porte against the efforts of Lord Salisbury and General Ignatiew. The following † is a telegram, on December 24, 1876, from Safvet Pasha to Musurus Pasha :—

"Telegram received, No. 431, special.

"I have read it to the Grand Vizier. His Highness received this communication with deep gratitude, and begs you to express to his Excellency Lord Derby his acknowledgments. You will explain to his Lordship, in the name of the Grand Vizier, that the *Sublime Porte* reckons more than ever on the kind support of the Government of Her Britannic Majesty, under the difficult circumstances we are passing through."

Safvet Pasha had evidently received a telegram promising the support of the British Government. The telegram of Lord Derby † dated January 9, 1877 (sixteen days after), to Lord Salisbury, is given as if it were the

\* II. of 1877, p. 342.

† II. of 1877. No. 87.

‡ II. of 1877. No. 150.

answer. It is evidently not the answer. But it reveals the fact that there was some other and a later telegram which promised "*the assistance of Lord Derby and Lord Beaconsfield*":—

"I have received your telegram of the 8th instant, in which you state that the Grand Vizier believes he can "*count upon the assistance of Lord Derby and Lord Beaconsfield*," and I have the honour to inform your Excellency that Musurus Pasha has been warned in the strongest terms to the contrary. His Excellency has admitted to me that I have discouraged any hope of the kind.

"It is not in my power to speak more plainly than I have done on this subject; and I feel satisfied that no language different to this is being held by any person connected with Her Majesty's Government."

The terms are different; although the substance is the same. The voice is that of Israel; but the hands are those of Esau. Musurus had evidently been "seen" upon the subject, and been told that he had "let the cat out of the bag;" and been entreated to pen a disclaimer. This transaction would not, in a court of law, be held as straightforward. The Protocol was another example of deception. Prince Gortchakow's Circular points to the kind of argument which was used to induce England to do that which she had most positively refused to do before; viz., to sign a Protocol on the breaking up of the Conference: "Russia must have something to show for all the 500,000 men which she has put on the frontiers, and her expense, and the stoppage of her trade. The Czar at Moscow made a promise to his people and the Panslavist Societies; he must satisfy or bamboozle them, or else he will lose the Social Power which he now enjoys. Sign me then this harmless, unmeaning Protocol, I pray!"

and it was signed. "Now (Lord Derby should have said) it either binds the six Powers, or it does not bind. If it does bind them, then the five Powers have been deceived by Russia ; if it does not bind them, then the Russian people were deceived by the Czar and the five Powers. Either way it is a fraud and deception. Further ; if it is binding, it binds us to coerce Turkey, which we have bound ourselves not to do. So that, either way, all the six Powers are guilty of deception."

Did I not rightly say, at the beginning, that Diplomacy is an art which arises, as Truth and Justice depart from nations ? What insincerity, what disingenuousness, what prevarications, what shufflings, what misrepresentations, what simulations and hypocrisies, what equivocations and palterings, what confusing ambiguities and misleading fallacies, what counterfeits, shams, cantings, juggleries, finessing, collusions, and bamboozlings, and tangles, and snares, and pitfalls, and jockeyings, and cajoleries, this Eastern Question is full of ! The Elysian fields of diplomatists ; the Purgatory of honest men ! Fraud is the woof and web of the Russian soul. The St. Petersburg correspondent of *The Times* \* has lifted the veil of their temple :—

"That boxes of stores should be found empty, that thousands of cartridges should be found to contain sand, instead of powder, that the Intendance Department should have neglected to make the most simple, but essential preparations for an army in the field—these, I maintain, are facts which bring Russia before the world in her true colours."

It was the same in Czarina Catharine's days, in 1803, in 1828, and in 1854. Russia was betrayed by fraudulent Russian contractors and false Russian officers ; as

\* Jan. 22, 1877.

Napoleon III. lost his German campaign by fraudulent Lebœufs. So important is a rooted honesty to the life of a nation ! so destructive to honesty is diplomacy ! Russia, the common enemy of mankind is strong through false semblance, and not through strength ; she appals by a talisman, and not by power. When will the spell of that talisman, by courage, be broken ; and the false semblance, by honesty, be dispelled ?

## CHAPTER XII.

THE CONFERENCE ; OR THE GOVERNMENT OF NATIONS  
BY FOREIGN DIPLOMATISTS.

Now we come to that more than Royal progress of the Marquis of Salisbury. As he started, the people of England stood, silently respectful, at the station ; crowding to the line at each side ; and cheering as he passed. He entered a Royal Saloon carriage, in a special train. He crossed the sea in a special steamer. A special train took him to Paris ; another to Berlin ; to Vienna ; to Rome ; to Brindisi, where a man-of-war was waiting for him. Crowned Heads hastened to greet him. All Europe stood breathless, expectant, on tiptoe, watching his progress, and anxious to catch his faintest whisper.

The Marquis of Salisbury was chosen as the fittest ambassador. Was it he who wrote that very able article on "Provincial Turkey," in the great organ of the Conservative Party,—*The Quarterly Review*, for October, 1874 ? Many persons studied the article, in order to learn the character and disposition of our Envoy. I will give a few extracts :—

"‘ Although, in the opinion of some, it matters but little to England whether an Othman, a Romanof, or a Hapsburg rule on the banks of the Bosphorus, it does, in the opinion of all, concern her much whether a Turk or a Frank rule in the valley of the Nile.’ Thus far the practical good sense of Mushaver Pasha, Sir Adolphus Slade ; and

had the gallant Admiral added the valley of the Euphrates to that of the Egyptian stream, and coupled the Red Sea with the Persian Gulph, his proposition would have gained in completeness without losing in force.\* . . .

"Constantinople is a refuge, a very nest of adventurers, of quacks, of sham diplomatists, of swindlers, of the worst scum of pseudo-enterprise and rascality, collected to prey on Eastern ignorance and supineness ; of Europeans degraded into the baseness of Asiatic vice, and Asiatics refined into the finish of European scoundrelism ; a repair where the robbers of all races divide and batten on their ill-gotten gains, and where Blake's visionary verses on an imaginary 'London' find, with slight change, a much truer application than in our own or any other European capital :—

'the hapless peasant's sigh,  
Runs in blood down palace walls.'†

" . . . . The provincial populations, though not devoid of capacity for better things, are at present condemned to wither under a general atmosphere of maladministration and decay. . . . .

" Little doing, less likely to be done ; trade degenerated into pedlary, enterprise into swindling, banking into usury, policy into intrigue ; lands untilled, forests wasted, mineral treasures unexplored, roads, harbours, bridges, every class of public works utterly neglected and falling into ruin, pastoral life with nothing of the Abel resemblance about it, agriculture that Cain himself, and metallurgy that his workman son might have been ashamed of ; in public life, universal venality and corruption ; in social life, ignorance and bigotry ; and in

\* I. e. Russia may have Constantinople, provided we get Egypt.

† Evidently written by the "great master of flouts and gibes and sneers."

private life, immorality of every kind ; not ‘something,’ but ‘everything,’ rotten in the state of Turkey.

“ . . . . From a confederacy of half-independent states, each retaining in the main its own customs, privileges, and institutions, guaranteed by a strength to defend them, and by a rough, but efficacious popular representation, Turkey has, within the last fifty years passed into an absolute, uncontrolled, centralised despotism ; under which every former privilege, institution, custom, popular representation,—in a word, every vestige of popular freedom and *local autonomy*,—has been merged and lost in one blind centralised uniformity. . . . . An Empire converted, like the later Byzantine dominions, into a huge property, exhausted to feed an ever-rapacious capital, explains its permanent meaning for the internal condition of the Ottoman Empire itself.”

The conclusion arrived at is couched in these words :—

“ ‘ Already executed on the elder criminal (the Papal throne), that sentence, though delayed, cannot fail of ultimate execution on the younger ; and to hinder or delay it is no part of England’s duty. . . . . To Russia, mistress of the Central Asiatic line, belong of necessity the destinies of Northern Turkey, &c.’ . . . .

“ Nor have any rulers of the earth a fairer claim to the inheritance of the Fatimite and Abbaside Caliphs, to Cairo and Bagdad, than ourselves, the Lords of Ghuznee and Delhi, the heirs of Mahmoud the Conqueror and Akbar Khan.”

Was the Marquis of Salisbury, from his predisposition and antecedents, qualified to persuade the Turks ? Or was his mission another slap in the face, and humiliation to the much-enduring Porte ? Lord Salisbury is

not exactly a pacific gentleman. The *suaviter in modo* is not his predominating characteristic.

Why send any one at all? Why propose a Conference? We knew that Russia had been intriguing for years to raise the rebellion, and cause the present difficulty. We were aware that, for more than a century, her every endeavour, and every act of hers had been to undermine the Ottoman Empire. Did our sense of honour make us shrink from calmly discussing with Russia her schemes of reforms for the Turkish Provinces, and her ideas for remodelling the Ottoman Empire? If a swindler had, for years, been systematically ruining a young gentleman, would any one with feelings of honour or propriety invite the swindler to his table and discuss with him the means he might propose for retrieving the young gentleman's fortunes, and then join with the swindler in forcing the young gentleman to accept those schemes? That is what Great Britain has done! Not a question was asked as to what was just, and who was in the right. Our first thought was to frighten Turkey into giving way to unjust demands; our second was, under the appearance of unanimity with Russia, to thwart her ambitious measures. But as Turkey was only on the defensive, to make her give way, was to weaken her defence; it was digging a hole in the dyke that kept out the rising Russian tide. It was destroying that independence and integrity which our interests imperatively called on us to defend. We should have denounced Russian intrigues, Russian volunteers, Russian lawlessness; and have refused to be "the companion of robbers," and to "cast in our lot with those that shed blood." So far from doing this, we proposed to humiliate the rival of Russia, and our ancient ally, by discussing, in his own

capital, the means of taking away his authority, and casting his sovereignty down into the dust.

Lord Salisbury knew the real cause of the difficulty he was sent to solve. For he wrote \* these words to Lord Derby :—“ *It is probable that the movements which have recently taken place in Bulgaria, and have been so terribly repressed, are due in part to agitators of Russian nationality.* ”

If he had not known this before leaving London he had not studied the Blue-Books, and was not qualified for his mission.. But if he knew this, why did he † say to the German Emperor at Berlin “that it was the full intention of Her Majesty’s Government to insist on the provision of adequate guarantees ?” Why did he † say to Count Andrassy at Vienna “that the inability of the Turks to fulfil the promises which they had made on various occasions, and the grievous sufferings which, *in consequence*, had befallen the Christian populations, had imposed upon Europe the duty of making every exertion to secure not only the enactment of any further reforms that might be necessary, but also guarantees for the efficacious execution of those which had already been sanctioned ” ?

The Earl of Derby is not to blame for starting the idea of holding a Conference. The first intimation that is given of it is in a conversation with the French Ambassador in London,§ on May 27, 1876, three days before the deposition of the Sultan Abdul Assiz. It is thus reported by Lord Derby :—

“ The Duc De Cazes would not repeat the expression of his disappointment at learning that Her Majesty’s

\* II. of 1877. No. 167.      † II. of 1877. No. 22. Nov. 23.

‡ II. of 1877. No. 27. Nov. 20.

§ III. of 1876. No. 305.

Government had decided not to join in the action of the other five Powers (the Berlin Memorandum), but he could not conceal the apprehensions for the future to which this refusal had given rise. What was now likely to be the next step in the matter? . . . . He was unable to see anything to be done except to summon a Conference. *The Duc De Cazes would not, however, propose a Conference unless assured that Her Majesty's Government would agree to it.* . . . .

"I replied that I saw no objection to the idea of a Conference in principle, but that I thought it would be useless without a basis. If the Powers were not agreed beforehand, there was not much prospect that they would agree any the more when the Representatives met around a Conference table."

On the 7th of June,\* Lord Derby is informed that the Austrian Government have "rejected the idea of a Congress to consider the means of remedying the present state of affairs in European Turkey." On June 10,† it appears that Lord Derby drew back from the very hesitating and equivocal acceptance of the idea of a Conference, which he had given a fortnight before. The German Ambassador told him that proposals had reached Berlin "from various quarters" for a Conference. The idea had evidently been assiduously and widely put about. Lord Derby replied that he did not "think that there would be any practical advantage in such a meeting, unless *some preliminary agreement were first come to.*" This is an intimation that he would consent to an extra-national government of the Porte, by a committee of foreign ambassadors, to the exclusion of a Turkish representative.

\* III. of 1876. No. 388.

† III. of 1876. No. 402.

The Porte \* objected in the strongest language to a Conference, on the ground that thereby "a serious blow would be struck at the principle of the independence of the Empire itself, if its internal affairs became the object of the deliberations of an International Conference.

"How could she resign herself to overthrow with her own hands, by taking part in a Conference whose object is to regulate the internal affairs of the Empire, the strongest barrier which the Empire can now set between herself and her enemies? Once the work of the Treaty of Paris put on one side, we shall find ourselves at the mercy of events. . . . Whether, then, the proposed Conference were to succeed, or whether it were to fail, the Imperial Government would none the less come out of it with diminished independence, or, at any rate, with those means of defence much crippled which are now secured to her by international engagements."

The Treaties of Paris expressly denied the right of the European Powers, singly or collectively, to interfere between the Sultan and his subjects. The meeting of the Conference, therefore, amounted to an abrogation of those Treaties. Sir Stafford Northcote saw this, and said so on December 14, 1876, when it was too late. He allowed that they were "*stepping beyond the arrangements of the Treaty of Paris*, by meddling in the internal affairs of Turkey." This he excused by the maxim that he had "*no superstitious regard for Treaties*." How was it, then, that the idea had so industriously been put about, as to overturn British policy, and overcome the objections of Austria? From what source did the potent and ruinous fallacy come? On November 2nd, the Czar told Lord Augustus Loftus that it was he who had pressed for a Conference. It

was quite in accordance with Russian aims, and with the character of Russian diplomacy. It was the Russian Ambassador who flattered Lord Derby into imagining that it was his proposal, and who persistently called it the "English proposal."

Why was a Conference proposed? Not to resist Russia; because Russia had secured a majority of votes at it; which majority it increased afterwards, by the exclusion of the Turkish representatives. It was called to indorse some policy. That policy was either just or unjust. If just, then there was no need of a Conference to decide it, and no need of a majority to endorse it; for that which is just is determined by an eternal and universal Law, and commands respect by Divine Authority. But if unjust, then you were combining to do a Wrong to Turkey; and where you assemble to devise, you should have been content to denounce. The principle of British policy, which you had proclaimed as your policy, was the *status quo* or integrity of Turkish territory, and non-interference in Turkish affairs. You knew that your interests did not coincide with those of Russia; nay more, they were diametrically opposed to those of Russia; and yet you sent an Envoy who co-operated with Russia, and who made himself the bitter mouth-piece to enforce Russian demands. Then Russia backed out and made concessions, leaving England as the great enemy of Turkey; so that you quarrelled with your friend, without gaining the support of your enemy. You have lost England's *prestige* and General Consideration on the basis of justice; you have stripped her of Federative power, by abandoning her friends; and you have committed yourselves to Russia's unjust demands.

Perhaps you held that your "end justified the means."

What, then, was the end and aim of the Conference? To bring about a concert of the European Powers, said Lord Derby.\* To establish autonomous states was the end, said Lord Salisbury at the Conference. To make peace between Russia and the Porte, said both Lord Salisbury and Lord Derby. These ends are compatible only on the supposition that the six Powers had agreed to make Peace by the creation of autonomous states. This seems, indeed, to have been acknowledged by Sir Stafford Northcote on December 14, 1876, when he said that: The interest of England is peace; and that no peace can be solid, unless it rests upon solid arrangements for the better government of the Slav provinces of Turkey.

There was another end put forward, as the aim of the Conference, by Lord Derby on November 20, and by Lord Salisbury on November 30, and on January 12, 1877. Lord Derby's instructions to Lord Salisbury,† spoke of the six great Powers as "the *Mediating Powers*." That is Russia, Germany, Italy, Austria, France, and England, were to *mediate* between Russia and Turkey! *Quod est absurdum*; it is irrational. On Nov. 30, Lord Salisbury‡ wrote from Rome, the opinion of the Italian Government, which he thus reports:—

"His Excellency Melegari went on to express the opinion, upon which he insisted with much force, that *the action of the Powers ought not to be derived from or limited by the Treaty of Paris, but that their functions were rather those of mediators*, deriving their title simply from the events of the war and the acceptance of the Conference by the Porte. They ought, he considered, *to be unrestricted in their search for a solution*

\* II. of 1877. No. 924. Nov. 11.

† II. of 1877. Nov. 20, 1876. . . . ‡ II. of 1877. No. 29.

of the questions to be submitted to the Conference by any obligations imposed by that Treaty, and he was not prepared to admit that the Porte would be at liberty to reject any decision to which the Conference might come."

That is to say : the six Powers, including Russia, were to be called "Mediators," in order that they might be free from every Treaty engagement ; and so that the ablest representative amongst them (doubtless General Ignatiew) might devise the award, and procure the consent of his friends to it ; and then, discarding the character of mediators, they were to enforce the decision on the Porte ! The following is the account of the interview with Lord Salisbury, which Count Melegari himself gives in the Italian "Green-Book" :—

The Government of Italy, "from the interchange of communications had with the Imperial Cabinet, must necessarily acquire the conviction that if the occupation is not a resolution taken definitively and irrevocably by Russia, it is nevertheless considered by that Power as the best and perhaps the sole guarantee which Europe can give herself for the perfect performance of the deliberations about to be taken.. I found Lord Salisbury no less preoccupied than myself with the eventuality of not being able to eliminate from the discussion the project of occupation. . . . And as I had read in Prince Gortschakoff's despatch to Count Schouvaloff that the point of divergence between Russia and England consisted principally in the resolution attributed to the Cabinet of London of wishing to remain firm in seeking a mode of reconciling the intent which all now seek to reach with the literal provisions of the Treaty of 1856, I esteemed it opportune to cause my interlocutor to observe that the action of the Powers in the Conference about to be opened at Constantinople had not its

juridical basis in that Treaty, but in the *mediation* which each and every Government had assumed, and which Turkey had accepted. . . .

"The question, then, in my belief, is to establish among the Powers the clauses of a true and proper act of mediation, *which must be accepted* as well by Turkey as by the other belligerent parties, and which ought hence to have all the guarantees which are proper to acts of such a nature. Among these guarantees the most essential consists in *the power which the mediators can reserve to themselves of watching over the performance of the act of mediation in all its particulars.* Therefore if this idea were adopted the consequence would justly issue from it that *the Powers assembled at Constantinople would continue, either directly by means of the Conference or by means of appropriate delegates, to watch over the performance of their resolutions.*

"Lord Salisbury appeared to me to appreciate this our point of view, which, as you see, enables the Powers to adopt a line of conduct which, without derogating in its general lines from the tutelary principles which prevailed in 1856 at Paris, permits them to examine with perfect freedom of judgment what changes, according to the experience gained during the last twenty years, have been made in the situation of Turkey. Your Excellency understands well that whensoever the Plenipotentiaries of the six Governments, reunited in preliminary conference, shall declare their intention of undertaking an act of mediation pure and simple, the mode of proceeding in the negotiations ought to correspond to the aim desired to be reached. The consequence would arise that the preliminary conferences would acquire a much greater importance than perhaps it was originally intended to give them, since *it is natural that the act of*

*mediation ought to be elaborated in all its parts among the mediating powers alone previous to being proposed for the acceptance of Turkey."*

The "mediators," then, are to do something more than devise, in the absence of the Porte, a scheme contrary to the engagements and Treaties with the Porte; and then impose that scheme by force on the Porte. They are also to form a Permanent Cabinet or Committee of Foreigners for the Extra-national Government of an Independent Empire! This is not mediation between two disputants. Who ever heard of one of the disputants,—(and the one who was alone in fault),—pretending to judge in the dispute, and then enforcing the award on the other, who was not to be heard, until the Judge had put on the black cap and was proceeding to give his sentence? Through the whole proceeding it seems never to have occurred to Lord Salisbury to ask himself what he was doing? He was flattered by his Royal progress; he was bamboozled as he progressed; he uttered his fallacy to an astounded Sultan;\* he, with considerable satisfaction, reports his achievement to Lord Derby in these terms: "I stated to his Highness that the Representatives of England had been charged with the *duty of mediation*, and had made their utmost efforts to bring about a satisfactory arrangement." At last the poor Prodigal returns, "lean, rent, and beggared by the strumpet" Russia, and remembers (as we have already seen, at the end of Vol. II. of 1877) that the insurrection had been carefully sown and industriously fostered by Russia, and her Secret Societies, and her Imperial Consuls; that the Servian army had been officered by Russians, and had its ranks swelled by Russian artillerymen and Russian Cossacks; and that Russia was

\* II. of 1877. No. 220, p. 302.

beaten. Then Russia pretended to have been at peace, and called herself a "Mediator," and pretended to sit in judgment upon Turkey, who was not the culprit, but had merely defended herself against Russian machinations! All this while England assisted, instead of saying: "No; as you were one of the combatants, you also must stand at the bar, while we alone consider what judgment we in justice must pass." That would have been rational, although that also would have been contrary to Treaty and illegal. But a European Areopagus of the Six Powers is neither rational nor legal.

So then the End of the Conference was not good and the means were evil. On October 9\* Austria reiterated her objections to the Conference, and gave her reasons, and then mentioned her suspicions: "Is Turkey to be represented at the Conference? She is, let me tell you, an equal; she is free to reject anything we may agree to; besides, we can never agree to anything; we have irreconcileable differences of opinion; and we have no competency or right to decide anything behind the back of Turkey." Lord Derby could not answer this objection,† and said he must reserve his answer until he had gathered some opinions, or accepted some fallacies from other Powers. He wrote this to St. Petersburg. He had not to wait long. The very next day, October 10, the Russian ambassador called and said the Czar "insisted" on the exclusion of the Porte, on the ground that "it was undesirable" that Turkey "should be witness to the differences that may exist between the Powers;" and you know, my Lord, that we ought not to wash our dirty linen in Public! Enough, (thought Lord Derby), you have given me my cue, and supplied

\* I. of 1877. No. 552, p. 409.

† I. of 1877. No. 800.

me with a general proposition to defend my conduct. Then, carelessly :—

*“Count Schouvaloff suggested as one method of avoiding these difficulties, that the first sittings of the Conference should be held by the representatives of the six Powers merely, and that the Turkish Government should be invited to send a representative to take part in the discussion as soon as a definitive plan had been agreed upon, at all events in its broader features, which could be submitted to the consideration of the Porte.”*

The Russians had proposed Constantinople as the place of meeting for the members of the Conference. Our old and trusted ambassador on hearing of the scheme at once \* telegraphed as follows to Lord Derby :—

*“If a Conference is to end by decisions which are to be imposed upon the Porte, sufficient violence will be done to the feelings of the Turks as an independent nation without the additional humiliation of their being concerted by foreign Representatives in their own capital.*

*“General Ignatiew alluded to the proposed exclusion of a Turkish Representative from the Conference, and spoke of the possibility of overcoming the difficulties that he recognized in the adoption of a course so wholly contrary to international usage, by having a preliminary Conference between the Representatives, and when their projects were sufficiently matured, to have a full Conference, at which a Turkish Plenipotentiary should attend, rather, apparently, to be made acquainted with decisions that had been arrived at than to discuss measures of vital importance to the Empire.”*

Here was a difficulty for Lord Derby ! Never mind ; I will back out of it ; and he † telegraphed :—

\* I. of 1877. No. 845, p. 579. Oct. 20.

† I. of 1877. No. 749, p. 531. Oct. 23.

"Your telegram of the 20th instant has been received.

"I have to point out to your Excellency that I have never agreed to any Conference from which the Porte should be excluded; still less have I suggested such a course.

"Though I have mentioned Constantinople as the place where a Conference might be held, the question of locality remains quite open; and I have not pledged Her Majesty's Government to the selection of any particular place."

Another conversation with the Russian ambassador! Courage; I was all right before. Lord Derby sends a Circular despatch, on October 27, to all the British Embassies.\* It detailed, with becoming approval, that instructive conversation :—

"The Porte was not, he said, *required by Russia* to pronounce an opinion beforehand upon the systems of autonomy to be granted to the disturbed provinces, as they *would be defined at the Conference of the Six Powers.*"

It had evidently been reported to the Czar, that Lord Derby required encouragement, to prevent him from drawing back again, and to smother any awakenings of conscience. Hence † a telegram from Livadia, (where the Czar was staying), to urge the meeting of the Six Powers, without the Turkish representative. That afternoon there was another compunction. He wrote a second despatch ‡ to Lord A. Loftus, viz.: Then that would "make it undesirable that Constantinople should be the place of meeting." This was the day after the taking of Djunis, and the total defeat of the Russo-Servian army by the Turks. Lord Derby had doubtless received

\* I. of 1877. No. 781, p. 547.

† I of 1877. No. 799, p. 555.

‡ No. 800.

the news. The day following, October 31, the Turks took Alexinatz, and the Russian ultimatum was presented. On November 4 \* Lord Derby wrote a Circular to all our Embassies, in which he said :—

“ If the other Powers thought it advisable, Her Majesty’s Government would not object to their Plenipotentiaries joining in preliminary discussions with the Plenipotentiaries of the other five Guaranteeing Powers, before the opening of the Conference. These discussions, to be on the same bases as those proposed for the Conference.”

This was repeated to Prince Gortchakow, by Lord A. Loftus, on November 14.†

The bases, to which the Conference was to adhere, and which had already been agreed to, were given, in the same Circular, as follows :—

“ Her Majesty’s Government further submit as the basis for the deliberations of the Conference :—

“ 1. The independence, and the territorial integrity of the Ottoman Empire.

“ 2. A declaration that the Powers do not intend to seek for, and will not seek for, any territorial advantages, any exclusive influence, or any concession with regard to the commerce of their subjects, which those of every other nation may not equally obtain.

“ This declaration was made on September 17th, 1840, in the Protocol for the pacification of the Levant, and again, August 3rd, 1860, in regard to the pacification of Syria.

“ 3. The bases of pacification proposed to the Porte on the 21st of September, viz. :—

“ (a.) The *status quo*, speaking roughly, both as regards Servia and Montenegro.

\* I. of 1877. No. 873.

† I. of 1877. No. 1032, p. 708.

"(b.) That the Porte should simultaneously undertake, in a Protocol to be signed at Constantinople with the Representatives of the Mediating Powers, to grant to Bosnia and Herzegovina a system of local or administrative autonomy, by which is to be understood a system of local institutions which shall give the population some control over their own local affairs and guarantees against the exercise of arbitrary authority.

"There is to be no question of the creation of a tributary State.

"Guarantees of a similar kind to be also provided against mal-administration in Bulgaria. The reforms already agreed to by the Porte in the note addressed to the Representatives of the Powers on the 13th of February last, to be included in the administrative arrangements for Bosnia and the Herzegovina, and so far as they may be applicable for Bulgaria."

Every one of these bases was violated by the Conference, while "No. 3, b." was rejected by the Porte. This, however, is an anticipatory remark, which is made in order that we may observe how this result was brought about.

The Earl of Derby's instruction to Lord Salisbury \* gives the bases in exactly the same words, but adds :—

"These bases have met with general acceptance by the other Powers, and may therefore be considered as regulating the deliberations of the Conference and marking the limits within which its discussions should be confined."

The moment that the meeting of a Preliminary Conference had been secured, Prince Gortchakow proceeded to demolish the bases which were to limit the delibera-

\* II. of 1877. No. 1. Nov. 20, 1876.

tions. In his despatch \* to Count Schouvaloff which was given to Lord Derby, he says :—

“ It is necessary to escape from this vicious circle and to recognize that *the independence and integrity of Turkey must be subordinated to the guarantees demanded by humanity, the sentiments of Christian Europe, and the general peace.* . . . It is the right and *duty of Europe to dictate to her the conditions on which alone it can on its part consent to the maintenance of the political status quo created by that Treaty;* and since the Porte is incapable of fulfilling them, it is *the right and duty of Europe to substitute itself for her to the extent necessary to ensure their execution.”*

This sweeps away the first basis of the Conference,—the general principle of British policy. The second basis is overridden by the assertion of the right of Europe to substitute itself for the Porte, in the government of the Ottoman Empire. That is, the Extra-national Government of Turkey by a permanent Committee of foreigners. This may have staggered Lord Derby, if he thought about it. It is not, however, encouragement now that he wants ; we will play another card. He has not great moral courage ; let us try what terror can do. Prince Gortchakow, therefore, on Nov. 13,† wrote to Count Schouvaloff, a despatch which Lord Derby was to see : viz., The efforts of diplomacy to obtain real guarantees in favour of the Christians, have failed, therefore we have mobilized six army corps of 40,000 men each ; this is only a small part of the Russian army ; and the step is taken in the cause of “ humanity,” and for “ a general

\* I. of 1877. No. 1053. Nov. 7, 1876.

† I. of 1877. No. 1011.

peace." Moreover, the Russian sea-board on the Black Sea is now protected by earthworks and torpedoes.

In the meanwhile Sir H. Elliot seems horror-stricken at the easy pace of his superior. On Nov. 23 he asks :\* You have agreed to a Preliminary Conference ? The first question which arises is: what will "be the character to be given to the meetings " ? He continues thus :—

"I have informed your Lordship by telegraph of the fear entertained by Safvet Pasha that *resolutions might be adopted at those meetings to be merely submitted afterwards to the Conference* for its ratification.

*"This is, unquestionably, the aim of the Russian Ambassador, who would thus practically attain the original wish of his Government for a Conference of the Christian Powers, to decide upon arrangements to be imposed upon the Porte."*

Lord Derby, in his instructions to Lord Salisbury (Nov. 20), admits that the Porte "remonstrates strongly" against any proposal for autonomy, which Lord Salisbury said was the aim of the Conference ; and objected to the Conference on the ground that it was an interference in the internal affairs of Turkey, and an infringement of the Sovereignty and independence of the Porte, and would be an encouragement to fresh disorders. That is to say, the Conference is not only a violation of Treaties, but is in flagrant contradiction to the first basis of the Conference itself. On the 11th of Dec.† Lord Salisbury calmly informed Lord Derby that the third basis had been ignored by the proposal to cede territory to both Servia and Montenegro ; while the second basis had been thrown overboard, and no "declaration" had been made by the Powers. The Conference, therefore,

\* I. of 1877. No. 1083.

† II. of 1877. No. 82, p. 58.

completely and entirely gave the lie to its own basis! On the 14th of Dec.,\* Lord Salisbury, at the instance of General Ignatiew, telegraphed a proposal to overleap his instructions by admitting of foreign occupation,— Russian occupation, if Lord Derby did not object. Yet the English Cabinet † had given him these instructions :—

“It remains for me to state explicitly that Her Majesty’s Government *cannot countenance the introduction into the Conference of proposals*, however plausible or well-intentioned, which would bring foreign armies into Turkish territory in violation of the engagements by which the Guaranteeing Powers are solemnly bound.”

Certainly, the proposal had been “plausibly” and cunningly slipped in by General Ignatiew, with the air of a man who did not seem to care much about it,— rather disliked it than otherwise. Of course, however, the British Cabinet fired up and exploded at such a violation of their instructions? Not at all. On Dec. 18 ‡ Lord Derby telegraphed :—

“I have the honour to inform your Excellency that Her Majesty’s Government are ready to assent in principle to the plan proposed by the preliminary Conference, viz., local reforms, as stated in your telegram of the 17th instant, with a Commission of Supervision for one year, such Commission to be supported by an escort not exceeding 6,000 men at the utmost, to be drawn from some minor State, such as Belgium.”

On second thoughts Lord Derby said to himself: Our Envoy has violated every one of the bases of the Conference; he has overleaped his instructions; he has entered upon a scheme for the extra-national Government of Turkey; why should not I exceed him in daring,

\* II. of 1877. No. 57.      † II. of 1877. No. 1, p. 9.

‡ II. of 1877. No. 65.

and overleap the British Constitution, and establish an extra-national Government of England ? The foreign gentlemen there, want money to pay the foreign troops ? The British taxpayer shall give it on my commands and without the assent of Parliament :

“ If the Belgian scheme is adopted and adhered to, no difficulty will be made about the money advanced.”

The Preliminary Conference, that is the foreign Committee for the Government of Turkey, held their seventh and last sitting on Dec. 20th, when General Ignatiew declared that the programme of reforms for Turkey, which they had drawn up, was a “ *minimum irréductible*. ” On Dec. 21st the first meeting of the Conference took place ; and the six Powers presented their programme, and said to the Porte :—Your acceptance or your life ! No acceptance. Lord Salisbury tried the imperative mood : You must. Then the subjunctive : If you should not, we will use force. No acceptance. Then the optative : I wish you would. Turkey only scoffed at United Europe : “ Come and cut our throats,—if you can, but we won’t cut our own throats.” The Conference reduced the irreducible, and cheapened their demands. Still nothing but scoffs : Your wares are all Brummagem ; we will not barter our Sovereignty for your favour, you Cheap-Jacks ! You instigated our provinces to revolt, and winked at the sedition, and connived at their crime ; you broke your promise of 1867 ; and now you want to reward Servia when beaten, and hamper us in our reforms. You are betraying us. Friendship, you profess ; you insult us with a kiss of Judas. Now ! if you want our territory, come and take it. Then all the Envoys left amid curses, and execrations, and hisses of the populace. The sick man has overthrown a United Europe ! Your blandest persuasion failed, because its

fallacies were detected ; your menaces have been derided, because they had no terrors ; and you have recoiled from your threatened coercion.

Lord Salisbury, at the Conference,\* defended the appointment, by the European Government, of the International Commission which was to rule Turkey, on the ground that, if elected by the Turkish people, it "would be pushed forward by revolutionary ideas ;" therefore, said he, the Commission must be independent of the Porte, and be appointed by the Foreign Powers. This argument Lord Salisbury afterwards repeated at the same sitting. At the ninth sitting,† Lord Salisbury, in the following words, explained the intention of the six Powers of Europe ; namely, to establish a committee of foreign diplomatists, who were to rule the Government of the Ottoman Empire :

"I have already expressed my conviction that an elective Commission, if it were freely elected, would contain elements fatal to the authority of the Ottoman Government, adding the opinion that in the present state of Bulgaria a really free election, of a Commission *independent of the Government*, would be impossible. Now *the independence of the Commission* is the essential condition of its working effectively, without which it would *offer no guarantee* for the execution of the reforms that the Ottoman Government has promised.

"Her Britannic Majesty's Government, and all the other Governments, I am quite sure, will look with a lively sympathy upon the faithful execution of these reforms, not only in Bulgaria and Bosnia, but also in Epirus and Thessaly, and in the other parts of the Empire. But it was not to take note of the conciliatory intentions

\* II. of 1877. Sixth Protocol, p. 339.

† II. of 1877, p. 375. Jan. 8.

of the present Government, nor to record projects of improvement in the administration of the central power, that the Conference of the Powers has met at Constantinople. Its task is to establish administrative autonomy and effective guarantees against bad administration in the revolted provinces. As soon as a refusal to grant such guarantees has been duly recorded, its mission is completed, and its existence can no longer be prolonged."

## CHAPTER XIII.

## THE RESULTS OF THE CONFERENCE.

LORD DERBY had spoken\* of “the liberal and enlightened projects of reforms which had from time to time been promulgated at Constantinople,” and the assurance “that the Porte abides by all the engagements for reforms in the disaffected provinces.” On Sept. 28, Sir Henry Elliot † proposed that such reforms “should be adopted for the whole Empire;” but Lord Derby ‡ disavowed the ambassador, and said this “is certain to be regarded as inadmissible.” Again, § the Porte proposes to carry out, for the whole Empire, the fullest reforms that the Powers could desire. But Lord Derby cut the matter short : “It is useless to discuss the subject further ; the terms proposed to the Porte *had been settled and agreed to by the six Powers in concert*, and it was impossible now to attempt to modify them.” This was in October, before the Conference, that the fullest Reforms were refused without discussion, on the ground that the six Powers, irrespective of the Porte, would settle what should be done, and impose their will on the Porte.

What other reforms, then, were needed ? “Guarantees for good Government,” we were told. Now, a guarantee, or a security for good Government, means a restraint on

\* June 13, 1876. III. of 1876. No. 422.

+ I. of 1877. No. 433.                   ‡ I. of 1877. No. 484, p. 370.

§ Oct. I. of 1877. No. 475.

the ruling power,—a limitation on its independence or Sovereignty. A restraint may be *ab extra* by foreign Governments ; or *ab intra*, by fundamental laws and the people. That the Conference desired the former only, is proved by the fact that Midhat's Constitution did not satisfy their desires. Sir Stafford Northcote aimed at the same foreign coercion, for he said, in the House of Commons : “ Nobody can put the slightest confidence in a Constitution, of that kind, as a remedy for the evils we have to deal with. It is ridiculous to suppose that it can produce any sensible results, in the Christian provinces, *without ample guarantees* that their Government would be improved.” A Constitution is a voluntary limitation, by the Monarch, of his Sovereignty ;—a surrender of part of it in favour of his subjects. It consists of a system of cunningly devised checks on arbitrary power. Yet I allow that this may easily be made to give, under the form or cloak of freedom, a substance of despotism. Because it is more easy to rule despotically by means of a Parliament, as every “ limited monarchy,” or Constitutional Government demonstrates. This is, however, far pleasanter ; because the nation imagines itself free ; and everything is in the imagination. Persuade a nation that it is free, and it is contented. However good a Government may be, if the people think it is oppressed, it is unhappy. The best way to hoodwink a nation, is to let majorities choose representatives, who are few in number, and having been disciplined and told off into two parties, can easily be managed ; and so the nation is managed, while it says it is free.

The principles of Midhat's Constitution, however, were those of 1789,—Liberty, Equality, and Fraternity. The sick man was to be cured by a dose of arsenic. This

was brought about by the deposition of the Sultan. Yet the injury to Russia will be greater than the injury to Turkey, perhaps. Turkey falls like Hamlet, who first stabbed Laertes with his own poisoned rapier. The following is the Ottoman description of the Constitution,\* dated Dec. 26, 1876 :—

“ After the reading of the Imperial Hatt, His Highness the Grand Vizier, in an eloquent and vigorous speech, expressed the feelings of gratitude, of joy, and of just pride which animate the whole Ottoman people, and drew in the most noble and patriotic language a striking picture of the new institutions which will found in the Ottoman Empire *the reign of liberty, of justice, and of equality*; that is to say, *the triumph of civilization*. . . .

“ You will remark that the Constitution clearly proves that the new institutions, *far from having a theocratic character*, establish in the most formal manner that no religious prescription shall fetter the application of reforms and the establishment of a judicial and administrative state of things in accordance with the wants of the country and the principles of modern law. . . .

“ *The general principles of liberty and equality* proclaimed at the head of the Constitution, and which *are borrowed from the most liberal public European law*, constitute the true base of our great reform, and all the dispositions which follow are only in one way or another its natural consequence.

“ The definition of the prerogative principles of Sovereignty was the necessary completion of this declaration of principles, and the happy thought of placing the rights of the Imperial Dynasty under the guardianship of all, is a disposition which doubtless will convince Europe of *the truly democratic character of the Ottoman*

*social State.* Like the father who, whilst bidding his children share in the administration of their own interests, trusts himself to their love and their fidelity. . . .

"That which the Constitution proclaims is a new *régime*, based on the most complete administrative decentralization ; it is *the principle of election* scrupulously applied to the formation of all the Councils of the Vilayets, of the Sandjaks and of the Cazas ; it is the simultaneous development of *the autonomy of different communities*, including the Mussulman, for the management of their private interests, apart from the general interests of the country ; it is, in fact, *the creation of elected Municipal Councils carrying on the affairs of each commune of the Empire.*"

Another result of the Conference is, that we have written our own sentence. We have set up a mirror in Turkey, wherein we may see ourselves, if we are honest enough to look. For example : Lord Derby, in his Instructions to Lord Salisbury,\* said that the " Presidents of the Minor Courts should be Mussulman or non-Mussulman according to the population," and that "the jurisdiction over landed property should be removed from the Mussulman Courts, in cases in which non-Mussulmans are exclusively concerned, to non-Mussulman Courts." Lord Derby has laid down what is just for another state. Did he reflect for a moment, and take the trouble to frame for himself the Major Proposition which would cover the conclusion to which he has arrived ? Did he consider that "should," if it meant anything, denoted a duty ? If so he would have seen that the same major proposition was good for Ireland. Change "non-Mussulman" into Roman Catholic, and "Mussulman" into Protestant, and you will know the duty of a

\* II. of 1877. No. 1, p. 8.

Protestant government towards the Catholic population in Ireland, in respect to Petty Sessions Courts, and also to Quarter Sessions (so far as relates to questions concerning land). Lord Salisbury\* sneers at "the Chamber of Deputies established by the Constitution" because "the Mussulmans will necessarily have an overwhelming predominance." Could he not say the same with regard to our House of Commons and our House of Lords? They legislate for Catholic populations in Ireland; and yet the "Protestants have an overwhelming predominance." Mr. Gladstone at Taunton, on Jan. 27, amplified this argument:—

"Another artifice, of which you will no doubt hear, is this: you will be told to trust to the Turkish Constitution. Now, the Turkish Constitution is one of two things. It may be an imposture; but, it is not an imposture, it is something worse. What does the Turkish Constitution promise? and what will happen if it is fulfilled? Our complaint is this: that a small minority of Mahomedans exercise an unrestricted rule over a vast Christian majority in European Turkey; but although the Christians are a large majority in European Turkey, they are a minority in Turkey at large, and therefore the remedy that is proposed for the improvement of the condition of these Christians is that they shall be represented in an assembly where they will be a limited, and moreover a discouraged, and to some extent, I must say, in some cases even a debased Christian minority, in the face of a Mahomedan majority; and it is to this Mahomedan majority that we are invited to leave the task of doing justice to the subjects of the Porte."

Now read it again, substituting "Protestant" for

\* II. of 1877. No. 167. Jan. 4, 1877.

"Mahomedan," and "Catholic" for "Christian," and "Ireland" for "European Turkey," and "Great Britain and Ireland" for "Turkey at large." Lord Salisbury next proceeds to enumerate the guarantees which are necessary. The first is that the Powers should appoint Christian governors over Christian provinces. Should France and Spain, Austria and Italy not, on the same ground, appoint a Catholic Lord Lieutenant for Ireland, a Catholic Governor-general for Canada, and Catholic Governors for Jersey, Gibraltar, and Malta? What is sauce for the goose, is sauce for the gander. His second guarantee, or "second category of Reforms," is the admission of Christians to the armed forces of the country. The universal proposition which made him come to such a conclusion for Turkey, would have gone near to make him urge the raising of Catholic Volunteer regiments in Ireland.

A few lines up, I have quoted a passage from a speech of Mr. Gladstone's at Taunton, applying it to Ireland. Here is a passage from Mr. Gladstone's letter to Sir H. D. Wolff, dated March 23, 1877.\* I must again beg the reader to substitute "Ireland" for "European provinces of Turkey":—

"Within a few lines of your quotation, while commending the policy of Lord Stanley, I go on to supply the answer in the following words (of my speech of Feb., 1867):

"I cannot but hope that within the last year we have seen a step in advance in that policy, adopted not at the first moment, but after a brief delay—which it is not for us to complain of—in the case of the Danubian Principalities. The literal application of it may be im-

\* *Times*, March 26.

possible, but I hope that the principle acted upon in that instance may be adopted throughout the European Provinces of the Ottoman Porte.'

"It thus appears that, without insisting upon form or details, I, on the first opening of the Cretan question, recommended in 1867 the principle of an effective autonomy for all the European Provinces. This is just what I have done in 1876-7 for the Slav Provinces in particular."

Mr. Gladstone is certainly consistent, and clear in his principles, even when those principles are obscured by exuberance of verbiage and variety of details. Everyone remembers his promise to cut down the "three branches of the Upas-tree of Protestant ascendancy" in Ireland; and how he lopped off the land, and the Church, and tried to saw through the Educational branch. It was, on that occasion, warmly contested whether he said, or did not say, that "we should govern Ireland according to Irish ideas." In 1876, at all events,\* he used, in the House of Commons, the following words ;--

"There could not be a doubt that the Government intended to recognize the decision of the House and what they thought were the wishes of the Irish people in their substance. . . . For while we should recognize the general conviction and desire of the people of Ireland on the subject, he fully admitted that it was an important transition. . . . He was sure the right hon. gentleman would feel on political grounds that it was desirable to take out of the mouths of those who wish to show obstinate disregard and disrespect on the part of Parliament for the will, interest, and judgment of Ireland in matters properly Irish, any plea such as had to a certain extent been afforded by the fact that we did not give that

\* July 12.

regard to the wishes of the people of Ireland in a matter which, by our legislation for Scotland, we had shown that we considered to be one that might fairly be regarded as of local and not of Imperial interests. Apart from moral and social objects the question was very important indeed, whether, in subjects of a local as opposed to those of an Imperial character, we should give the same regard to the wishes of the people of Ireland as we did to the wishes of the people of England or of Scotland. This principle lay at the root of all sound policy and sound procedure in that House, and he should despair of maintaining permanently in a satisfactory manner the connexion between the two countries on its present footing unless we sincerely adopted and acted upon this principle."

Mr. Gladstone is therefore consistent in approving what Lord Salisbury said of Turkey. Lord Salisbury is inconsistent and illogical in refusing to apply to Ireland, that which he said of Turkey.

There are other principles which our Envoy warmly advocated and pressed on Turkey: the duty of making division by races. Such a division of administration has been called "Home Rule" by the Irish people: \* the restriction of the revenue to the use of the European Provinces of Turkey, and so forth. Did Lord Salisbury, before asserting that it was the duty of the Porte to make such changes, ask himself whether he was not morally bound to urge similar changes at home? I fear that he must now be haunted by a writing on the wall, wherever he goes, "*Mene, mene, tekel, upharsin,*"—Thou hast been weighed in the balance, and found wanting.

I subjoin an article from the *Times* of Dec. 26,

\* I have stated in the House that I do not concur in the fanciful additions to the Principle. I adhere to the old English Constitution.

1876, making substitutions where the words are in Italics :

"Let us suppose that the *British House of Commons* were to be freely elected—a supposition that will, we fear, bring a smile to the lips of French Prefects. Since it would be drawn from *England* and *Scotland* as well as from *Ireland*, the *Protestant* members would have an immense majority. Thus it would increase the chief evil which is destroying the *British Empire*—that religious animosity which, even in time of peace, keeps it in a state of suppressed civil war, and makes the interest of a religious sect take the place of patriotism. The *Protestant* members would be miracles of enlightenment and self-sacrifice if they were to insist that the *Catholics* should be treated as the equals of themselves. Not only would the strong prejudices of their sect and their race make them unwilling to elevate a despised and hated religion, but they might be pardoned if they should shrink from putting the weapons of legal, social, military, and ministerial equality into the hands of their hereditary foes. To do the *Protestants* justice, they have good reason to fear that their own lot would be unpleasant if the *Catholics* should gain supremacy. In *Ireland*, which is the most coveted part of the Empire, the *Protestants* are greatly out-numbered by their religious foes, and they are still as distinctively a garrison as they were three or four centuries ago. The sense of their peril is shown by their refusal to let the *Catholics* possess any warlike weapons, enter the police, or enlist in the army."

There is another result of the Conference, to which no allusion has ever been made. The vaunted arbitration by diplomatists, to settle the quarrels, and compose the evil passions of nations,—which is to banish gunpowder, and hammer swords into pruning-hooks,—has most

signally failed. Sir W. Harcourt spoke, indeed, of the Conference as a "Court of Arbitration," and of their programme as "an award." If so, this kind of arbitration is a failure. But diplomatists cannot form a court ; only a consultation of attorneys. Their proposals are not an award ; because it cannot be enforced except by the war which they are to avert. They come to no judgment, and regard no justice or law ; for each one is seeking after the selfish advantage of his own country. This kind of arbitration must always fail to prevent war. Sir W. Harcourt would not have called it an Areopagus or Court of Arbitration, had he not before his mind, the Extra-national Government of nations by a Committee of foreign Diplomatists, which Russia is seeking to establish, in order to get a universal Empire into her hands. So far indeed Russia has succeeded ; she has made all Europe present her ultimatum, or "irreducible minimum;" and so far she has herself been the Areopagus ; as she is now the Executive of Europe.

The proposals of the Conference, the ultimatum of Europe, rested on two principles. (1) The rebellious subjects were to be rewarded, while the peaceful, loyal subjects of the Sultan were to be passed over in silent contempt. Allegiance to the Sultan was put at a discount ; loyalty to a Secret Society and the Czar was run up to a premium. (2) The Sovereignty would, if the Porte had given way, have been shifted from the Porte to an *omnium gatherum* International Commission, leaving only the simulacrum and paraphernalia of royalty to the Sultan, and no vestige of real authority, except in his seraglio. Having accomplished this feat of Diplomacy, —injurious to every country except Russia,—the Envoys chaunted, if not a *Te Deum*, at least a *Domine dimitte nos in pace* ; and then war bursts out without delay.

In their dealings with the Porte, the European Powers have forgotten to consider the nation as a man. Or else they have shown a complete ignorance of the laws by which the human mind is governed. They treated the Turks as a jelly-fish or star-fish ; as something between the vegetable and animal creation ; or as “anti-human monsters,” as one Statesman called them ; as a something which, according to Darwin’s theory, has not yet been developed into an Earl ; and nothing below that is really a man, in Lord Beaconsfield’s eyes. He used to look on a county member as the lowest grade of the human species, and framed his Government of Dukes and county members. Now he has seen reason to look on Viscounts as below the limit of mankind. In the same way the Conference regarded the Turks as below the standard at which man begins ; and thought that, without fear, they might rule them with a rod of iron, and run no risk of wounding any human feeling. That is the explanation of their solicitude for “humanity,” compared with their treatment of the Turks. Right, and justice, and Treaties, and social principles are good enough for men ; but what have they to do with Mussulmans ?

The Ottoman Empire is like a rich widow, who is very ill, and is surrounded by doctors, who bawl out their remedies, and quarrel, each keeping an anxious eye upon her valuables, which they each intend to pocket as soon as the others look away. The homœopaths want to administer as little as possible ; the allopaths, as much as possible ; Lord Derby tries both systems alternately ; while Russia is for letting blood. But

“ The tampering world is subject to this curse,—  
To physic her disease into a worse.”

Whatever was done, was not calculated to bring about

peace, but to sow the seeds of future trouble; while Russia has always come out as the protector of the Christians, and therefore the true arbiter of peace and war. It is she who says when the Eastern Christians shall be satisfied, and what they are to do.

## CHAPTER XIV.

PERMANENT COUNCIL, OR EXTRANATIONAL GOVERNMENT  
OF EUROPE.

THE Preliminary Conference without the Turks, and the appointment of the International Commission, are the same in principle as the Conference *en permanence*, as proposed by the mouth of the Italians. The object was that it should settle the affairs of another State, over the heads of the Rulers of that State. If that can once be done for one State, it can be done for every State; and thus Universal Dominion is at once established. All nations become federated, by this means, under the Supreme Government of this Committee of Foreign Diplomatists; and all that is wanted is that all States should be Republics, in order to fulfil the dream of Mazzini,—viz., *l'Alleanza Repubblicana Universale*. The Holy Alliance was a league of Kings against peoples, and in favour of existing dynasties. The “International” is a league of Proletaires against Kings and Proprietors. Each of them is a menace to the independence of every State. The Treaty of Olmütz (Nov. 29, 1850) was a renewal of the Holy Alliance, after the Revolutions of 1848. The year 1862 saw the full inauguration of the International, after the events of 1859 and 1860.

On Jan. 19, 1877, the telegram from Vienna first informed me, to my horror, that a plan was entertained to

adjourn the Conference to Venice or another town, and to exclude Turkey from it. Nay, more ; the proposal was to maintain the Conference *en permanence*, so as to be ready to take advantage of circumstances as they might arise. Thus the freedom of every State was to be taken away, and every nation was, for an unlimited time, to be placed under the tutelage of foreign diplomatists !

Congresses always meddle with more subjects than they are appointed to consider. The Congress of Verona was appointed with regard to Italy ; it made a war on Spain. This Congress was held in consequence of the Congress of Laybach, which had made war on Naples. Again : the Congress of Paris was appointed to make peace with Russia ; it interfered, in favour of Russia, to take away the maritime power of naval states. In 1859, Cavour, Louis Napoleon, and Clarendon met in Conference, and they devised a war in Italy, which Napoleon carried out in obedience to the command : *Frappez vite, et frapper fort.* A Congress is a European Federation, in which the most astute Diplomatist really governs ;—or rather it is he who uses the Secret Societies in order to govern. It is a universal Dominion by uncrowned heads. Each representative in it—each member becomes a sort of Vice-Roy in his own country, and orders the policy of the cabinet. If patriotism offers resistance to the Congress,—in support of the national and legal Government,—then that patriotic resistance becomes a Revolution and a crime.

Count Beust's Circular of Feb. 5, 1867, was the first document, as far as I know, which made such a proposal :—

“ We came to a decision to put forward this opinion only after having acquired the certitude that it wa

shared in by France and England. . . . If, accepting our ideas, the Guaranteeing Courts should meet in Conference to occupy themselves with the Oriental questions, it would perhaps be preferable not to invite the Ottoman Government to take part in their preparations. . . . It is impossible not to perceive that the participation of an Ottoman Plenipotentiary in these discussions . . . would only compromise their success."

In the present case \* it was Italy which was got to put forward the idea. Lord Derby thus narrates the circumstance :—

"The French Ambassador called upon me this afternoon wishing to know, on behalf of his Government, what answer I was prepared to give to the proposal put forward by Italy that, in the event of Turkey refusing the proposals of the Conference, the Representatives should not separate, but leave Constantinople, and hold their meetings in some place outside the Turkish dominions.

"I said that I had not heard the idea discussed until yesterday, nor did I know what was likely to be thought of it by the Powers generally."

It appears that Lord Derby had the day before received this very proposal from the Italian Government.† He thus mentions the matter :—

"The Italian Ambassador called upon me this afternoon and strongly urged upon me, on behalf of his Government, the proposal which he had mentioned to me two days ago, that in the event of the Conference at Constantinople breaking up, the Plenipotentiaries of the six Powers should resume their deliberations at some place out of the Turkish dominions."

\* II. of 1877. No. 127, p. 136. Jan. 3.

† II. of 1877. No. 132, p. 139. Jan. 4.

The Italian Ambassador at Vienna, had also made the same proposal at that Court,\* and also at Berlin,† and at Paris.‡ The proposal fell through, not so much from horror at the tremendous despotism it would inaugurate, as because no one would pay any attention to it at the time. Yet the scheme has not been withdrawn.

When the Conference was about to fail,§ Lord Derby telegraphed that the British Government had decided, that it was most desirable that no identic note or Protocol should be signed, "embodying the results of the preliminary meetings." Also,|| Lord Salisbury was to be careful to avoid every "appearance of menace," or any "language that can be construed as pledging Her Majesty's Government to enforce the proposals of the Conference."

At the Conference, the Russian Ambassador had pretended to make numerous concessions; but had never given up the three points which would be destructive of the Independent Sovereignty of the Porte, by putting over the Sultan an Extranational Government. On the 19th of January ¶ Prince Gortchakow sent his circular to all the six Powers. It contains the following phrases:—

"The Imperial Cabinet has from the outset considered this question as an European one, which should not and cannot be solved but by the unanimous agreement of the Great Powers. . . .

"This Conference arrived during its *preliminary meetings* at a complete understanding, both as to the conditions of peace and as to the reforms to be intro-

\* II. of 1877. No. 181, p. 257.

† II. of 1877. No. 145, p. 181.

‡ II. of 1877. No. 185, p. 259.

§ II. of 1877. No. 147. Jan. 8.

|| II. of 1877. No. 188. Jan. 13.

¶ VIII. of 1877. No. 1.

duced. The result was *communicated to the Porte as the fixed and unanimous wish of Europe*, and met with an obstinate refusal. . . .

"Thus, after more than a year of diplomatic efforts attesting the importance attached by the Great Powers to the pacification of the East, *the right which they have, in view of the common welfare, to assure that pacification, and their firm determination to bring it about*, the Cabinets again find themselves in the same position as at the commencement of this crisis, which has been moreover aggravated by bloodshed, heated passions, accumulated ruin, and the prospect of an indefinite prolongation of the deplorable state of things. . . . *The Eastern question has become aggravated.* . . .

"The object held in view by the Great Powers was clearly defined by the proceedings of the Conference.

"The refusal of the Turkish Government threatens both the dignity and the tranquillity of Europe.

"It is necessary for us to know what the Cabinets, with whom we have hitherto acted in common, propose to do with a view of meeting this refusal, and *insuring the execution of their wishes.*"

This Circular assumes that there were more grounds of interference in 1877 than in 1876 ; it asserts that the six Powers of Europe had tried to impose their regulations on the Porte ; it points distinctly to an Extra-national Government of the Ottoman Empire, and it calls on the six Powers to become, not only European Legislators and Judges, but a supreme Executive also. Sovereignty consists of three parts : - the Judicial, Legislative, and Executive Powers. All these, Prince Gortchakow called upon a Committee of foreign Diplomatists to exercise. That Committee would be the Sovereign of Europe.

Then came the proposal to sign an identic note, a Protocol of the joint demands on Turkey (which Lord Derby and the British Cabinet had said "was to be by all means avoided"). It was an ultimatum to be presented to Turkey by "United Europe;" and, of course, it was an admission, by all Europe, of the justice of Russia's demands. It was, therefore, an annihilation of the Treaty of March, 1856, and of the Tripartite Treaty of April, 1856. Lord Derby then writes:—\*

"Her Majesty's Government agree in principle to such Protocol, provided they could come to an understanding as to its terms."

What was the principle laid before Lord Derby and the Cabinet? It is to be presumed that they had not before them the draft Protocol itself; but they knew at least what the Russian Ambassador had told them of it; for Lord Derby rehearsed it in the letter to Lord A. Loftus, from which the above quotation has been taken.

"The Protocol would contain no more than *the principles* upon which the several Governments *would have based their reply to the Russian Circular*. It would be desirable that it should affirm that the present state of affairs was one which *concerned the whole of Europe*."

It appears that the Russian Ambassador was aware, by confidential communications, of the replies to the Gortchakow Circular, which the several Governments "would" have made. The Gortchakow Circular was dated January 19, 1877, and the Russian Ambassador was ordered to leave a copy, at once, with Lord Derby. Lord Derby states that a copy was left with him on Feb. 5th (seventeen days after).† On the 14th of February

\* VIII. of 1877. No. 5. Earl of Derby. March 13, 1877.

† No. 2 in VIII. of 1877. Lord Derby. Feb. 15, 1877.

the Russian Ambassador called to get his answer.\* Lord Derby gives this account of the answer :—

“ I said that since that Circular was written, circumstances had changed, and that Her Majesty’s Government, after giving it their best consideration, with an earnest desire to meet the views of His Imperial Majesty the Emperor in a friendly and conciliatory spirit, had determined that it would be better to *defer their reply to it until events should have developed themselves*, and it was seen what was the effect of the recent change of Government at Constantinople, both in reference to the administrative reforms which had been promised, and the negotiations for peace now pending between the Porte and Servia and Montenegro.”

On March 13, 1877, he gives, however, this account, —and in reading it, we must bear in mind that the Russians knew the answers of the several Governments :

“ The Governments of the other Powers were at this moment preparing their answers to the Russian Circular. *The Russian Government* would not express any opinion by anticipation on these replies, but they *foresaw in them the possibility of a great danger*. For if the replies were not identical, what would be the position of the Imperial Cabinet ? *The agreement of the Powers, so fortunately established at the Conference, might be broken up* in consequence of the shades of opinion manifested in the replies of the several Cabinets ; would not that be a determining cause to induce Russia to seek for a solution, either by means of a direct understanding with the Porte, or by force of arms ? ” (The danger to be apprehended was a wrecking of the scheme for the Extraterritorial Government of the Ottoman Empire.)

“ Under these circumstances it appears to the Russian

\* “ 14th ult.” is a misprint.

Government that the most practical solution, and the one best fitted to secure the maintenance of general peace, would be the signature by the Powers of a Protocol which should, so to speak, terminate the incident."

But to return to the "principle" of the Protocol, to which our Government agreed :—Lord Derby learns that, for an indefinite time, all the Governments of Europe were to "watch" and judge how the Porte was fulfilling its supposed promises regarding its internal affairs. A European Areopagus established for all time! An extra-national government of Turkey, which would soon be applied to other powers also! A virtual abrogation of all treaties, seeing that the Treaty of Paris, which now stood in the way of this European cabinet which is to rule sovereigns, is to go down before it! This is the account which Lord Derby gives :—\*

"As a period of some months would not be sufficient to accomplish these reforms, it would be preferable not to fix any precise limit of time. It would rest with all the Powers to determine by general agreement whether Turkey was progressing in a satisfactory manner in her work of regeneration.

"The Protocol should mention that *Europe will continue to watch the progressive execution of the reforms by means of their Diplomatic Representatives.*

"If the hopes of the Powers should once more be disappointed, and the condition of the Christian subjects of the Sultan should not be improved, the Powers would reserve to themselves to consider in common THE ACTION which they would deem indispensable to secure the well-being of the Christian population of Turkey, and the interests of the general peace.

"Count Schouvaloff hoped that I should appreciate

\* March 13, 1877, in VIII. of 1877.

the moderate and conciliatory spirit which actuated his Government in this expression of their views. They seemed to him to contain nothing incompatible with the principles on which the policy of England was based, and their application would secure the maintenance of general peace."

The Protocol of March 31\* is a logical sequence to the proposal for a permanent Conference ; just as the proposal for a permanent Conference followed naturally from the Preliminary Conference. The Protocol carries with it and establishes the proposal for a permanent Conference, or European Areopagus, without a Turkish representative, and over the head of the Porte, to judge, to decide, to manage the internal affairs of the Ottoman Empire. What is now attempted to be done for Turkey (*experimentum fit in corpore vili*) will soon be extended in operation to the whole of Europe.

Now, it is the left leg forward ; next, the right leg will advance ; while Russia always progresses towards an Extranational Government of Europe by a Cabinet of Ambassadors, who are to dictate to sovereigns, and have their decrees carried out by national Cabinets. That is Universal dominion, on the ruins of monarchies, and cataclysm of states.

The Protocol begins with,—we will hope,—a lie ; and every minister who signed it, has,—we trust,—put his hand to a falsehood. For if a joint undertaking had been made, then the Extranational Government had already been established. Thus it begins :—

"The Powers who have undertaken in common the pacification of the East, and have with that view taken part in the Conference of Constantinople, recognize that the surest means of attaining the object, which they have proposed to themselves, &c.

"As regards Montenegro, the Powers consider the rectification of the frontiers and the free navigation of the Bojana to be desirable in the interest of a solid and durable arrangement."

As soon as the Protocol was signed, Montenegro raised her demands, at Russia's bidding, and asked for that which they knew the Porte could not concede. They had acquired an European ultimatum,—a judgment of the European Areopagus,—to back them.

The next point was to make the Turks disarm in the face of the "500,000" Russian soldiers on her frontier, while Russia was not even "invited" to demobilize. The Thug asks the wayfarer to trust to him, and to seat himself on the grass and cross his arms behind him, and look up and count seven stars, so as to learn his fate. A sharp knife across his throat speaks his destiny. These are the words:—

"They invite the Porte to consolidate the peace by replacing its armies on a peace footing, excepting the number of troops indispensable for the maintenance of order, and by putting in hand with the least possible delay the reforms necessary for the tranquillity and well-being of the Provinces, the condition of which was discussed at the Conference. They recognize that the Porte has declared itself ready to realize an important portion of them."

The next point was the establishment of the European Arcopagus, consisting of ambassadors, and *agents non avoués*, who are to "watch carefully." A compound of a police force and a staff of detectives! What are they to watch? to see how Turkey fulfils her promises. This court of detectives, mark you, is not established for a term of years, but for ever:—

"The Powers propose to *watch* carefully, by means of

their representatives at Constantinople and their local agents, *the manner in which the promises of the Ottoman Government are carried into effect.*"

This court of ambassadors and detectives of the powers are also to be the judges who are to decide whether the supposed promises are adequately fulfilled, so as to "prevent the return of the periodical complications" which Russia has always been busy in stirring up by her intrigues.

The Powers now are called upon to admit, and have admitted, that the complications were caused by abuses in Turkish rule ; and that the European Areopagus is the proper remedy for it ; and that the Treaty of Paris is as if it had not been ; because interference by force between the Sultan and his subjects is at once to take place with the sanction of "United Europe." The last paragraph of the Protocol is in these terms :—

"If their hopes should once more be disappointed, and if the condition of the Christian subjects of the Sultan should not be improved in a manner to prevent the return of the complications which periodically disturb the peace of the East, they think it right to declare that *such a state of affairs would be incompatible with their interests and those of Europe in general.* In such case they reserve to themselves to consider in common as to the 'means' which they may deem best fitted to secure the well-being of the Christian populations and the interests of the general peace."

Compare that paragraph with this passage in the Berlin Memorandum :—

"If, however, the Armistice were to expire without the efforts of the Powers being successful in attaining the end they have in view, *the three Imperial Courts are of opinion that it would become necessary to supplement*

*their diplomatic action by the sanction of an agreement with a view to such efficacious measures as might appear to be demanded, in the interest of general peace, to check the evil, and prevent its development."*

Yet Lord Derby peremptorily rejected the Berlin Memorandum, and accepted the Protocol! So much for the Alpha and Omega of the Protocol, and of the whole lengthy line of these three years of diplomatic intrigues! The universal dominion of Europe was the aim of the Conspiracy.

That is the Protocol of which Lord Derby wrote on April 2\* to our Chargé d'Affaires at Constantinople—the Hon. Strange Jocelyn :—

"I added that you should also communicate them to the Turkish Minister for Foreign Affairs, and point out that the Protocol, as now signed, *contains nothing to which the Porte could reasonably object.*"

We must not forget the "declarations" of those conspirators against European liberties. The Russians imposed certain preliminary and impossible conditions :—

1. Peace must be made with Montenegro.
2. The Porte must accept the programme of the Conference, and the Protocol.
3. The disarmament of the Turks must be carried out in face of 500,000 Russian soldiers.
4. The execution of the so-called Reforms must be completed.

These having been fulfilled, Turkey will be permitted, by Russia, to send a special envoy to the foot of the throne of Czardom, to sue humbly for peace ; while the Russians, on the other hand, are not to honour the Porte by accrediting an agent to Constantinople. At the same

\* VIII. of 1877. No. 8.

time, the Czar reminded the naughty boy of the crime which had been committed by a big boy, whom Europe trusts and supports. The Czar said :—“Take care we hear no more of Bulgarian massacres (which Russian agents will take care to produce *ad libitum*), for, in that case, you, having demobilized, shall be crushed by our 500,000 men.” Here it is in diplomatic language :—

“Count Schouvaloff made the following declaration, placing, at the same time, a *pro-memoria* of it in the hands of Her Britannic Majesty’s Secretary of State :—

“*If peace with Montenegro is concluded, and the Porte accepts the advice of Europe and shows itself ready to replace its forces on a peace footing, and seriously to undertake the reforms mentioned in the Protocol, let it send to St. Petersburg a Special Envoy to treat of disarmament*, to which his Majesty the Emperor would also on his part consent.

“*If massacres similar to those which have stained Bulgaria with blood take place, this would necessarily put a stop to the measures of demobilization.*”

Lord Derby then made his declaration. It affirmed two propositions : which, next morning, must have lain heavy on his conscience : (1) That he had sought only peace, and not the phantom called “amelioration of the Christian subjects ;” (2) that there had been war up to that time (for he speaks of peace being attained between Russia and Turkey). His declaration also imposes two conditions to the validity of the Protocol : (1) That both Russia and Turkey shall disarm at some future time ; (2) that peace shall be concluded. Then, says he, if these objects shall have been attained, there shall be a European Areopagus, and all the Powers shall watch Turkey, and shall interfere by force in her concerns. The slanderous affirmation in the Protocol, remains, however,

even if the conditions should not be fulfilled, and the Protocol should become invalid. This is his declaration :—

“ Inasmuch as it is *solely in the interests of European peace* that Her Britannic Majesty’s Government have consented to sign the Protocol proposed by that of Russia, it is understood beforehand that, in the event of the object proposed not being attained—namely, reciprocal disarmament on the part of Russia and Turkey, and *peace between them*—the Protocol in question shall be regarded as null and void.

“ *London, March 31, 1877.*

“ (Signed)      DERBY.”

Italy declared that she should be bound by the Protocol as long as the European Arcopagus, which is called the “agreement between the Powers,” should last. The “Powers” had evidently, up to that moment, not been in accord ; they, like Herod and Pilate, had made friends over the Arcopagus.

Lastly : the scope of the Protocol was : that the Powers should *take further Counsel* what they should do. As soon as it had been signed, there was—not Counsel, but a declaration of war.

The world was naturally very curious to know why Lord Derby should put his hand to this ruinous instrument. On the 13th of April, the House of Commons heard the explanation of the Chancellor of the Exchequer :—

“ The Conference might have been far more successful than it actually was if it had not been that the presence of the Russian Army and the attitude which the Russian Army maintained during the negotiations, complicated the position and made it the more difficult for

Turkey to give way. . . . It was evident that the position of the Russian Army, which was a cause of difficulty during the Conference, would continue to be a cause of difficulty. What happened? Russia came forward, after having put this question, which would not and could not be conveniently answered, and which it was not desired by Russia should be answered, and she told us what would be sufficient. She said, 'If these proposals cannot be accepted you may at least put matters on a footing which will be sufficiently satisfactory, and which will show sufficient evidence of progress to enable me with honour to disband my troops.' We have heard all about 'this wretched Protocol,' and every expression of contempt has been heaped upon it. But allow me to remind the House that the Protocol is not the invention of the British Government; it is the proposal of the Russian Government. . . . What was done was that the Declaration was arranged by Russia before any was made by Lord Derby. It is perfectly obvious. For what was the position? Russia having her troops under arms comes forward, and says, 'If you will sign this Protocol we will be prepared to take the step of disarmament.' The Declaration, though not part of the Protocol, is of equal authority as showing the intention of Russia and what the considerations were which induced us to sign the Protocol in the hope that it would be a step to the reciprocal disarmament of Russia and Turkey, and thereby conjuring away the danger of war. That is the simple explanation of the position, and we believed that if the danger could be conjured away even for a year or less than a year it would form a breathing time and opportunity of pressing on the Porte those measures which were more or less concerted and agreed upon at the

Conference as measures which would be likely to bring about the better Government of Turkey. That is the simple explanation of the case, and I think there is nothing in it which can be considered derogatory to the character of England."

In the very "simple explanation" of the Leader of the House, we find four important facts : (1.) It was the mobilisation of the Russian troops which caused the Conference to fail. The failure is therefore due to the deliberate act of Russia. (2.) The continued presence of the Russian troops on the frontier, made every other attempt become abortive. (3.) Russia procured the signatures to the Protocol on a false pretence, viz. : by promising that she would at once demobilise her troops. (4.) The Protocol, doomed to failure by Russia, was the invention of Russia. Her aim, consequently, was not in the efficaciousness of the Protocol towards peace, but in its committal of all the Powers to the Propositions contained in it.

Lord Derby gave his explanation three days after :—

"The Russian Government asked us to sign a document of this nature, giving as their reason that they were anxious to disarm, but that it was impossible for them to do so, or to appear to retreat in the face of Turkey, unless they had something to show that in the action they took they had the support of Europe. The Russian Government asked us to sign this Protocol, so as to give them, as they said, an excuse for demobilisation."

Lord Derby corroborated the four facts of Sir Stafford Northcote, and added a fifth : Russia asked for the Protocol, because she wanted to deceive the Russian people with it, and make them think that the Czar had the support of Europe and had achieved a substantial victory

enough to make up for all the expenditure. Lord Derby was *particeps criminis* in this alleged act of deception. The Board of Directors published a fraudulent *Prospectus*.

In 1826, Mr. Canning wavered between Turkey and Russia, as Lord Derby has, for two years, been swinging, on his Trapèze, between these two policies. In March, Mr. Canning signed a Protocol, as in March Lord Derby signed his. To Mr. Canning's astonishment, he found out, when too late, that the 3rd clause bound the contracting parties to seize every opportunity, collectively or separately, to cause the Porte to submit to the arrangements which had been made for "the Pacification of Greece." Mr. Canning's error was accordingly an addition to the General Consideration, on the basis of fear, concerning Russia. She became a first-rate Power, although not really strong. Russia then determined on separate action, and England allied herself with Russia "in order to restrain her" (*absit omen*). Hence the disastrous victory of Navarino. Mr. Canning's vanity had also been flattered into professing a strong sympathy for the Greek "Christians," which they certainly did not deserve. He thus involved himself in the political puzzle: how to help the Christians, in virtue of his expressed sympathies, while he preserved the Independence and integrity of Turkey, which was in accordance with his policy, or rather, required by his sense of honour. Was this a parallel case? But children never learn through the experience of their fathers. Russia, a few days after signing the Protocol, committed an act of war, in crossing the frontiers. She then issued a declaration of war, before the ink on the Protocol had time to dry; and she has shot down Turks before Lord Derby has recovered his astonishment. She says she

is defending the cause of Europe! The European Areopagus has commissioned her to execute its will! and the Protocol turns out to be a European ultimatum, which was duly presented to the Porte, and not accepted within the twenty-four hours' grace which were allowed! Thus says the Czar's war-manifesto of April 24:—

“Desiring to try every possible means of conciliation in order to persuade the Porte, we proposed to the other Cabinets to frame a special Protocol, comprising the essential conditions laid down by the Conference, and to invite the Porte to share in this International act, tracing the extreme limits of our pacific demands. Our expectation, however, has not been realized. The Porte has not deferred to the unanimous will of Christian Europe; it has not assented to the conclusions of the Protocol. Having thus exhausted all pacific efforts, the haughty obstinacy of the Porte obliges us to proceed to more decisive acts.”

The following is Prince Gortchakow's circular to all Foreign Courts, of the same day:—

“The Protocol signed in London on the 31st of March in this year has been the last expression of the united wishes of Europe. . . . In formulating the wishes and decisions of Europe the Protocol had confined itself to a stipulation that in case the Great Powers should be deceived in their hope of seeing the Porte energetically adopt the measures destined to improve the condition of the Christian populations—measures unanimously recognized as indispensable to the tranquillity of Europe—they reserve to themselves the right of consulting together as to the means most suitable for insuring the well-being of these populations and the interests of the general peace.

" Thus the Cabinets had taken thought of the contingency that the Porte should not fulfil the promises which it had made, but not that the Porte should reject the demands of Europe. . . . The refusal of the Porte, and the motives upon which this refusal is founded, leave no ground for hoping that she will now defer to the wishes and advice of Europe, and afford no guarantee for the adoption of reforms suggested for the improvement of the condition of the Christian subjects of the Porte."

It is easy to sum up, in one sentence, the cause of the present war :—The Porte will not admit of an Extra-national Government ; or : Turkey will defend her liberties and those of Europe.

The *Vienna Times* Correspondent (April 4) writing in admiration of "the simple, homely outpouring of a member from Kurdistan" in the Ottoman Parliament, said that he "carried the House with him to such an extent that the President had some trouble to calm the excitement. . . . This patriotic feeling seems to have been the predominant one." The following is all that is given of the speech :—

" You talk of misery, and yet I see brilliant uniforms, luxurious palaces, and many elegant carriages in Constantinople ! Come to our Province if you really want to know what misery means. I myself, like most of the people in my Province, go about in rags, and it was only by a great effort and sacrifice that I have been able to get this coat to appear decently among you, and still, I am ready to give up this coat and resume my old rags in order to fight for the existence and honour of my country. No one has a right to interfere with our own domestic affairs, and we Ottomans protest solemnly against such interference by any foreign Power."

On which side shall British feeling be ranged, on the side of Gortchakow, Salisbury, Derby and the Cossack party, or on the side of this brave member from Kurdistan? To which side does British honour drive us? To which do our interests lead us? Shall we support the scheme for establishing an Extranational Government of Europe, or shall we fight to preserve our liberties? Shall we declare ourselves accomplices in lawlessness, or the supporters of Law? \*

\* Although it does not form part of the Eastern Question, yet I cannot forbear noticing the following matter as an illustration of the attempt at universal dominion. An endeavour has been made, under the Extradition Treaties, to get a man given up on some trumped-up criminal charge and then to try him on another charge (*e.g.* disobedience to some unjust law of the State). Thus a bishop escapes to Rome, and his extradition is demanded by Germany on a false charge, *viz.*, that he had misappropriated Church funds belonging to a parish, or to his diocese. When seized, he is cast into prison because he had suspended a priest, without the sanction of the civil courts (which is a violation of the Falk laws). He says that he is bound to do so, by his duty as bishop; and that his jurisdiction comes from the Pope. The German Government, on the contrary, aver that all jurisdiction, even in Church matters, comes from the Emperor. Be that as it may, the attempt is being made, under the Extradition Treaties, to extend the jurisdiction of Caesar all over the world. If this is allowed, no man will be safe, in any corner of the world, from religious persecution. The liberties of mankind will be most seriously and extensively menaced.

## CHAPTER XV.

## FEDERAL UNION OF NATIONS.

THE Equilibrium of the States of Europe is gone. One gigantic Power, now towering above the rest, has shown its character to be duplicity, hypocrisy, and falsehood. She is greedy of victory ; regardless of right. She swallows up small States by fraud, and wades through blood to universal Dominion.

The social Equilibrium, between Rulers and peoples, is also gone. Because law is everywhere ignored ; the sense of right has faded from men's hearts, and authority and respect are ideas of a bygone age.

By the word Equilibrium is designated the rest of a system of counterbalancing weights, and security from disturbances that arise from without. Is there any Equilibrium now ? Is there any security ? If Russia, when weak, grasped successfully at power and wealth ; what guarantee for peace is there, now that she is strong ? She claims to found the great Empire of the Slavonic race, which spreads its dwellings from the Elbe almost to the Himalayas, and from the gelid sea of the north, to the sultry Persian gulph. A Panslavonic Empire of 550,000,000 souls with its centre in Constantinople ! What Chaldaean irruptions may it not make into Europe,—“that bitter and hasty nation, which shall march through the breadth of the land, to possess the dwelling-places that are not their's. They

are terrible and dreadful: their judgment and their dignity shall proceed of themselves. Their horses also are swifter than the leopards, and are more fierce than the evening wolves: and their horsemen shall spread themselves, and their horsemen shall come from far; they shall fly as the eagle that hasteth to eat. They shall come all for violence."\* That is impending; and nations are becoming armies, supplying their blood and gold, because of the rapacity of one Government. This will not avail! Without firing a shot, or calling out a man, the Extrnational Cabinet may decree the destruction of any nation; and the Government of that nation itself will be the instrument for carrying that decree into execution.

Even if we look at the social condition of every nation in Europe, we shall find the same character pervading it. There is a want of Social Equilibrium in every state. The war between nations is nothing to the war of those who have not, and do not enjoy life, against those who have, and do enjoy every pleasure. Why is there this antagonism? Because there is no sense of right in any breast, and no authority, spiritual or temporal, is respected. Men do not live under law. They are lawless. The bases of public order have been undermined by the middle classes; and the working classes take advantage of the confusion. The anarchy of opinions is not their making, but their vantage ground.

If it be our aim to maintain harmonious relations between the various States of Europe, we shall find that it can be attained only by a supreme jurisdiction over them, to unite, or federate them in one. We seek to bring about a unity,—to form a society of nations. We not only desire to prevent actual war from occurring;

\* Habakkuk, i. 6-10.

we would also get rid of the ruinous rivalry in armaments, and the burdensome increase of the means of destruction, which is now the policy of every Government. Our object is not only Peace, but also a security that peace shall not be disturbed.

How, then, is a unity among nations, or a Federative union of nations to be brought about? A principle, or law of unity, and a centre of unity are essential,—or, in other words, a supreme authority over the whole is necessary to every social unity. Where, then, shall this supreme authority, over all the nations of Christendom, be found?

Mazzini's aim was to frame a European union of a republican character, which he called the *Alleanza Repubblicana Universale*. He desired two things: (1.) that every State should become a Republic; and (2.) that these Republics should form a unity, by being federated under the Supreme authority of one central cabinet or Congress. This supreme cabinet of the agents of all nations, would be such an Extranational Government of European States, as that to which I have already drawn attention. That was Mazzini's idea of unity. That was Mazzini's way of putting an end to rivalry and war.

The aim of the "International Society" is twofold: (1.) Every nation is to be broken up into "Communes," or little village republics, which are to determine for themselves all local matters. Small bodies are to enjoy the most extended powers of self-government. (2.) All these Communes are to be federated, or united together, by being placed under the authority of a Central Government, whose only function is to declare the general principles of laws,—such, in fact, as the Privy Council of England before the Revolution.

Each of these schemes aims at the unity of Europe. Each proposes, as the means of unity, the Government of Europe by a central Cabinet. A central Cabinet is to govern. It is to be a Sovereign body. It is to be supreme. That is to say: it is, in the last resort, to have the supreme Legislative, Judicial, and Executive functions; and all those functions in local bodies, are to be in subordination to those of the supreme Cabinet. In other words: there is to be no escape from the legislation, and no appeal from the decisions and acts of the central Government. Its decisions are to be irreformable, or, for all practicable purposes, infallible. For, if there were an appeal, then the Sovereignty would lie in that body to which the appeal is made. The Supreme Government would really be vested in that body; while the body from which appeal is made, would exercise only ministerial, vicarial, or vice-regal functions. It would be merely an agent or instrument of Government.

The judgments, therefore, of that body which is to be the centre of unity, the sovereign body, or the government of the civilized world, must be without appeal, irreformable, and practically, although not really, infallible. That is to say: the whole civilized world becomes a monarchy, under an absolute sovereign, or many-headed despot. The Cabinet, or centre of unity, is the despot.

"No (says Mazzini), it must be a republic." Let us consider whether that can be. By "a republic," he meant a country ruled by a small body of men, who, by some means, have attained to that position, and who style themselves "the Republican Government." Every government must, of course, be a unity. For, without unity, there is anarchy, or no government. In a real

Republic, the unity consists of a small body of men (*e.g.*, a village community) who all take part in managing their own affairs. But the so-called " Republic " of Rome (that is, two-thirds of the known world) was, in reality, an absolute monarchy, whose sovereign was on the Forum. A Republic is necessarily very small. Otherwise the real ruler is an absolute monarch, consisting of a committee, and the so-called " Republic " is a monarchy. Except where there are very small and independent Republics,—so small that, in each of them, all the inhabitants can meet to manage their affairs,—there must, of necessity, be a monarchy ; and the monarch (whether one man ; or one man with Councillors ; or one man and Chambers ; or a committee of equals) is the centre of unity. That is the sovereign. Destroy that, and the unity is gone.

The accidents of this sovereign body, or centre of unity, do not affect this substantial truth. It is a second question whether the Sovereign shall be one man standing alone, or advised by Councillors ; or else a dozen selected men ; or a Representative Chamber. It is a still further question whether the sovereign shall be elected, or hereditary ; and so forth. These questions concern the accidents of government alone ; but not the form. What I say is, that a Republic is necessarily very small ; and that those so-called Republics, which are large, are despotisms.

That which is called "a limited monarchy," or "constitutional government," is only accidentally different. It means either that the person who wears the crown and holds the sceptre, is not really the sovereign ; because his powers are limited by the necessary participation of other parts of the sovereign body ; or that the King is supreme only in a limited sphere, while other matters

are not brought under his cognizance at all. For sovereignty always means independence, freedom, or unlimited authority throughout the whole sphere of sovereignty; and a limited monarchy denotes either that a crowned royalty, together with representative Chambers, is the Sovereign; or else that the crowned royalty enjoys only a limited sphere in which he is sovereign or supreme.

I have just answered Mazzini, by saying that his objection about a Republic does not touch the point. He, without knowing it, was striving to unite nations in a monarchy, under the despotism of a cabinet of foreign diplomatists. Here the Communists or Internationalists step forward and exclaim: "That is the reason why we insist that each village, each small town, each ward of a large town, should rule itself, and be a Republic or Commune." They intend that each of the present states of Europe shall be broken up into thousands of little Republics, and that all the inhabitants in each of them, shall decide, in the market-place, the matters which concern them. I ask them whether all these thousands of Republics are to be united in one? or to be free and independent,—that is: separate and perhaps warring atoms? "They are to be one; their action must be unified or harmonized; they are to be federated into one state; just as all the European states are to be joined in a federal union." This means that you are to have a federal authority over all these little Republics? "Yes; otherwise there cannot be a unity." Then those Republics will no longer be independent; they will no longer be free; they will no longer entirely rule themselves.

Now let us turn to the states of Europe. Our aim is to harmonize, or unite all nations; that is: to join them in one Federal Union. Let us not, I pray, confuse our-

selves with an ulterior question : viz. : what are to be the functions of the supreme Government—or, how many subjects its sphere of action shall embrace ? Let us put that ulterior question aside.

I have shown that, in order to unite nations, there must be a supreme government or centre of unity. The next point is, that the centre of unity must be one man, with absolute authority in all matters within his sphere of jurisdiction. For if we place many men in that position (as you do in your Extranational Cabinet), or if we limit the Authority of that one man, by requiring the concurrence of Councillors, or of a Chamber, then an antagonism may arise, and the parts of the Sovereignty may clash. One of two things must then follow : either (1) there must be a compromise, which is a sacrifice of truth and justice, and therefore fatal to our purpose ; or else (2) the unity will be gone ; interminable wars of factions will succeed, and the object, at which we are aiming, will be lost. A limitation of authority, either way, will prove fatal to our purpose. Therefore, there must be a supreme Authority. There must be one man as the Sovereign. Advised, indeed, he may be, by the best and wisest. Assisted he may be, by the learning and research of many. Yet the Supreme Authority and centre of unity must be one.

An objection may be raised : “The one Supreme Authority may abuse his power ; with the best intentions, one man is likely to err.” By “abusing his power,” you mean that he is likely to act unjustly ; to ignore the rights of others. In other words, you mean that probably he will be a tyrant. This part of your objection amounts to this : that the Sovereign will transgress the moral or Divine laws. The second limb of the objection,—“likely to err,”—denotes an error of judgment in

interpreting or applying the moral law. Now the primacy of the Head of the Church involves two things : His jurisdiction both in government and in doctrine. The assistance of the Holy Spirit attaches to his jurisdiction in all questions of faith and morals. This follows from the fact that our Lord established the Church as the Teacher of all nations, and promised that He would be with Her until the end of the World ; and that His Spirit should lead Her to all Truth ; and that the Gates of Hell should never prevail against Her. The Head of the Church, then, cannot err in interpreting or applying the moral law ; and the Church is, therefore, the Divine means provided to attain our end of federating nations in one, and making a unity where there is now antagonism.

## CONCLUDING CHAPTER.

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*Ab Aquilone, pandetur malum super omnes habitatores terrae.*

THE *modus operandi* of Russia may be gathered from the foregoing pages. It can be clearly seen in Oriental countries. In the East, her object is but carelessly veiled. In Western Europe, the varieties of opinions, the divergences of interests and feelings, enable Russia to use Protean pretences, and to flatter each man's passion ; so that she creates a body of partisans who are ignorant of her end and means. The control, which she thus obtains in every country, enables her to influence Cabinets, and make them her instruments in pursuit of her designs in the East. Russia can direct the affairs of Europe, because she has laboured to obtain, and knows how to use, men of greater ability than any that are arrayed against her ; while no opposition to Russia can be successful, until a counter-influence of equal or greater intellectual ability has been found. At present, the intellectual ability in her camp being greater than that of any mind in the other, she can keep Europe in continual unrest,—over making a confusion and leading it.

We have seen that Russia works by deception ; for she utters verbal formulas, disseminates neatly-turned phrases, and leads men captive by the fallacies which she adroitly instils. The aim of most nations is enjoyment. The end of Russia is advancement. On Universal Dominion all her thoughts are concentrated. In order to

dominate the anarchy, and lead the weakness (which is the necessary effect of mutual antagonisms), she excites State against State, interest against interest, and class against class, in other countries. If any Minister attempts to thwart her aims, she is sure to upset him,—“*le fera culbuter dans une heure*,” as was said by Napoleon III. In 1814, Talleyrand brought about the secret alliance between England, France, and Sweden ; and he was excluded from power, by a clause in the Treaty.

We have observed how Russia succeeds in deceiving every Government as to what is lawful ; how she misleads them even as to what is expedient for the nation over which they rule. The conquest of Poland was conceived in order to multiply the relations of Russia with the nations of the West. Napoleon I. saw, on the other hand, that Poland must be reconstituted, and Russia debarred by her from Europe. For Russian policy has ever been to destroy the powers of each neighbouring nation, in order to establish immediate relations with the nations beyond. Thus unceasingly she advances towards universal dominion.

In these latter days a scheme has come to light, which, for a long time, she has, in secret, been fostering,—to federate all states in one, by a central Cabinet ; to establish a permanent Congress of ambassadors, for the Extranational Government of Europe. In this Congress or Cabinet, her Envoys, from their greater knowledge, ability, and tact, are sure to gain a predominance over the others. To foil this attempt and preserve the liberties of Europe, we must find an organisation, and sufficient intellectual abilities to become a focus of resistance for every Government ; and possessed of sufficient influence to combine other states against this combination of Russia. Without this, Liberty, dear Liberty ! will

soon become an empty name, and the faded memory of an aim of braver generations of men.

I have mentioned the schism, or falling away, of the Eastern Church in A.D. 866. I have shown how the Czar, without entering the true Church, cut himself and his Church off from this schism. He did it in order to make a Church of his own, as an *instrumentum regni*, or political engine for the extension of his Empire. He thus constituted himself an absolute, autocratic head, both spiritual and temporal, whose simple will creates law, and decrees right, and defines doctrinal tenets ; and who claims for himself the adoration due to God alone. We are told that, after the “falling away,” the “man of sin shall be revealed . . . who opposeth and exalteth himself above God, . . . showing himself as if he were God.”\* This is the ground of the policy of Peter the Great and succeeding Czars. *Ab aquilone pandetur malum super omnes habitatores terræ.*† We know from sacred writ that such was the despotism of the Pharaohs, over the Egyptian Empire. Such it was in the Assyrian Empire. The crime of the absolute rulers of the Chaldæan Empire ‡ was that they “denied that the Most High ruleth over the kingdom of men,” and that “all power is from God.” The same was the principle of government in the Medo-Persian Empire : § “what the king decrees may not be altered,” and “no man may transgress it.” His word was law ; his word was the source of right, and of moral obligation,—infallible, irreformable. The Greek Empire rested on the same basis. From the Roman Empire of *Divus Cæsar*, all languages have borrowed the name of “Cæsarism.”

\* II. Thess. ii. 3, 4.

† Dan. iv. 22, 23.

‡ Jer. i. 11-14.

§ Dan. vi. 8.

The seventh, or antichristian Empire, is in the future. Of that we know nought but that the same character will distinguish it; and that *ab aquilone pandetur malum super OMNES habitatores terræ*. It will apparently be the old Greek Empire again,\* added to part of the Medo-Persian Empire,† and part of the Chaldean Empire;‡ and it “shall speak words against the Most High, and shall think himself able to change times and laws” ;§ and || “the king shall do according to his will, and he shall be lifted up, and shall magnify himself against God ; and he shall speak great things against the God of Gods ; and he shall rise up against all things.” Yet men will not see that it is so, for they will accept its insidious fallacies, and “strong delusions ;” they will allow themselves to be by it beguiled. “The wicked one shall deal wickedly, and none of the wicked shall understand ; but the learned shall understand.”¶ We learn, further, that all men and rulers (except those who are united in Christ’s Holy Church), shall worship this evil autocrat. The seventh Empire may not be a geographical limit, like the others. The “ten toes,” of the image in the dream, were distinct and yet combined or federated together by a common Extra-national Government, developing the principle of Cæsarism, which pervades the image as its life-blood.

Cæsarism, essentially, and of necessity, is Lawlessness. Lawlessness must be the principle of action, when an autocrat proclaims that there is no law, except his command ; and no right, except what he decrees ; and when he owns no limit or restraint on his will. This is an abjuration of the Divine Law over all, and of all autho-

\* “Like a Leopard.” Rev. xiii. 1, confer Dan. vii. 7, and viii.

† *Feet of a bear.*      ‡ “Mouth of a lion.”      § Dan. vii. 25.

|| Dan. xi. 36.

¶ Dan. xii. 10.

rity above the temporal Sovereign. Cæsar always shapes his acts by the motive of Peter the Great : "If religion should increase, the people will care more for the Chief Pastor than for the Chief Ruler ; and therefore I will make myself absolute Head of the Church, and Auto-cratic Ruler of the State." Cæsar must always be a tyrant, and his people slaves. For there must always be either internal or external repression. Men must either be accustomed to restrain themselves, by having the law of God in their hearts ; or else, they must be restrained by policemen's batons and cavalry charges, by chains, forced labour, and black dungeons.

A full perception and adequate consideration, of this Eastern Question, reduces every one to despair. Alas ! "There is no ruler in Israel !" there is no one to lead the minds, or guide the actions of nations. The war, which has just begun, threatens to light, in all Europe, a devouring flame, which will burn up many things now valued and idolized. In Asia, the advance of Russian armies in alliance with Persia, if unchecked by Tartar risings in their rear, will give the Czar a power supremely minatory to our Indian Empire. More serious still is the Russian alliance with the Secret Societies, who have undermined every throne, and lurk in the dark depths below every Government in Europe. No one knows where to turn. No one can devise a remedy, nor bethink him what to propose.

"Man's extremity is God's opportunity." That is a good old English maxim. Bossuet wrote the same thought in this expansive way : "*Quand Dieu veut faire voir qu'un ouvrage est tout de sa main, il réduit tout à l'impuissance et au désespoir, et puis il agit.*"

"When the pains are great, the child is born ;  
The darkest hour precedes the dawn ;"

—the dawn of triumph for that which is great, and good, and true. “God shakes all things in heaven and earth,” so that only those things which have an eternal foundation can remain. So He did with Pagan civilisation. It was shaken, and fell to pieces ; and that alone which was immovable, was left standing. In such a time, shams, hollowness, and unrealities crumble away ; and nothing can live except that which lives by Him who is “the Way, the Truth, and the Life.” Such a time, many feel to be near. Their feverish uncertainty, and anxious fear proclaim it. Every one asks his neighbour : What will happen next ? and both feel that the future is an unknown quantity,—as unknown as Derby’s wit or Salisbury’s wisdom. What we know is, that the Government has already committed us to the Russian project of an Extranational despotism over Europe ; and it seems as if nothing can save us except a war for Turkey, and the utter defeat of Russia. Yet a probable collision between France and Germany ; and perhaps Austrian arms against us in Turkey, may well make even a brave Minister tremble. Pity Lord Derby’s feelings !

That is the result of the “vigorous foreign policy of the Government.” Their vigour, hitherto, has indeed been like that of the grave-digger, whose action makes the pit deeper and broader. That vigour was first shown in 1875, when Mr. Disraeli, no doubt winking at the Sphinx, spent the money of the public, without authority, in buying shares in the French Suez-Canal Company. That gorgeous phantasmagoria of Eastern extravagance, was then explained as the adequate solution of the Eastern Question, which was then looming in the menacing future. That day-dream of Eastern magnificence, with orchestral accompaniments from “Israel in Egypt ;”—that vigorous policy of one member of the

Cabinet, certainly served to obliterate the memories of the slips and blunders of the rest. The dazzling splendour of that *coup de théâtre*, in the land where the children of Israel once served as slaves, certainly led the Cabinet, for a little, out of the fog, in which a political Vanguard disaster was impending. It dispelled the clouds, and dissipated the darkness, which had begun to gather round the Government. But it certainly was not the adequate solution of the Eastern Question.

It must, however, be a comfort for Lord Beaconsfield to reflect that, as the last agonies of England were approaching, he first prepared a bill to suppress Ritualism, and reduce the Anglican Church to anarchy, because some High Church curates had a yearning to amalgamate with the Church of the Czar and to own his jack-booted spiritual dominion; and secondly, that he pressed through the Legislature, by the dead weight of his majority, a Royal Titles Bill, to strike terror in a semi-barbarous Czar, and stop all further advance in his ambitious schemes; in which, indeed, he confessed that\* he was counselled by a school-girl and guided by an Almanack.†

He trusts to Treaties, and his policy is peace. That is good. Yet, in these days, Treaties are not regarded, and Protocols are broken as soon as signed. Only victories by bayonets and cannon-balls seem to bear any enduring fruits. Moreover, peace can never be real, nor an alliance lasting, until he shall have succeeded in removing, from the minds of men, those lawless principles, and immoral maxims which lead to war. War there always will be, as long as concupiscence and lust of power, are allowed, with impunity, to cast from them the bonds by which God's law has bound them.

Events never happen. They are done. Events are

\* March, 23, 1876.

† Whitaker's.

the effects of mind. It is a change of maxims which produces a new course of conduct. National sympathies, expressed, though they be, in the droning of platforms, and twaddle of quidnuncs, have nothing to do with that which is done. The secret will, and the veiled thoughts of a few men, unsuspected in their aims, and unknown as to their power, are the causes of every historical movement; while the opinions, which the Public think their own, are the means which those men create and use. There is a multitude throughout all nations, who form a secret band of diplomatists and warriors, and who are strictly united in carrying out the subversive aims which those men, in secret, devise.

They are united. Yet the Europe, which is seen, now consists of disunited nations, and States with repugnant aims. Their Governments acknowledge no common law or authority over all. The only principle which guides them, in their mutual relations, is their selfish interest, which they support by force; while the demands of that self-interest are always in proportion to the force they have at command. The question is: How to put some common law and authority over all, so as to harmonize their activities?

This was the character of the barbarian age. The result of it we see: an armed peace and vast expenditure. This proves that there is a deep and universal mistrust between governments;—a mistrust which reacts in producing that growing expenditure, and a cruel and unyielding Conscription. Mistrust! “When I come, thinkest thou that I shall find faith on earth? I tell you, nay!” If there be, at any time, a little lull in European affairs, that breathing-time of truce is due only to the fear which each state entertains, lest its interests should be injured by open war. It does not arise from

any respect for rights, or love of Justice. These rivalries and antagonisms, these mutual armaments, these costly animosities have become so intolerable that the Governments of Europe have sought to establish unity by creating an Extranational Government over them, to direct their aims, and harmonize their efforts.

They have invented a new kind of unity, instead of resorting to the unity of the Catholic Church, which they have abjured. The One, Catholic (or Universal) Church was instituted by our Lord to comprise all nations as integral parts ; each preserving its own liberty of action, but with a harmony of aims, and all subordinated to the eternal Law of God. That was the means, created by Christ, for saving Society, and the "healing of the Nations." It contains the source of harmony, the principle of unity, the supreme Government of a Society of nations : "That they all may be one!"

The Extranational Government, which you are seeking to institute, will crush all liberties, annihilate local varieties, and disregard the sanctity of Law and Treaties. Moreover, who is to call together your Sovereign Areopagus or Extranational Cabinet ? Who is to preside over it ? Who is to be charged with seeing to the execution of its decrees ? That person will be the true despot of the world, or Cæsar with a universal dominion.

That the possibility of maintaining things as they are, has passed away, I quite allow. That some centre of unity or supreme Government must be acknowledged, I admit. The question is : Which do you prefer,—the Church, or a Committee of Diplomatists ; Law, or lawlessness ; Liberty, or Cæsarism ? If we are to look to the Universal Church to harmonize or federate all nations of the earth, then we must find that Church under the

government of one, who is the principle of unity, the centre of action, the Supreme interpreter of the moral law.\* To him must be the appeal in the last resort; and from his decision there can be no further appeal. He must be accepted as right in his judgments; otherwise he would be a subordinate in his jurisdiction; he would not be supreme, and could not be the centre of unity and principle of cohesion between nations.

"But this sacred Republic (you will say) is as absolute as the Extranational Government which you fear!" Yes; it is a Theocracy. It is the Kingdom of Christ, who is the King of the whole earth;—*Rex regum et Dominus dominantium*; and who has left a Vice-Regent over His Church, to rule in His place, while it pleases Him to be invisible. Yet it is not absolute as the Extranational Government of Europe would be absolute. For it is limited and restrained by the eternal Laws of God; by the Law of Nature; and by the unchanging moral Laws of the Decalogue and Gospel; while its aims are determined by the End of man, and the Divine precepts of Perfection. The Extranational Government, on the other hand, is a Cæsarism, that knows no law above it. It carries out its own will by force, or by intrigue. It deceives; it enslaves.

These are the alternatives before us. If nations are to be federated in one; if peace is to become secure, we must have either the one or the other:—an Extranational Cabinet over Sovereigns,—a Cæsarism which acknowledges no law, and crushes nations, in abject slavery, under its will;—or else a Unity in the Church, where the Laws of God shall be upheld; where disputes

\* I am considering only the political ground, in allusion to the last chapter, and not the Pope's Infallibility, as Teacher of the Faith and Morals.

shall be decided by Justice and right, and the liberties of all peoples shall be secure. This is not visionary, nor impracticable. It is the promise of the Everlasting Son of God ; of Him who prayed "that there may be one fold, and one Shepherd;" of Him whose promise was : *Veritas liberabit*, the Truth shall make you free. It will not be yet. But of this I am certain : in no other way will swords be beaten into ploughshares, and spears into pruning-hooks. To the day when men shall seek this unity, we are bidden to look forward. For that we pray, when we ask that the Kingdom of the Eternal Ruler of the world may come.

Oh ! Great, Mighty, and Eternal Son of God ! King of the whole earth ; who doeth all that is done in the world ! Source of all Light, and Wisdom, and Knowledge, and Power ; Instructor of my boyhood, Protector of my youth, and Companion of my manhood ! O Healer of Nations ! The rulers of the earth desire unity, and the harmony of one supreme Authority. What men desire, Thou hast provided ! Thou hast created the one remedy for all the ills under which Europe now suffers. Yet the harmony of Thy Law, and the unity of the "one fold and one Shepherd," which Thou hast provided, men have refused. The edifice of nations is a ruin. Because the Corner-stone is rejected, the building crumbles. Thirsting for unity, and suffering pangs of mistrust, antagonisms, and war, men refuse the Well of Living Waters. They have hewed out other cisterns for themselves, which can never hold water. Let us pray that the unity of Thy Kingdom may quickly come, so that all nations may be one, as Thou and Thy ~~Baptists~~ are one.

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